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Democratization, decentralization, ethnic identity, federalism, rights of indigenous people 
and politics of consensus are often-used terms in the contemporary political debate in 
Nepal. Despite political consensus on federalism as the founding notion of the Interim 
Constitution (2007), political parties with Constituent Assembly have failed to forge 
consensus on the nature of federalism. This thesis analyzes the complexity of politics in 
multi-ethnic societies, and specifically, the rise of the ethnic politics and federalism 
agenda of political parties in Nepal. The lack of ethnic-specific regions makes the identity 
issue more complex given that the Maoist platform promised ethnic-specific regions in 
the country upon coming to power. The issue was made more complicated due to 
complex geopolitics, inter- and intra-party squabbles for power, and unhealthy party 
competition for political benefits and attention.  
This thesis also suggests that the solution to state restructuring rests on the 
political parties and their commitment to democratic procedures because federalization 
and democratization of the state are mutually supportive, a lesson learned from India and 
Spain. Only political understanding at the highest possible levels and compromise of 
political interests putting people and national agenda at the center can solve the present 
political impasse revolving around federalism. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Nepal’s attempts at producing a democratic constitution since the end of its 
Maoist-led civil war directed at the monarchy have been fruitless.1 The political parties 
and elite class involved in the state-restructuring process have failed to arrive at a 
common understanding, primarily surrounding the issue of state restructuring. This is due 
to differing perspectives on federalism. Consequently, the Constituent Assembly (CA) 
has failed to promulgate a constitution despite four years of effort, taking double the time 
agreed upon in the interim constitution. The Nepali people’s enthusiasm of finally 
achieving democracy after 50 years of democratic movements took a beating at the 
dissolution of the CA on May 28, 2012, and the decision to hold a fresh election for a 
new CA.2  
Although the leaders of the four major political parties, United Communist Party 
of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-Maoist), the Nepali Congress (NC), the United Marxist Leninist 
(UML), and the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), were able to compromise on 
many contentious issues, including the form of government, judicial and electoral 
systems, the negotiation between the ruling coalition and democratic opposition failed on 
the central issue regarding the design of the federal system.3 The question of whether the 
federal constitution should be based on national, ethnic, or linguistic identity, which 
                                                 
1 Two major attempts in 1950 and 1990 did not translate into meaningful enduring democracy. The 
later popular uprising in 2006 managed to declare Nepal a democratic federal republic by abolishing the 
monarchy, but the difficult quest for consolidation of democracy is still unfinished. See Pramod Kantha,  
“Nepal’s Protracted Democratization in Terms of Modes of Transition. “ Himalaya, the Journal of the 
Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies 28, no. 1 (2010): 59. 
2 Manesh Shrestha and Indrani Bagchi,  “Nepal Misses Statute Deadline, Polls in November,” Times of 
India, May 28, 2012, accessed  October 12, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-05-
28/south-asia/31876558_1_constituent-assembly-interim-constitution-nepali-congress  
3 There are four major political parties, as per their position in the dissolved CA, which are mainly 
considered driving political forces in the country. Maoist and Madhesi Front are in 15- party ruling 
coalition whereas, the other two, NC and CPN (UML) are in opposition. 
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would then shape the center state relations, led to the dissolution.4 Following the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of the extension of CA for the fifth time, Prime Minister 
Baburam Bhattarai called for a fresh election just before the CA was set to dissolve.5 This 
move took the country into a constitutional crisis and deeper polarization. The two oldest 
political parties, the NC and Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxists and Leninists) 
(CPN [UML]), immediately opposed the move and appealed to the president not to 
endorse the election date, arguing that a fresh election without political consensus is both 
unconstitutional and authoritarian. President Dr. Ram Baran Yadav was assigned the role 
of custodian under the interim constitution. He declared the Bhattarai-led government 
(UNCP-Maoist-led) caretaker and called for all parties to come together to form a 
national consensus government to end the constitutional and political impasse.6  
This thesis seeks to answer the question of why discussions around the federal 
design failed although all the political groups agreed on the idea of federalism. What 
were the main issues and why didn’t the CA members reach a compromise despite the 
fact that all the parties agreed to establish federalism after overthrowing almost two and 
half centuries of an active monarchy? How did they reach this impasse that led to the 
collapse of the CA? This thesis then seeks to explore the various notions of federalism 
among various parties in Nepal and what are these various notions. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Transitioning democracies usually suffer through a vulnerable phase while 
dealing with several facets of democratization. This includes state restructuring in 
accordance with democratic norms, values and practices, as well as the relations between 
the state and the center. Ethnicity often becomes a source for mobilization as the elite 
utilize identity politics to gain support. In Nepal, state structuring around ethnic lines 
                                                 
4 Prashant Jha,  “There is No Alternative to Elections: Baburam Bhattarai” Hindu, June 4, 2012, 
accessed October 20,2012, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/there-is-no-alternative-to-elections-
baburam-bhattarai/article3486846.ece    
5 “Into the Wild: Nepal without a Constitution,” Economist, May 28, 2012, accessed June 2, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/05/nepal-without-constitution  
6  “Prez Declares Government Caretaker,” My Republica, May 30,2012, accessed June 2, 2012, 
http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=35660  
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became one of the main points of contention in the CA in discussions around the federal 
design. This thesis will focus on what led to ethnic demands in Nepal by highlighting the 
role played by the elite in this process. The research will expand our understanding of the 
role of elites in democratic transitions. 
Nepal also has its own unique complexities because it is one of the most socially 
and economically backward areas of the world.7 Deprivation, disparity and 
discrimination in Nepal are appalling, which has a direct bearing on its social structure. In 
the course of its struggle for access to resources and opportunity, Nepal also has just 
come out from a decade-long insurgency in which ethnic and caste inequalities, the 
dominance of certain groups in state institutions, and socioeconomic disparities played a 
central role in motivating and sustaining support for the insurgents.8  
Nepal’s socioeconomic inequalities are deeply rooted and are difficult to address. 
Many indigenous people are facing social exclusion based on religion and language. 
According to Nepal South Asia Centre (NESAC),  “The caste system of Nepal is rooted 
in Hindu religion. On the other hand, the ethnic system is rooted in mutually exclusive 
origin myths, historical mutual seclusion and the occasional state intervention.”9 Groups 
such as sukumbasi (squatter) and kamaiya (bonded labor) are victims of poverty, whereas 
Dalits (lower caste), including women, are victims of poverty and social discrimination 
due to the fundamental practices of the Hindu religion.10 The caste system in the Indian 
sub-continent, Varna on the basis of ritual purity in Hinduism, is the oldest surviving 
social system in the world. Untouchability and exclusion of Dalits from social and 
religious spheres is the hallmark of caste-based discrimination.11 Discrimination based on 
                                                 
7 Kantha, “Nepal’s Protracted Democratization,” 60. 
8 S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates,” Spatial Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal,” Review of Development Economics 9, issue 1(2005): 121, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2005.00267.x.    
9 Government of Nepal, Ministry of Health and Population, Nepal Population Report 2011 
(Kathmandu: MOHP Population Division, 2011), 58, accessed September 14, 2012, 
http://www.mohp.gov.np/english/files/new_publications/Nepal%20Population%20Report%202011.pdf  
10 Harka Gurung, “Social Exclusion and Maoist Insurgency” (Paper presented at National Dialogue 
Conference on ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, Kathmandu,  January 19–20, 2005). 
11 Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Caste 
Discrimination and the Conflict in Nepal, (New York: NYU, 2005), 6, accessed June 18,2012, 
http://www.chrgj.org/docs/Missing%20Piece%20of%20the%20Puzzle.pdf. 
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religion, sex, caste, tribe, and ideological conviction is illegal by the Civil Rights Act of 
1955 but remains difficult to implement because of the elite structure. This structure is 
dominated by the upper castes: the Brahman and Chhetri.12 Surprisingly, one study says 
that about eighty five laws and 137 legal provisions remain discriminatory.13 Ethnicity 
based on social divisions becomes a tool for mobilization by the elite.  
Discussion on how to deal with such a social structure according to federal 
principles contributed to the collapse of CA. Nepal is at the crossroad of a political 
settlement to two decade-long conflict. Yet, disagreements over the design of federalism 
and an upsurge of ethnic politics may take the country deeper into turmoil. It is 
imperative for the political actors to negotiate and take a pragmatic approach towards the 
state restructuring approaches, putting ideological contentions and party or group 
interests aside.14 This study contributes to an understanding of the issues around state 
restructuring by exploring the problems and difficulties surrounding the federal structure 
as perceived by different political elites in the multi-ethnic settings of Nepal. This 
contribution will not only help scholars of South Asia but also those studying 
democratization and the role of the elite in this process.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The CA from 2010 sponsored several committees and reports on the issue of state 
restructuring in order to promote an understanding among political parties. These efforts, 
however, have failed to produce a majority agreement for the design of a federal 
structure. The question of how Nepal should be divided and what should be the 
relationship between the state and the center became a focal issue that could not be 
resolved despite major efforts. For instance, in 2010, a State Restructuring and Division 
of State Powers Committee (SRDSPC) approved the Maoist proposal of a federal 
                                                 
12 GSEA Study, Unequal Citizens: Nepal Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment, (Executive 
Summary), (Kathmandu: DFID, 2006), 7–11, accessed August 19, 2012,   
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/3177394-
1168615404141/NepalGSEASummaryReport-part1.pdf   
13 Ibid. 
14“Ideology vs. Inclusive Governance” My Republica, July 16, 2011, accessed September 8, 2012, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/ . 
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structure with fourteen states that was mostly based on ethnic identity. Dissent, however, 
came from Nepal’s oldest party and the second largest voting bloc, the NC, which has a 
history of seventy years of democratic struggle. With this disagreement, a two-thirds 
criterion was not met for passing the constitution, so it was sent to a constitutional 
committee for further consideration.15  
In November 2011, the State Restructuring Commission (SRC) also proposed a 
similar plan: ten ethnic states and one non-territorial state for scattered Dalits in January 
2012. Once again the NC-led minority group did not agree and instead proposed a six-
state solution with no definite ethnic criteria.16 The main leaders of CPN (UML), shifting 
from their earlier stance, opposed the idea of the formation of ethnic states and claimed 
that state restructuring along ethnic lines would lead the country into further conflict, 
possibly to disintegration. Intellectuals close to CPN (UML) stressed that ethnic-based 
states and one Madhesh (southern plain) province should not be allowed because they 
were not suited for a multi-ethnic society and were not an economically viable solution. 
Most of the UML leaders were in favor of states on the basis of cultural and historical 
contexts.17 
The most important concern around the division of states is identity and economic 
viability, but the balancing act over these two is difficult. Some experts suggest the 
political architects of the new federal Nepal ought to consider financial self-reliance.18 
Dr. Mahat, a former finance minister and NC leader, highlighted the economic prospects 
of federalism:  “To make each state autonomous, the states have to be divided based on 
the economic prospects so that each state gets some resources that help them in 
                                                 
15  NC, Plains Parties Differ on Issue of Federalism-Report,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, March 17, 
2012, accessed April 10,2012, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-283342780/nepali-congress-
plains-parties.html  
16  Nepal Constitutional Foundation, Constitutional Assembly Archives and Records: Constitutional 
Update, accessed December 18, 2012, http://www.ncf.org.np/ca-archives/ca_updates23.htm  
17 “UML Leaders Oppose Ethnic States: Ethnic State Means Disintegration” Kantipur, February 22, 
2012, accessed August 11, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/ . 
18 “States should be financially viable”, Himalayan Times, August 16, 2012, accessed September 11, 
2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/ . 
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generating income to run the states on its own.”19 Likewise, federalism is meaningless if 
its sovereign entities have economic disparity. A renowned economist, Dr. Chiranjibi 
Nepal says,  “The federal structure will not work in the case the central government has 
to provide aid to the states.”20  
With the abolition of the monarchy in 2008, many envisioned an end to the 
traditional social hierarchies shaped by caste, ethnicity, clan and religion. The problem 
today lies in the contradictory journey of the national politics of Nepal guided by party 
interests and diverse perceptions regarding state restructuring. The eventual objective is 
to make a peaceful transition. Political tradeoffs, however, are heading from demos to 
ethnos.21 How did this happen and how did the focus on the ethnic divisions bring the CA 
to an impasse? What are the specifics of these different notions of federalism and what is 
their background? In this study, reasons of failure of CA will be explored through the 
following hypothesis which has three aspects:  
First, as the monarchy in the 1980s deepened its control over the country and the 
democratic parties mainly NC remained an elite movement unable to resolve the social 
and economic issues, new opposing movements (the Maoists) took on an ethnic angle. 
The political conditions produced a new movement, which relied on ethnicity. Therefore, 
the debates in the CA were centered upon whether the identity-based structure or 
regional-competence-based structure would work in Nepal. This thesis will show that the 
Maoists combined ethnicity and economic justice issues to mobilize the people against 
the establishment. Meanwhile, the democratic parties that had existed for a while had not 
mobilized along ethnic lines. Thus, the CA, consisting of various anti-monarchy 
movements, came to the table with different ideas of what the democratic structure was 
going to be like. Maoists, Madhesis (people of Madhes) and several Janajati (indigenous-
nationalities) leaders from different political parties stand in support of identity-based 
states, while NC and UML, along with other parties, stand firm on the capability-based-
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21“Demos or Ethnos,” My Republica, July 5, 2012, accessed July 16, 2012, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/ . 
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structure.22 Interestingly, as pointed out previously, community in Nepal is characterized 
by multiple ethnicities with no single group as a majority in a particular geographical 
region. If a state with a single identity, based on demands by a few affluent ethnic groups, 
is formed, this may not satisfy all ethnic groups and may not be viable from an economic 
perspective.23  
Second, party politics guided by ideological legacy, unhealthy competition of 
political parties for benefits and secured vote-bank, and underestimation of ethnic 
diversity caused political stalemate on the issue of federalism. Major political players 
failed to rise above party political lines and transient priorities. This was possibly due to 
drought of rational political leadership. This thesis will also demonstrate that the lack of 
compromise among the leadership combined with a very difficult setting contributed to 
the collapse of the CA. 
Third, an influence of regional and international players has contributed to the 
failure of the CA when it came to the state restructuring issue. Given the Nepalese 
geopolitical situation, international players are also divided over the issue of federal 
structure. India is in favor of ethnic federalism because it is convinced that formation of 
Madhes province may address the Indian security concern in Nepal.24 People in Madhes, 
however, include several ethnic groups with a distinct language and culture, such as the 
Maithili (12.30%), Bhojpuri (7.53%), Tharu (5.86%), and Abadhi (2.47%).25 Since the 
late 1960s, a significant number of migrants from the northern hills also live in Madhes, 
therefore achieving a province for the Madhes is not so difficult to achieve. Since the 
European Union also gives high importance to the empowerment of marginalized ethnic 
groups, it believes in ethnic federalism. Meanwhile, China fears that Nepalese ethnic 
                                                 




25 According to census data, there are more than 20 languages based on mother tongue in Nepal. The 
Nepali language is the mother tongue of almost half of the population; whereas, Maithili is 12.3% of the 
total population, but Maithili speaking people are concentrated in central and eastern Terai (plain). See 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Population Monograph of Nepal 2003-Volume-1, (2003): 141, accessed 
December 7, 2012, http://cbs.gov.np/wp-
content/uploads/2012/Population/Monograph/Chapter%2004%20%20Language.pdf.  
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federalism will revitalize the “Free Tibet movement.” Regional and international 
influence complicates the issue and undermines the Nepalese leaderships’ ability to find 
consensus and mutual understandings.26 This study will also go over this aspect and show 
that various political interests are connected to external players and are influenced by 
them. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is no dearth of academic literature on democratic struggle, but the issue of 
federalism and states restructuring is relatively a new topic in Nepal. Therefore, literature 
dealing with these aspects in the Nepalese context is limited. Meanwhile, federalism in 
general is an important subject in political science; hence, there is an abundance of 
academic contributions by leading scholars. The literature on federalism provides the 
perspectives to understand transitions and global cases to illustrate which model may be 
best suited for Nepal. In this thesis, several articles and papers by contemporary scholars 
will be reviewed to understand the different perspectives and approaches to understand 
the issue of federal system in Nepal. First, the general theory on federalism will be 
examined to help understand the demand for federalism. Second, literature on ethnic 
demands for federalism in multi-ethnic societies will also be examined in order to 
understand what causes such demands and what some possibilities are. 
1. Various Federalist Designs and Their Contexts 
According to Ronald L. Watts, federal political order is constituted on the basis of 
combined shared rule and self-rule.27 Hence, federalism is the model of such order, 
including principles of the separation of power between member units and a common 
institution often called central government or authority.28 There are several forms of 
federal order, which range from federation of unions, confederations, leagues, 
                                                 
26 “The Unending Debate,” My Republica.  
27 Ronald L. Watts, “Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 1, no. 1 (1998): 120. 
28 Andreas Føllesdal, Federalism, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford: The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, spring 2010), accessed November 17, 2012, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/federalism/ . 
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decentralized unions to hybrid forms such as the present day European Union.29 A 
federation involves constitutionally well-established territorial divisions of power 
between province/state/canton and central government in which both levels of 
government are from direct election and accountable to people. A confederation, 
however, is an arrangement, where member units outweigh the center; hence, 
confederation is a much weaker form than federation.30 Similarly, symmetric and 
asymmetric federations mainly differ in terms of same or differential arrangements of 
power among member units.31 In multinational and multi-ethnic contexts, such as India, 
Canada or Spain, it is very difficult to hold a multi-national polity together. Thus, 
according to Alfred Stepan, multi-national democracies often resort to constitutionally 
asymmetrical forms of federalism assigning different competences (linguistic, cultural, 
ethnic, legal etc.) to different member units.32  
Robert P. Inman analyzes the performance ability of federal institutions based on 
three categories of “valued outcomes” among 73 countries including 13 well known 
established federal democracies and 11 federal dictatorships. 33 He argues that federal 
governance provides an institutional comparative advantage to enhance the transition to 
the democracy protecting the economic and civil rights of once ruling elites.34  
According to Alexander Hamilton, the splitting sovereignty between member unit 
and the center encouraged the citizens to enjoy their individual rights and control the 
abuse of authority at each level.35 But Madison and Hamilton made it clear that the power 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Watts, “Federalism Federal Political,” 121. 
31 Føllesdal, “Federalism,” section 1. 
32 Alfred Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model,” Journal of Democracy 10, 
no. 4 (1999): 31 
33 “Valued outcomes” for the comparative advantage of federal governance are economic efficiency, 
democratic participation and protection of personal rights and liberties. See Robert P. Inman, “Federalism’s 
Values and the Value of Federalism,” (Working Paper no. 13735, The National Bureau of Economic 
Research Cambridge, January 2008): 3–10, accessed November 10, 2012, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13735.  
34 Ibid., 29. 
35 Alexander Hamilton, “The Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection,” 
Federalist No. 9, accessed November 24, 2012, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_09.html . 
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of defense and interstate commerce should rest on central authority.36 Stepan argues,  
“Many of the new federations that could be created in the currently non-democratic parts 
of the world would probably be territorially based, multi-national and multi-lingual.”37 
Paul E. Peterson describes federalism with the help of two contrasting theories: 
functional theory and legislative theory. He prefers to call  “perspectives of federalism “ 
since it is in the initial developing stage of full-fazed theory.38 Functional theory focuses 
on domestic policy mainly for developmental and redistributive purposes. The primary 
responsibility of redistribution rests on the national government, whereas state and local 
governments should be responsible for development.39 Legislative theory, a less 
optimistic theory of federalism, is based on the assumption that policies are shaped by 
legislators as per their political needs. The elected representatives normally work for their 
own reelection. They always admire and get credit for good things and avoid the blame 
for bad things.40  
According to Graham Smith, the constitutional subordination of government and 
democratic practices determine the true federation.41 While describing the federation and 
its distinguishing characteristics, Burgess and Gagnon state that toleration, respect, 
compromise, bargaining and mutual recognition are its catchwords, and union with 
autonomy is its promise.42 Similarly, H. Meadwell views federalism as a significant 
source of institutional capacity that promotes group mobilization due to ensured access to 
resources. The accommodation and cooperation are the fundamentals for sustaining 
federal institution.43 P. King defines the federation as an institutional structure of 
                                                 
36 Føllesdal, “Federalism,” section 2. 
37 Stepan, “Federalism,” 32. 
38 Paul E. Peterson, The Price of Federalism (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 16. 
39 Ibid., 17–18. 
40 Ibid., 39–41. 
41 Graham Smith, Mapping the Federal Condition: Ideology Political Practice and Social Justice, ed. 
Graham Smith (New York: Longman, 1995), 8. 
42 M. Burgess and A. Gagnon, Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and 
Future Directions (London: Harvester, 1993), 7. 
43 H. Meadwell, “Transitions to Independence and Ethnic Nationalist Mobilization,” in Politics and 
Rationality ed. W. Booth, P. James and H. Meadwell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 200. 
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sovereign state. This incorporates all its units in a central decision-making process on the 
basis of constitutional authority.44 Graham Smith argues,  “The federal idea, in short, is 
generally conceived as a compromise, conveyed by the image of checks and balances 
between unity and diversity, autonomy and sovereignty, the national and regional.”45 
2. Multiethnic Designs 
Federalism in multi-ethnic societies, according to W. Livingston, can be said to be a 
form of functionalism, pluralism, or some form of corporatism, but not federalism.46 
Federalism, however, is conceived as non-territorial, particularly in the context of 
geographically dispersed ethnic communities. Austro-Marxists, Karl Renner and Otto 
Bauer—to secure the cultural rights of scattered ethnic groups—floor the idea of dispersed 
ethnic reconciliation by means of non-territorial based institution, with non-territorial form of 
political representation.47 
Graham Smith describes inter-ethno regional tensions, in which provincial elites seek 
redefinition of regional boundaries, from four perspectives: cultural self-preservation, 
rectificatory justice, uneven development and the practices of federation.48 In the issue of 
social conflict and success of federalism, Burgess and Gagnon state,  “the success of federal 
system is not to be measured in terms of elimination of social conflicts but instead in their 
capacity to regulate and manage such conflicts.”49 Therefore, a federation is not a tool to 
bridge inter-ethnic gap, but it is a territorial approach of social control promoting 
coexistence and harmony among different ethnic and regional groups.50  
                                                 
44 P. King, Federalism and Federation (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 77. 
45 Smith, Mapping the Federal, 5. 
46 W. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 2. 
47 Smith, Mapping the Federal, 6. 
48 Cultural self-preservation perspective can be linked to fear of wearing-away of cultural values and 
identity in which secessionist elites grossly perceive that their national culture is at grave risk. Rectificatory 
justice can be linked to secessionist demand to create sovereign state claiming that federation was forced 
incorporation. The level of inter-regional and inter-governmental conflicts is the function of political 
economy associated with distribution of wealth and resources. The institutional procedures and policies to 
manage and regulate ethno-regional tension are vital for the success of federal system. See Smith, Mapping 
the Federal, 10–13. 
49 Burgess and Gagnon, Comparative Federalism, 18. 
50 Smith, Mapping the Federal, 13. 
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According to Graham Smith, a federation upholds the minority interests against 
the tyranny of the majority by constraining centralized executive power through 
territorial institutional support often guaranteed in the constitution. Federalism, in the 
context of multi-ethnic federation, where polity is structured along multi-ethnic lines, 
may suffer from tyranny by a minority that acts as a hindrance to freedom of all. The core 
issues of federalism in multi-ethnic societies, according to Smith, are how to ensure the 
right to be different and to be a full citizen at the same time.51  
The sovereignty and military capacity fall on the jurisdiction of national government 
because the notion of dual sovereignty and shared military capacity is not significant in 
modern federalism. Instead, according to Paul E. Peterson, federalism means government 
headed by elected political leaders in each level that enjoy the full exercise of their own 
financial arrangements for taxing and spending.52 He outlines two fundamental features in 
federalism. First, every government, irrespective of level, needs to be made up of elected 
leaders by the people to avoid the sentiment that the government is an agent of somebody 
else. Second, the confirming authority at each level rests with the people.53  
There is a symbiotic relationship between federalism and democracy in terms of 
institutional arrangements and management of ethnic diversity and growing aspirations. 
Considering intrinsic problems of ethnic federalism, chain reactions related to state demands 
from more and more ethnic groups and danger of continued ethnic tension, Lovise Aalen and 
Magnus Hatlebakk have recommended CA for Nepal.54 This particularly so that the political 
elites must be responsible for looking into inclusive democracy, the careful balance of rights 
in federal units with strong legitimate political center, and to be flexible with enough 
transparency when creating federal units/sub-units.55 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 16–22. 
52 Peterson, The Price of Federalism, 10. 
53 Ibid., 14. 
54 Lovise Aalen and Magnus Hatlebakk, Ethnic and Fiscal Federalism in Nepal, Bergen: Chr. 
Michelsen Institute  (2008): 5, http://issuu.com/cmi-norway/docs/3082-ethnic-and-fiscal-federalism-in-
nepal/1 
55 Ibid., 6. 
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Democratic practices based on concept of sovereign people and inclusive 
democracy, perhaps, is the only way out so that balance rights in federal units and strong 
with flexible enough political center ensure the future of federalism in the country with 
ethnic diversity. Thus, federalism in multi-ethnic societies with geographically dispersed 
ethnic communities, so as in the case of Nepal, is very tricky to adopt balancing between 
the rule of majority and adequate rights to the minority at the same time. 
3. Possibility of Federalism in Nepal 
In Nepal, there is a wide spread misconception among the traditional political 
parties that Nepal cannot accommodate a federal system effectively due to its 
geographical and demographical characteristics. Interestingly, Lal Babu Yadav argues 
Nepal is a larger geographical area and has a population more than two successful federal 
countries, Switzerland and Belgium, and these cases possess several similarities in terms 
of diversity of cultural and linguistic groups.56  
Since the issue of inclusion and socioeconomic disparity among various deprived 
ethnic and backward indigenous groups in Nepal surfaced as the root cause of a decade 
long conflict, some argue that the federal structure establishes the foundation to resolve 
such conflicts specially related to identity-based issues and promotes communal 
harmony. The basic problem in Nepal, according to Lal Babu Yadav,  lies in the status 
and recognition of all ethnic, linguistic, and regional groups. This includes equal access 
to state machineries and resources.57 In fact, federal structure is in need of time that 
ensures the reasonable participation of the target population in both the development and 
in the democratic political process.  
Most of the political parties are facing intense pressure from the party cadres in 
support of identity-based federalism that makes backtracking on federalism politically 
unworkable and disastrous. Several leaders from the minority ethnic and regionalist 
backgrounds are already suspicious of major political parties and label their commitment 
                                                 
56 Lal Babu Yadav, “Need and Basis for Federalism,” Weekly Telegraph, January 9, 2008, accessed 




to federalism as lip service.58 An ICG report acknowledges federalism and proportional 
representation as a major step to deal with deep-rooted discrimination on the basis of 
caste, ethnicity, gender, religion and regional identity. It doubts, however, complete 
inclusion. This is due to the patronage-based nature of the state and the likely exploitation 
of grass root people by their respective ethnic, regional and Dalit elites.59  
According to G. B. Thapa and J. Sharma, symmetrical federalism with the right to 
internal self-determination having federal provinces with identical powers is conducive to 
stabilizing and consolidating the democracy in Nepal.60 Federalism is a key proposition 
of the Nepalese constitution-making process to overcome the challenges posed from the 
historical and complex structural inheritance of the society. Thapa and Sharma believe in 
a system of progressive or collaborative federalism with broad responsibility and 
accountability of the Nepalese political community. Consequently, it makes the system 
more inclusive in appearance, representative in practice and responsive in conduct. They 
clearly observe, however, that there is a drought of strategic or rational political 
leadership willing to struggle for democratic goals allowing variation in conceptions and 
formulation of politics for rational transformation.61  
The main public debate, an issue hard to settle, is about how to frame the federal 
structure to ensure that the people are well represented. This is a huge undertaking of 
political elites accommodating a variety of ideas and concerns of local peoples.62 
Sheppard uses the term New Nepal63 in the context of the declaration of Nepal as a 
                                                 
58 ICG, Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism, Asia Report No. 199, (January 2011), i. 
59 Ibid., 26. 
60 G. B. Thapa and J. Sharma, “The Democratic Deficit and Federalism in Nepal: Is It Cure or Part of 
the Problem,” Lex Localis- Journal of Local Self-Government 9, no. 2(2011): 43. 
61 Strategic leadership means that leadership who is capable to take difficult choices with clear 
priorities, balancing diverse demands and views to resolve conflict through arbitration and persuasion. 
Rational leadership is that leadership who maximizes the net gains through deliberate decision-making 
process. See Thapa and Sharma, “The Democratic Deficit,” 45–50. 
62 Julieclaire Sheppard, “Federalism in Nepal: A Tharu Perspective,” Contribution to Nepalese Studies 
36, no. 2 (2009): 214. 
63 The term “New Nepal” became quite popular with the success of People’s Movement (Jana-
Andolan) - II in 2006. This term envisages the meaningful inclusion of all disadvantaged groups and 
members, as well as prosperous members of the society in the spirit of democratic and all-round 
socioeconomic development of Nepal. 
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Federal Democratic Republic in the Interim Constitution 2007. He stresses the 
requirement of some common unifying factor to execute federalism by breaking the 
country actually into smaller units. This in itself is an incredibly complicated issue to 
ensure that the government can be accessed down to the grass root people. 64  
According to Aalen and Hatlebakk, identity and the resources to sustain federal 
structures should be the two overriding bases for federalism. Given the present ground 
reality of the regional economic structure of Nepal, twelve districts out of seventy five 
districts contribute 94% of the government’s revenue. There is a need for a strong 
national government to redistribute financial resources equally and reasonably to all 
states.65 A successful and inclusive local democracy is needed to promote the interests of 
the minorities within all federal states. This is even after the final partition of the states 
and a strong national government to distribute financial and natural resources equally 
even to poorer states.66 
The exclusion and inequality among ethnic groups and the failure of 
democratization are two derivatives of a long history of authoritarian rule. This promotes 
the domination of the CHHEM in Nepal despite its being the oldest state in south Asia.67 
Mahendra Lawoti gives credit to the decade of 1992-2002, a period of democratic regime 
under multi-party democracy, than to the collective efforts of Maoist, political parties and 
marginalized groups at the critical juncture in 2006. According to him, democratic 
openness and practices during that decade set the conditions for inclusive reforms 
sensitizing the larger segment of society and political parties toward more inclusive polity 
and transitions.68 
                                                 
64 Sheppard, “Federalism in Nepal,” 217. 
65 Aalen and  Hatlebakk, “Ethnic and Fiscal Federalism,” 7. 
66 Ibid., 9. 
67 CHHEM stands for Caste, Hill, Hindu, Elites, and Males. High castes put exclusionary system and 
practices in place against many ethnic, castes, religious and linguistic groups along with the consolidation 
of state. See Mahendra Lawoti, “Introduction to Special Section: Ethnicity, Exclusion and Democracy in 
Nepal,” Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies 28, no. 1 (2010): 9. 
68 Ibid., 14. 
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Khanal in  “Federalism in Nepal: Management and Implementation, “ terms the 
present political chaos and internal tensions as an unprecedented phase of historic 
transition that is heading probably to inclusive multi-party democracy along with the 
promulgation of a federal constitution.69 Arguing the efficiency and effectiveness of a 
federal system greatly depends on political players and their personal conviction, 
behavior and vision to make the system beneficial for people. Khanal states,  “The first 
priority today has to be the creation of a truly federal, democratic, republican political 
system and to ensure its development rising above the party political lines and transient 
priorities. This task cannot be accomplished by limiting oneself to a certain political ism 
or anti-ism.”70  
Therefore, given the growing pressure of identity-based federalism from ethnic 
communities and federalism being the main agenda of Nepal’s constitution making 
process, the careful and wise decisions by political players are crucial to take the country 
forward from present political crisis. Two factors—ethnic identity and resources to 
sustain the federal units—need to be considered while restructuring the country in federal 
system. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This research will examine the conflicting approaches by different political parties 
and other concerned power centers about the issue of federal structure, which led to the 
failure of CA. Historical material and descriptive analysis of Nepalese democratization 
and state-building along with illustrative case studies from India and Spain on democratic 
federalism will be used to draw lessons and parallels for a smooth transition of the 
political deadlock. The perceptions and positions of major political parties, civil society, 
and ethnic groups about the issue of federalism will be analytically discussed. Their 
possible contributions to settle the dispute will also be analyzed. The focus will especially 
be on the divergent positions of parties and concern groups on federalism based on ethnic 
identity. Then, a logical conclusion will be derived with possible recommendations on the 
                                                 
69 Krishna Khanal, Federalism in Nepal: Management and Implementation, (Kathmandu: National 
Peace Campaign, 2009), 6. 
70 Ibid., 6–7. 
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present political impasse of federalism. This will be in light of a comprehensive study of 
Nepal’s historical settings for democracy and state restructuring and an analytical study 
of the federal systems of Spain and India.  
The research will be based on primary and secondary sources. The primary 
sources are limited to official documents, such as reports, agreements, press release, etc. 
released by government, parties or agencies and other reputable national and international 
organizations. The secondary sources consist of books, journals, articles, research papers 
and other pertinent materials available on internet/websites. Since the political situation is 
very fluid and difficult to predict in Nepal, and many stories and facts are unfolding, all 
those possible materials/sources which may available in the due course of research are 
incorporated.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is structured as follows: the thesis consists of five chapters. In the 
introduction, general background information of the democratization process in Nepal is 
provided along with a brief overview about the failure of CA to formulate the 
constitution. This is mainly based on the issue of federalism arising from ethnicity. 
Chapter II is a historical account of democracy and state structure. This includes the 
people’s mobilization in Nepal during the pre-1990 and post 1990 periods, with primary 
focus on Nepal’s transition from a centralized authoritarian rule to a proposed democratic 
federal republic. Chapter III will be the main part of the thesis and covers the different 
political parties and other stakeholders, along with their conflicting perceptions, positions 
and contributions on the issue of federalism and ethnic identity. There is an examination 
of how they reached these perspectives. This chapter will provide comprehensive insights 
on the political players, civil society, regional and international players. It will also 
provide their contributions towards national reconciliation with the primary focus on the 
role of the political elites and the ground of common understanding for a forward-looking 
settlement. In Chapter IV, the cases of India and Spain are compared from the perspective 
of federal structure in a multi-ethnic society. There will be an attempt to derive some 
parallels and lessons. These can be fruitful to arrive at a common understanding in the 
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fragmented political context of Nepal. In the concluding chapter, all the findings and 
derived thoughts will be gathered to discuss the reasons of the collapse of CA and the 
possible options for a federal structure. Some policy recommendations to solve the issue 
of federalism and ethnic identity are also provided.  
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II. HISTORICAL SETTINGS: CASTE, ETHNICITY, 
DISCRIMINATION, IDENTITY POLITICS AND NEPAL’S 
TRANSITION TO FEDERAL SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal entered the democratic era in 2008 after 240 years of the Shah Dynasty. 
There was a gradual shift from an authoritarian to a democratic system, as it progressed 
from the party-less Panchayat system to a multi-party democracy and to the current 
democratic federal republic. The current phase of democratization began when political 
compromise was reached in 1990 between political parties and the monarchy. It lasted 
about a decade and a half. This led to a rise of a popular movement in 2006, after which 
Nepal was declared a Federal Democratic Republic with the promulgation of an interim 
constitution. Yet the struggle to achieve federalism faces many tough issues. The primary 
issue is Nepal’s political diversity underlined by its ethnic, caste, geographical and 
economic diversities. 
The issues surrounding establishing federalism and the design of state structuring 
cannot be understood without detailed knowledge of Nepal’s political history, social 
structures, and socioeconomic challenges. The people’s perceptions and grievances 
against the state, related to their ethnic, cultural and religious rights, determine the 
political negotiations and possible national reconciliation. This chapter will focus on 
political developments leading to the CA election in 2008 and the complexities involved 
in determining the federal structure. It describes the issues of ethnicity and identity 
politics that emerged during the Maoist people’s war. The purpose of this chapter is not 
simply to narrate history, but to identify the class, caste and ethnicity of those who were 
historically, excluded from the national main stream, and then were mobilized by the 
Maoists through identity politics. 
B. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL JOURNEY TO 
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTION 
Nepal had been ruled by the Shah Kings since the unification of the country by 
King Prithivi Narayan Shah in 1768. In 1856, the country went under Rana dynasty’s 
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oligarchical rule for 103 years as result of a military coup staged by Jung Bahadur Rana. 
During the Rana regime, Rana Prime Ministers monopolized the executive powers 
through royal decree (Lal Mohar).71 Following the anti-British movement in South Asia 
which culminated with a democratic movement in India, the Nepalese middle class and 
some political elites also launched a democratic struggle and established a constitutional 
democratic state in 1950. It did not last long due to the competition of various institutions 
and elites. King Mahendra took power in 1960 backed by the military, dismissing the 
democratically elected government of the Nepali Congress (NC).72 He banned political 
parties and introduced the party-less Panchayat system that lasted for three decades until 
1989. He ruled the country for a decade and a half and died in 1972. He tried to keep the 
middle and lower classes in confidence and initiated a number of reforms. This included 
distributive land reforms in 1964 and the New Civil Code in 1963.73 
Political parties and critical masses of civil society continued their campaign for 
democracy and civil liberty during the Panchayat regime. As a result of domestic and 
international pressure from some democratic nations, King Birendra announced the 
national referendum over the Panchayat system in 1980. Although a referendum resulted 
in the rejection of a multi-party democracy by a thin margin, it created a public space for 
the discussion of democracy among the political elites, civil society and the people as a 
whole.74 It led to the collaboration of banned political parties with reformist, civil-society 
organizations (such as Nepal Bhasa Manka Khala), student and professional associations. 
Despite their opposing ideologies, the NC and a number of communist parties united 
under the Left Front and forged a working unity to establish the common goal of 
democracy.75  
A multi-party democracy was established in 1990 through the joint struggle of the 
NC, United Left Front, and several civil society groups. The political parties in national 
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politics and successive governments, however, were unable to consolidate and 
institutionalize their democratic achievements. According to John Whelpton, political 
parties could not rise above narrow, patrimonial party politics. Rather, they indulged in 
power games, sidelining the national agenda and the people’s mandate.76 Instead of 
consolidating democracy and the overall development of the country, the first phase of 
democratic politics created a setting conducive for the next series of conflicts. Dev Raj 
Dahal argues,  “Inter-and intra-party squabbles, neglect of the mid hills, widening urban-
rural disparity, social discrimination, economic decline, ethno-territorial assertiveness, 
and mal-governance of the ruling parties provided the structural and proxy causes of 
conflict and inspired the CPN (Maoist) to launch an armed insurgency –people’s war in 
13 February 1996.”77  
During a decade-long Maoist insurgency, which ended in 2006, the country 
experienced political instability. This included a royal massacre in 2001, an emergency 
rule to suppress the Maoists and direct rule by King Gyanendra. This brought an end to 
any democratic achievements of the 1990s. The opposition in 2005 formed an alliance of 
Seven Parties (SPA) against the autocratic rule of King Gyanendra. With the continuing, 
adamant position of the King, the SPA approached Maoists for a negotiated agreement 
for an end to conflict and the establishment of democracy. On November 22, 2005, a 
twelve-point agreement was signed between the SPA and CPN (Maoists) in Delhi under 
the facilitation of the Indian government. A joint movement of SPA and Maoists, which 
was the fusion of a Maoist rural insurgency and an urban protest by democratic parties, 
ended the King’s direct rule. The King agreed on restoration of the House of 
Representatives in April 24, 2006. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement-2006 (CPA) 
between the government and Maoists brought an end to the Maoist people’s war, which 
had cost the lives of more than 13,000 people since 1996. The SPA and UCPN (Maoist) 
failed to maintain the politics of consensus leading to the failure of the CA. They 
succeeded, though, in materializing CPA, formulating the interim constitution, managing 
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combatants and arms, and electing the CA. The UCPN (Maoist) emerged as the largest 
political actor in the CA, but they were short of a majority. A two-thirds majority is 
needed to form a government and promulgate a constitution according to the interim 
constitution. The NC showed reluctance to hand over its power. After negotiation, in 
2008, they all agreed to amend the interim constitution so that a president, vice president 
and speaker could be elected, and a government could be formed with a simple majority. 
This was the end of consensus politics as was envisioned in the interim constitution.78  
C. CLASS, CASTE AND ETHNICITY IN NEPAL 
Nepal is a homeland of two major racial groups, Tibeto-Burmans and Indo-
Aryans. They can be further divided into various subgroups. The Tibeto-Burman group is 
the largest population group, and they mainly reside in hills and high mountains in the 
form of various tribal communities. People with a Tibeto-Burman outlook speak an Indo-
European language live in the Terai region, and are considered indigenous people (IP). 
The second racial group, the Indo-Aryan people, can be split into two distinct subgroups. 
First, the Hill Indo-Aryan subgroup has a majority of high caste-Brahman Chhetri (BC) 
and a nominal number of service castes/Dalits. Second, the Indo-Aryans, residents of the 
Terai belt, are relatively recent migrants from India. Finally, the Newars, possibly of 
Tibeto-Burman and Indo-Aryan descent, are the original people of the Kathmandu 
valley.79  
The broad picture of the Nepalese ethnic distribution can be analyzed in terms of 
specialization in ecological zones based on a relationship among habitation zone, altitude, 
and socio-cultural proximity (see Figure 1). There are three ecological zones 
characterized by predominant ethnicity in Nepal: the northern mountain zone is 
dominated by the Tibetan culture and dialect; the middle hill zone is inhabited by groups 
who claim distinctive Nepalese, including some indigenous groups; the valleys are 
occupied by parbatiya (Hill BC); and the southern lowland is inhabited by Hindu, 
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Muslim and some IPs, such as Tharu.80 Gerald Berreman describes the people inhabiting 
the middle altitude hill zones as  “the distinctively Nepalese people who combine 
Tibetan, Indian and probably certain aboriginal elements common to neither and deriving 
from cultures that may have been preceded by both.”81  
This model oversimplifies the diverse ethnic picture of Nepal. Symbiotic 
interdependency among various groups in a region includes economic, ecological and 
social adaptations as the main features of Nepalese ethnicity.82 Nancy E. Levine, who 
studied the ethnicity and caste system in Humla (the northern district of Nepal), 
concludes that, in the case of Nepal, the state is responsible for creating caste hierarchy 
and, thereby, recognition of ethnic identities.83 
 
Figure 1.  Ethnic Distribution in Nepal (from 
http://www.planetware.com/i/map/NEP/nepal-ethnic-groups-map.jpg ) 
No ethnic groups are characterized by common territories and the embrace of 
political institutions. There are no tribes in Nepal.84 Heterogeneity within and between 
                                                 
80 Nancy E. Levine, “Caste, State and Ethnic Boundaries in Nepal,” Journal of Asian Studies, 46, no. 
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the main ethnic groups is prevalent. This makes the ethnic landscape of Nepal more 
complex (see Appendix). For instance, the Tamang of the western region are viewed as a 
single group, but they distinguish themselves as Sherpa, Gle, and Tamang. Similarly, 
state policies and available economic benefits also influence the ethnic groups and their 
interrelations. For instance, the Tamang link themselves to the Sherpa due to the 
opportunity of lucrative employment as trekking guides.85 Likewise, people from the 
mid-hills group used ethnic identity and caste per demand to increase the probability of 
recruitment into foreign armies (Gurkha Soldiers).86  
According to the 2001 census, there are 103 social groups listed in Nepal. No 
single group is predominant. The population can be broadly categorized into three 
groups: caste group 57.5%, Janajatis 37.2%, religious minorities 4.3% and others 1%.87 
The Nepal living standard survey of 2003/04 revealed that almost 31% of the people are 
struggling under the poverty line. IPs, Muslims, Dalits, and people living in the hills have 
a higher share of the population under the poverty line. For instance, more than half of 
the Dalit population is under the poverty line.88 The Parbatya castes BC, which 
constitutes 31% of the Nepalese population, are the most politically and socially 
dominant group due to a caste-based social structure. They have ruled Nepal as a Hindu 
kingdom since its establishment in the1700s.89 Major caste /ethnic groups are shown in 
Figure 2. 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 74–75. 
86 John T. Hitchcock, “Sub-Tribes in the Magar Community in Nepal,” Asian Survey 5, no. 4 (1965): 
208. 
87 P. Ranjan, Nepalese Minority Groups: Struggle for Identity and Representation, (Kathmandu: 
Support Nepal, 2009), 5–8. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Parbatya means a Nepali-speaking Hindu of the hill region. Madhesi high caste and Newar are 
considered non-parbatya and not included in dominant group though they are a privileged group in 
Nepalese society. The 2001 Census counts Parbatya BCs as 30.8%, including Thakuri and Sanyasi. See 
Ranjan, Nepalese Minority, 6. 
 25
 
Figure 2.  Ethnic/Caste in Nepal (from http://ethinicgroupsnp. 
blogspot.com/2010_07_01_archive.html) 
1. National Caste System and Social Status  
The Nepalese ethnic model is characterized by diversity, but with limited ethnic 
contrasts between Hindu and Buddhist, tribe and caste, and mountain, middle hill and 
lowland Terai. Nepalese ethnic relations, peculiar in terms of coexistence and mutual 
dependency, are more affected by interaction, interdependence and mobility than by 
contrast with each other. The present ethnic mix and complexity in Nepal is an obvious 
outcome of deliberate attempts by the state to manage the diverse ethnic landscape and 
the people’s response to it.90 Nancy E. Levine states that “ethnic relations today are the 
outcome of a historical process of accommodation between regional ethnic systems and 
the policies of the centralizing state.”91 After the territorial unification of Nepal, there 
was a necessity of time for the integration of diverse Nepalese societies to strengthen the 
state. Thus, state created a national caste system, which was the theme of the Muluki Ain 
(civil code) of 1854, to provide a space for each group per the ruler’s perceived notion 
about caste.92 
                                                 
90 Levine, “Caste, State and Ethnic,” 71–72. 
91 Ibid., 71. 
92 Nepalese society consisted of three distinct caste hierarchies: Parbatiya, Newar, and Terai caste 
system. These are considered historically autonomous and regionally influential. Tibeto-Burman-speaking 
communities in remote places and Tibetan ethnicity along the northern border also existed that further 
diversified the Nepalese ethnic landscape. For further details, see Andras Hofer, The Caste Hierarchy and 
the State in Nepal: A study of the Muluki Ain of 1854  (Innsbruck: Universitatsverlag Wagner, 1979),  
43–46.  
 26
The provision of legislation and different punishments based on caste tried to take 
care of the issue of commensality and physical contact among different social groups. 
State economic policies were also greatly discriminatory. Differentiated land tenures and 
job/trade rights were in place for specific caste ranking and ethnicity. This unequal 
treatment contributed to greater political and economic disparity. As a result, some 
people closed the ranks to retain benefits within a small group; whereas others merged to 
increase the size of the group so that they could claim more ethnic privileges. This kind 
of strategy perpetuated itself and influenced the people’s perceptions regarding benefits 
and significance of ethnic identity.93 
The basic aim of the national caste system was structural integration of the 
country, substituting for the existing regional systems. The goal was probably to 
legitimize the separate political identity of the state.94 The customary laws and traditions 
were so deeply rooted that legislation turned to a process of mutual accommodation to 
address the preservation of traditional customs and to make the law beneficial to Nepal’s 
diverse ethnic groups.95 The Nepalese caste system granted middle rank to the non-Hindu 
groups residing in the hills and mountains. This is quite a different practice than the 
Indian caste system. It is a great example of mutual accommodation despite the socio-
cultural variance from Hindu or Sanskrit ideals. Those ethnic groups of hills and 
mountains actually acquired the status well above the Hindu service caste and just below 
the high ranks of the Terai and Newar caste. Nancy E. Levine argues,  “Caste was 
particularly effective in integrating such diverse groups because it is, at base, an 
incorporative model for ethnicity.”96 The code and other government policies, however, 
strengthened Hindu dominance and marginalized non-Hindu groups. There were two 
important effects of the legal code. First, non-Hindu groups, except for Tibetan speakers, 
accepted the state definition of caste. Second, middle-hill peoples were acculturated and 
sanskritized.97  
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In today’s view, the caste system and legal code was discriminatory as the fines 
and punishment were different for different castes of victims and perpetrators. Lower 
castes and non-Hindus could be enslaved for certain crimes; whereas higher ranks were at 
times exempted from such punishment or the punishment was limited to a downgrade in 
caste. This is the main reason that every group, irrespective of Hindu and non-Hindu 
groups, tried to improve their status in the law. For instance, the Khas upgraded or 
changed their title to Chhetri. Now addressing Chhetri as Khas is considered an insult.98  
2. People, Language and Migration 
There is no distinction between ethnic group and caste in colloquial Nepali, as Jat 
is used for both to qualify as a descent group. The Parbatiya—people of the mountains—
are more dominant in Nepalese culture and, consequently, in state politics. The language 
spoken by parbatiyas is called Nepali. This is one of the Indo-Aryan languages and quite 
close to Hindi. This is because there are common technical terms as they were borrowed 
directly from Sanskrit. Since its script and certain words are similar to Hindi, the 
relationship of Nepali to Hindi is almost the same as Spanish to Italian. It is believed that 
the Khasas, the native speakers of the present day Nepali language, were the first people 
to migrate around 1000 BC to the western Himalayas of Nepal from western Eurasia or 
the Iranian plateau. After 1000 AD, a small number of Rajputs fled to the hills and joined 
the Khasas as a result of Muslim invaders. By late medieval times, Thakuries were ruling 
the central and western part of Nepal and claiming themselves as Rajput descendents.99 
The arrival and origin of hill ethnic groups is not certain. John Whelpton states,  “Many, 
though not all, of the other ethnic groups in the Nepal hills were there before the Khasas, 
but it is difficult to date their arrival…. Nepalese from many different ethnic groups will 
be at least partly descended from those earliest inhabitants.”100  
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A dialect spoken by the Kusundas of Mahabharat hill is considered the oldest 
linguistic stratum of Nepal. Similarly, the language spoken by Rautes and Tharus reflects 
its closeness to the pre-Tibeto-Burman language. Bhotia, the Tibeto-Burman speaking 
people, is the second largest group in the hills. Sherpa, who live in and around 
Solukhumbu, migrated from the north in 1531-33. The Tamangs, Gurungs and Thakalis 
are believed to have migrated from Tibet to Nepal, and they speak the Tibeto-Burman 
language.  
According to Kiranti legends, people residing in the eastern part of Nepal 
migrated from Assam as there are similarities between the Kiranti and Rong languages of 
Yunnan and Burma. It is believed that they migrated from South West China to Assam 
and then to Nepal following the Brahmaputra River. Whelpton argues that many ethnic 
groups existing in the hills could be the product of fusion between various groups that 
entered those areas.101 Magars, the largest ethnic group of the mid-western region, has 
much diversity in terms of dialects and cultures. Whelpton states,  “The term Magars was 
perhaps once simply a prestigious title that was adopted by numerous otherwise 
unconnected groups.”102  
The Madhesi, people of the plains are generally regarded as a single group, but 
Terai is a home of traditional Hindu people, a Muslim minority and a number of ethnic 
groups, e.g., Tharu. The language spoken by the Madhesi people consist of Indo-Aryan 
dialects. It is believed that those dialects entered north India along with migration down 
the Ganges basin from the Northwest. The ethnic diversity within the Terai is also 
prominent in terms of cultures, tribes, dialects and religion. About languages spoken in 
Terai, Whelpton says:  
For caste Hindus, and also for most of the ‘tribal,’ the Terai forms a 
dialect continuum with speech changing gradually from one village to the 
next, and no sharp divisions between one language and another. However, 
it is usual to recognize three main varieties: from west to east, Awadhi, 
Bhojpuri and Maithili, the last of which has the largest number of speakers 
in Nepal after Nepali itself.103 
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Politicization of resettlement makes the issue of the Terai elite even more 
complex, and their influence in national socioeconomic landscape is contradictory. 
Brown says of them: 
The new hill derived Terai elite retained their place in the national 
political hierarchy because they also retained their credentials as authentic 
Nepalis … A section of Terai elite was not of hill, but of comparatively 
recent, Indian origin. Indian immigrants to Nepal fell into two categories. 
One was composed of wealthy, high caste Indians who were landowners, 
and especially businessmen and industrialists … A second category, which 
included the bulk of Indian immigrants to Nepal, consisted of poor, low 
caste peasants … Consequently, while the majority of Indian immigrants 
lacked both economic and political power, high caste Indians had 
significant economic influence but maintained a discreet political 
presence, acquiescing in the hill domination of politics because they had a 
vested interest in doing so. 104 
3. Indigenous People and Their Rights 
A fair number of marginalized ethnic groups considered themselves indigenous 
people (IP), though Article 1 of the ILO convention 169 defines IPs as one who  
“inhabited the country or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time 
of conquest or colonization or the establishment of the present state boundaries.”105 IP 
mobilizations came into the limelight and expanded internationally through the sharing of 
experiences and strategies, along with the ILO Convention on the rights of IP and Tribal 
peoples 1989 (ILO Convention 169) and UN declaration on the rights of IP-2007 
(UNDRIP). Nepal was a signatory of UNDRIP and ILO 169 in 2007.106 
Nepali IPs are spread all over the country with a large number of smaller 
ethnicities, but they constitute almost 36% of the population in which Magars, Tharu, 
Tamang and Newars contribute 7.1%, 6.7%, 5.6% and 5.4%, respectively.107 Although 
IPs are considered politically and economically marginalized, internal variation is 
significant. Newars and Thakalis, minor groups of the IPs, are economically in better 
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position than normal BCs. Newars are quite influential even in the political sphere. Public 
perception is that IPs are discriminated against through sanskritization in Nepal. The 
level of marginalization is even apparent in civil society, as BCs dominate in the NGO 
federations and the journalism sectors where they represent 76% and 80%, 
respectively.108  
Nepalese IPs have been grouped together and called Matwalis (low-status 
category) since the unification of the country. The Nepal Federation of Nationalities 
(NEFEN) was instituted in 1990. This was renamed the Nepal Federation of Indigenous 
Nationalities (NEFIN) in 2003 after systematic inclusion of a qualifier adivasi 
(indigenous) in its charter.109 The term  “indigenous nationalities “ (Adivasi Janajati) has 
been used in political and social forum since the 1980s, but it has some controversies. 
Some argue that parbatyas (hill BCs) are also IP due to their long presence in the hills; 
whereas others argue that the inclusion of Newars in IP is not justified as they are urban 
people with mostly full-fledged Hindu caste system.110 When the Nepal Foundation for 
Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) Act was endorsed, an official 
initiative at the government level materialized (2002).111  
The issue of the right of self-government in the context of the Nepalese IP has 
been discussed much during the last decade. Peoples have been mobilized for ethnic 
federal states, but this is very hard to achieve due to the scattered nature of marginalized 
groups, such as the Dalits and Muslims all over the country. This results in no separate 
traditional homeland. Dalit politicians and leaders were concerned that the concept of IP 
right of self-government fails to address the traditional exclusion of Dalits, Muslims and 
women, and it overshadowed the issue of marginalized groups. Though minority politics 
is being developed as a zero-sum game, the IP rights movement should not be oppressive 
towards other societal groups.112  
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In recent years, BCs are forming organizations such as the Chhetri Samaj, Khas 
Chhetri Ekta Samaj, and Brahmin Samaj. These are campaigning to protect their rights 
and claiming also to be IP groups.113 They maintain, however, that their organizations are 
an unfortunate necessity. They claim that they are not believers of ethnic politics and that 
discrimination has actually been started by politics based on ethnic lines as there used to 
be exemplary harmony among various ethnic groups in Nepal. BCs perceive the under-
representation of marginalized groups in government positions is a result of 
incompetency and unwillingness to make career choices. This is because IPs have 
significant representation in army, police and foreign employment, including foreign 
military services.114 Mikkel Berg-Nordlie and Arild Schou argues that   “ many BC 
activists seem blind to the fact that it is not meritocracy and career choices of the IPs that 
has led their own group to be over represented at the higher levels of society.”115Hence, 
all IPs in Nepal are not deprived, and BCs are not in favor of federalism based on ethnic 
identity. This makes the issue of federalism more complex. 
D. ISSUES OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 
State policies under the Rana regime and the party-less Panchayat system 
continued to maintain the caste system of social stratification and work division. This 
obviously favored the higher castes. In fact, the monarchy and the Rana regime both 
supported the concept of one country, one religion and one nation.116 Civil Code-1963 
could not dismantle a caste system deeply embedded in the society except in formal 
official practice. Similarly, Land Reform-1964 could not reach to the grass roots—those 
at the bottom of society—and it merely served as a token step.117  
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The Madhesi and Dalits are believed to be more marginalized than others. The 
Dalits and the untouchables of the Madhes are mostly landless.118 Grievances and 
dissatisfaction of Madhesi communities appeared after 2006. This is not a new issue in 
Nepalese political history and practices. Fredrick H. Gaige argues that integration of the 
Madhesi people would be more realistic through their meaningful participation in the 
state’s political system than through coercive measures. In that way, they would be 
motivated to accept national political and cultural ideals voluntarily.119 Similarly, the 
issue of the Dalits is very complex and severe. Irrespective of the regions of inhabitance, 
ethnicity, religion or level of development, prevalent discriminatory practices exclude the 
Dalits from the socio-political and economic main stream.120 
Though ethnic communities are deprived of cultural and linguistic rights, it would 
be grossly incorrect to analyze the issue only from the perspective of inclusion or 
exclusion without giving due consideration to variations amongst social sub-groups and 
individuals within the caste and ethnic communities. Most of the literature and studies in 
this field are focused on the common argument that BCs are the most privileged and that 
they have enjoyed positions and powers that shaped the societal values and favored their 
community with the required materials and resources.121 Diversities and internal 
variations among various ethnic groups show that the general perception of ethnic 
population or caste as a homogeneous entity has lots of limitations. For instance, 
opportunities and privileges enjoyed by Newars and Thakalis (non-BCs) are out of 
proportion to any ethnic/caste groups. This is even though the BCs are considered the 
most dominant community/caste. 122 Nabin Rawal highlights the need to understand the 
issue of inclusion and exclusion in accordance with the national context and complexity 
of social structure, and argues: 
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As is seen social exclusion/inclusion is contestable term, and thus its 
relevance to Nepal in its European Avatar is open to a lot of questions. 
Furthermore, given the diversities in Nepal, with its own social, cultural, 
historical realities, the concept needs more deliberation and needs to 
reflect the realities of Nepal going beyond popular discourse and emotive 
appeal for a segment of the population.123 
Social exclusion and marginalization is not limited to IPs or any section of the 
society. Almost two-thirds of the Nepalese population is considered to be marginalized 
groups. This includes the Dalits, Muslims and Madhesi.124 At the substructure of Hindu 
hierarchy, the Dalits represent almost 15% of the population. Though it is officially 
illegal to discriminate, due to the extreme social practices of untouchability, they are 
considered to be the most marginalized section of society.125 The Dalit (lower segment) 
category is practiced in every social system. As a result, social discrimination is so deeply 
embedded that it is present even in the Buddhist and Muslim communities.126  
1. Social Exclusion and Disparity 
Discrimination on the basis of caste prevails in employment, marriage and other 
general social interactions. These are preserved and reinforced by traditional practice and 
social intimidation. Untouchability and exclusion of the Dalits from social and religious 
spheres is the hallmark of caste-based discrimination.127 The Dalits represent 80% of the 
ultra-poor in Nepal. Even though they comprise more than 20% of the population, they 
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possess only 1% of the wealth. The Dalits and lower castes are denied economic 
activities and opportunities forcing them into severe and disproportionate economic 
vulnerability. The Dalits own less than 1% of the arable land and only 3% of Dalits enjoy 
more than one hectare of land. In contrast, bonded agriculture labors, the haliyas, mostly 
belong to the Dalits and the lower castes. As they have no alternative other than to live 
without toilets and running water, most Dalits have a miserable subsistence.128 
According to the Reservation System Recommendation Committee (2003), 
women Janajati, Dalit and Madhesi are identified for affirmative action.129 The ADB 
report identified Dalit, Janajati, sukumbasi (squatter) and kamaiya (bonded labor) as 
disadvantaged groups.130 Similarly, the UNDP report released in 2004 recognizes 
women, Dalit, indigenous people, people with disabilities, children and senior citizens as 
vulnerable groups.131 The Harka Gurung argues that indigenous people are mostly facing 
social exclusion based on religion, language, and cultures. The Sukumbasi and Kamaiya 
are victims of poverty. The Dalits, including women, are victims of fundamental Hindu 
practices.132 Nepal’s first democratic constitution of 1990, promulgated after restoration 
of democracy, still suffered from some contradictions. Article 11.3 guarantees that no 
discrimination against citizens based on religion, color, sex, caste, ethnicity or conviction. 
Article 19.1 guarantees each individual the right to follow and practice his ancient 
religion by maintaining the dignity of prevailing traditions. Yet the tenth amendment to 
social code 1993 enforces discriminatory traditional practices at religious places as 
prevailing traditions.133  
The population census data for 2001 clearly reveals the social disparity in major 
occupations. Upper castes occupy 62% of professional and technical positions, 58% of 
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legislative/administrative positions, and 53% of clerical positions, despite their share of 
only 35% of the economically-active population. On the other hand, Dalits with 12% and 
IPs with 38% of the economically-active population have at the most 4% and 30% 
involvement in such occupations, respectively. The proportions in production labor, 
however, are just the opposite: high caste shares are 19%; whereas Dalits and Janajatis 
share 20% and 38%, respectively.134 In 2001, upper caste Brahamans held 57% in 
parliament and 89% in the judiciary. This is regardless that they comprised less than 20% 
of the national population. Only a handful of Dalits were represented out of almost 4,000 
village committees across the country.135 This also shows the under-representation of the 
Dalits, even in the grass root political system. 
Since the rural population is predominant in the national demographic picture, the 
top 5% of people control 40% of cultivated land; whereas the bottom 60% control only 
20%. The elite caste Brahman, Chhetri and Newars136 represent 48%, 26%, and 15% of 
government officials, respectively.137 According to a study carried out by Nepal South 
Asia Center, 12% of households own 71% of the wealth and the poorest 20% of the 
country’s families own only 3.7% of national income.138 There is also a disparity 
between city and rural health care. In rural areas, there are only five doctors available for 
every 100,000 people. Similarly, a majority of the population rely on agriculture for their 
subsistence.139 Most economically and politically powerful ethnicities were controlling 
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almost 69% of civil service positions in the mid-1980s. Within a decade of the restoration 
of democracy, this figure saw a sharp increase to 98%.140  
Discrimination based on castes and miserable condition of Dalits and backward 
people are very severe in Nepalese society. There is a huge gap between poor and rich 
people because national wealth is concentrated in certain high-caste elites and limited 
ethnic people. Since Nepal is rural, agro-based, multi-ethnic country, development is only 
possible when social inclusion and equality in resource distribution are ensured in the 
new structure of the country. Though domination of higher caste and under representation 
of Dalits and people of lower strata in state machineries are mostly prevailed throughout 
the country, women and Dalits are most oppressed section of the Nepalese society.  
a. Women and Dalits: Most Deprived Segment of the Society 
The caste system is preserved and reinforced in rural societies through 
traditional practice and social banishment. As a result, caste divisions prevail in most 
socioeconomic interactions, such as marriage, employment, and housing. At times, this 
exists even for basic needs, such as water.141 The Dalits comprise one fifth of this 
population, possessing 1% of the nation’s wealth, but they represent 80% of the ultra- 
poor in Nepal.142 The Dalits are considered ritually impure and untouchable due to their 
work related to dead animals or human waste.143 The Dalits face severe social 
discrimination as they are strictly denied free access to temples, restaurants, hotels, and 
even milk cooperatives. In turn, they are also denied any kind of compensation for their 
so called low-grade work—like handling of animal remains. This results in 
disproportionate economic vulnerability.144 
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Dalits women and girls are victims of a double burden of caste and gender 
discrimination. As a result, they lag behind Dalit men and other women in the society.145 
The Dalits women are also very poor in terms of socioeconomic indicators. The literacy 
rate of Dalits women is 24%, almost half of the national literacy rate of women. It is 
more severe in some Dalit communities, such as Mushahar where only 9% of Dalit 
women are literate.146 Discrimination based on religion, sex, caste, tribe, and ideological 
conviction is illegal per the Constitution and Civil Rights Act of 1955. Unfortunately, it is 
limited to paper since there is little enforcement in practice of such legal provisions. 
Discriminatory provisions still exist: the traditional practice of harassing Dalits from 
temples, denying inheritance rights to women, and refusing them the right to pass 
citizenship to their children. Surprisingly, Nepal still operates without a law for sexual 
harassment, and one study says that there are still about 85 discriminatory laws and 137 
discriminatory legal provisions.147 
A study conducted by a Kathmandu-based NGO revealed that there were 
still 118 provisions in Nepalese law and regulations that discriminate against women 
socially, economically and politically. Despite the fact that Nepal is one of the signatories 
of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), this includes rights of citizenship, marriage, adoption and abortion.148  
2. Issue of Ethnic Identity in Nepal 
In 1990s, the Maoists used ethnic politics to mobilize ethnic constituencies, such 
as the Magars, Tamangs, Limbus and Gurungs, and Dalits, to rally them against the 
centralized monarchial system. In turn, those ethnic groups were assured federal states 
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based on the right of self-determination.149 As they believed they had been bypassed in 
the peace deal and negotiation process for power sharing, these ethnic groups raised their 
grievances against the political elites. Leaders from the Madhesi, Tharu, Dalit and 
Janajati blame Nepali nationalism based on a hegemonic nationalistic ideology that is 
deep rooted in the traditional power and authority of Hindu high-caste BCs.150 The 
government had agreed to address the demands of various ethnic groups and 
organizations and has signed agreements with them.151 Poor implementation of such 
agreements makes those ethnic groups more suspicious of the political leaders and 
government. Despite socioeconomic and caste hierarchy, patriarchy, and the existence of 
103 ethnic and caste groups in Nepal, heterogeneity does not pose any threat to national 
integration and social harmony as long as all groups are conscious of a common national 
identity.152  
There are unifying symbols among the various groups. Since the majority of the 
population is Hindu, most Hindu groups and activists want Nepal to be a Hindu state. 
Nepali is the mother tongue of the majority of the people, and it serves as a lingua franca 
among the groups (see Appendix). However, getting groups to agree on common national 
identity has been a difficult process. Madhesi parties prefer either Hindi or other Terai 
local languages as the national language for Madhesi in Terai. Following the 
promulgation of the interim constitution, an ethno-political coalition comprised of a few 
Terai-based parties surfaced. They united in the name of the United Madhesi Front during 
the latter phase of the Maoist insurgency and started a semi-militant political movement 
against the Centre. They demanded federalism with Madhesi identity, self-governance 
                                                 
149 Guenther Baechler,  Emerging Archetypes: A Comparison of Patterns of the Peace Processes in 
Sri Lanka and Nepal, ed. Daniela Korppen, Beatrix Schmelzle and Oliver Wils (Berlin: Berghof Handbook 
Dialogue Series, 2008), 57.  
150 Ravi Bhandari, Nanda R. Shrestha and Dev Raj Dahal, “Rising Ethno-cultural Nationalism in 
Nepal: Post-modern Illusion or Democratic Delusion?” Sociological Bulletin 58, no. 1 (2009), 18. 
151 The heterogeneous nature of different groups and organizations, which is raising the issue of rights 
and inclusion of their groups in national mainstream, is making the situation more complex and difficult to 
address. Government has signed the accords with such groups on the bid to make CA election successful. 
Some of these ethnic group and organizations are Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum, Joint Muslim Struggle 
Committee, Kirat Janawadi Workers Party, Tharuhat Struggle Committee, Chure Bhabar Ekta Samaj, Terai 
Mukti Morcha, Janamukti Morcha, etc.  
152 Dahal, “Elections and Conflicts,” 13.  
 39
and a proportional election system. There was also a demand for one state for the entire 
Madhes ( “one Madhes one Pradesh “).153 Baechler states, 
Initially all parties—including the monarchists—tried to use the Madhesi 
upheaval to weaken the Maoist movement, which had some stronghold in 
western Terai; in particular, Maoist splinters used the Terai card to fight 
against their previous mother party and to strengthen their position vis-à-
vis the central government.”154 
Similarly, after a series of negotiations, the government signed a twenty-point 
agreement with NEFIN in August 7, 2008, which agreed with the representation of 59 
ethnic groups out of 103 and acknowledged the right of IP per ILO 169.155 Dev Raj 
Dahal argues,  “In the absence of any comprehension of a larger national community—
the state, contesting demands could intensify the struggle of subsidiary identity politics in 
future elections and politicize the national political domain.”156 
In Nepal, the spirit of the ILO 169 convention has been misinterpreted by several 
groups. For instance, Newars claim to be one of the indigenous communities of 
Kathmandu, but they enjoy lots of privileges and a significant presence in political and 
administrative portfolios. This includes a leading role in business sectors in Kathmandu 
and their monopoly in trade of the country. Certain IPs need to be integrated and granted 
special rights, but some indigenous people, such as the Newars, are not tribal.157 Muslims 
want to be registered as  “Nepali Muslim “ rather than categorized as  “IP “ so that they 
are eligible for the associated rights of a recognized minority, such as proportional 
representation in different layers of the state mechanism.158 Similarly, NFDIN stands 
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with the idea of incorporating  “Terai other Caste “ and  “Terai Dalits “ into the IP groups 
for justice of the marginalized people of the Madhesi community.159 People believe 
Sherpa have been residing in Nepal since around 1553; whereas Hindus (BCs) have been 
around since 400-900 CE.160  Such issues cause further polarization among communities, 
which continues to inhibit the federalization process.  
3. Ethnic Movement in Terai 
Terai based political parties and groups, mainly the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum 
(MJF), Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP) and Sadbhavana Party (SP), created a 
United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) polarizing the Terai people along ethnic lines 
in 2007. The main goal of UDMF was to establish an autonomous state of Madhesh to 
end long-standing traditional discrimination from Kathmandu and the Hills.161 The 
UDMF encouraged racial and ethnic violence as it redefined the identity of Terai people. 
This excluded the hill-origin people residing in Madhesh because UDMF interpreted Hill 
settlers as encroachers. UDMF agitated against the state, Maoists and Hill people, and it 
negotiated a number of agreements with the government. Implementation of those 
agreements, however, is complex and difficult.162  
The Madhesh movement could not cover all the people of Madhesh because later 
interpretation of Madhesi people referred to the non-tribal, Indian-origin, Hindu caste that 
lived in Madhesh. It highlights the racial and ethnic dimension instead of the 
geographical dimension. This new definition specifically excluded those, such as 
Muslims, Tharus, and Pahadis, who were residing there before Madhesi immigration.163 
The UDMF benefited from shifting the Madhes identity from one that was 
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geographically-based to one that was racially and origin-based because Madhes origin 
people supported parties associated in UDMF as their true representatives than national 
parties. It mobilized its grass roots and tried to justify violence, capitalizing on historical 
grievances for political benefits. Miklian says Madhes-based political parties were 
responsible for exploiting the Madhesh identity and argues:  “The UDMF has gained 
politically from selling Madhesh identity through the one Madhesh ideal.”164  
4. Citizenship Issue 
During the last quarter of the18th century, King Prithivi Narayan Shah of Gorkha 
established a Hindu kingdom, conquering smaller kingdoms and principalities.165 Nepal’s 
first civil code (Muluki Ain), promulgated by PM Junga Bahadur Rana in 1854, was the 
first attempt to prescribe and legitimize the structure of the larger Nepalese society.166 
This civil code clearly categorized Europeans and Indians (Mlechhas and Muglaniyas) as 
non-citizens, so they became disqualified for land ownership and government jobs.167 
Until the second half of the 20th century, there was no change in the state’s notion of 
citizenship and citizens as the ruler’s subjects (raiti) not being a part of state system. 
After the 104-year-long Rana oligarchy, the Interim Government of Nepal Act of 1951 
initiated the first legal document, produced a multi-party system and defined the citizen 
as a state component. The second constitution (1959) for the first time established the 
equality of citizens before law and the policy of non-discrimination based on gender, 
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caste, religion, etc.168 The citizenship Act of 1952 opened legal citizenship to Nepalese 
people based on their birthplace and a naturalized citizenship certificate to foreign 
nationals who qualified by staying in Nepal for more than five consecutive years. Some 
writers argue this provision of citizenship certificate to foreign nationals was too loose 
and suspect that it was aimed to attract Indian migration in the southern belt of Terai.169 
After the royal takeover in 1960, King Mahendra promulgated the Constitution of 
Nepal-1962, the third one within 15 years. It declared Nepal a ‘Sovereign Monarchial 
Hindu State.’ Under this constitution, the Citizenship Act-1964 was relatively stricter and 
came into effect based on constitutional provisions.170It is considered a historical 
achievement because it made an acquisition of citizenship difficult even for genuine 
Nepalese citizens, but this was an intentional move to curb large-scale movement of 
Indian people to Nepal.171 
The party-less Panchayat system, in its 30-year political history, put significant 
efforts into integrating Nepal’s immense socio-cultural diversity promoting three pillars 
as its political ideologies: the institution of the monarchy, the Nepali language, and 
Hinduism along with the popular slogan ‘Unity in Diversity.’172 Kansakar points out that 
the Monarchy used fear of an Indian influx across open borders to consolidate and 
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legitimize the Panchayat regime.173 As a result of a reluctance to grant citizenship to the 
Terai people because of their ethnic and cultural similarity, they were deprived of 
citizenship during the Panchayat regime. 
The Interim Constitution of Nepal (2006) promised recognition, rights, and 
respects to marginalized and deprived ethnic groups, Dalits and women.174 The 
Citizenship Act (2006) and its immediate execution proved a landmark achievement. It 
relaxed previous contentious issues and provided citizenship certificates to nearly 2.6 
million people of the low-lands. This was based on their descent, birth and marriage.175 
Citizenship has remained a complex and contentious issue in the political history 
of Nepal, and it has significant political dimension in contemporary Nepalese transitional 
politics. Political borders and citizenship, fundamental factors of national identity and 
nationalism, are at a critical juncture due to open borders with India, a porous border with 
China, and sensible historical relations with both of them. Hence, domestic issues cannot 
be analyzed in isolation, instead, it has some influences also from the outside the country. 
Federalism based on ethnic identity in Nepal is tricky one because Madhesi people are 
culturally close to the India, and they are raising the issue of citizenship given the border 
is virtually open in all senses.  
Given the disparity and discrimination along ethnic and caste lines, including 
other regional issues like citizenship issue, in Nepal, Maoists started their political 
adventure through people’s war in 1996, raising issues related to socioeconomic 
conditions of backward and marginalized people. Next section discusses the 
socioeconomic aspect of Maoist insurgency which last for a decade. 
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E. SOCIOECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE OF MAOIST INSURGENCY 
The Maoist insurgency in Nepal was a consequence of the country’s particular 
economic, political and social circumstances that had developed over time. The political 
instability, bad governance and the administrative suppression fueled grievances of 
deprived people.176 Consequently, the masses were attracted towards Maoist ideology 
that promised them equality and redistribution of sources. The Maoist peoples’ war began 
with attacks on police stations in the Rolpa, Rukum, and Sindhuli districts in 1996.177 It 
changed the Nepali political landscape and promised to put the backward people in the 
drivers’ seat. At the height of the insurgency, the Maoists compromised their ideology 
and accepted mainstream democratic politics. This also shows that political ideology was 
not the real reason people supported the insurgency; it was instead their economic 
condition.178  
Although the constitutional arrangements and laws were not discriminatory in 
spirit, most of the people in the state machineries and politics were from higher castes. 
The Maoist insurgency started from the western hills where significant numbers of the 
population were Janajatis and Dalits, the most deprived section of society. Later Maoists 
developed those areas into bases for further expansion.179 The Janajatis and Dalits 
became cheap sources of recruitment in the Maoist insurgency. The Maoist insurgency 
lasted for a decade from 1996 to 2006. Total casualty figures vary. This is because more 
than 2,000 people are still missing. According to the official data up to 2004, the highest 
casualties were from the western hills. The Terai, Janajatis and Dalits suffered large 
number of casualties (32%). 180  
The Maoist leadership argued that exploitation, external dependency, and 
discrimination based on religion, caste, gender, language, and ethnicity left no alternative 
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but to take up arms against the government. The main Maoist leader, Baburam Bhattarai 
(present Prime Minister), explained the Maoist people’s war from a political economic 
perspective as an obvious struggle against a semi-feudal and semi-colonial situation 
under the monarchy. Bhattarai said the principle objective of the people’s war was  “to 
develop the social productive forces and create a higher form of society through a 
continuous revolution …by putting ‘politics in command.”181 
The demography of violent groups provides a lens into who was involved in the 
violence. More than 50% of the population was under 18 years old, and 93% of children 
lived in villages and had a 40% dropout ratio from elementary school. The bulk of 
illiterate or undereducated youth were constantly challenged to survive in poor socio 
economic circumstances because of a negligible presence of state mechanisms. The 
Dhami Commission (1997) and Deuba Commission (2000) both underlined abject 
poverty and hardship among the youth as indisputable factors in violent uprising.182 
Substantial number of unemployed youth proved to be a real weapon for the people’s 
war. The idea of engaging such vulnerable groups had its origin in Maoist ideology.183 
The basic Maoist strategy was to rally masses in the shortest possible time.184 
Women are also one of the most exploited and deprived section of the population in rural, 
caste-based societies, so the Maoist raised a voice against patriarchal exploitation and 
discrimination of women. They explained that full liberation of women and gender 
equality will only be possible in a classless or communist society. Thus, women got 
actively involved in the Maoist insurgency, breaking the normal trend of male political 
participation in electoral voting and occasional candidacy.185 Maoists succeeded in 
recruiting significant numbers of motivated female guerillas, mostly from Janajatis and 
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Dalits communities. They did this by raising the issue of state discrimination based on 
caste, ethnicity, religion, language, and gender.186 
1. Why Did Peasants Support Maoist Insurgency? 
Although NC came into power as the first democratically-elected government in 
1991, according to Madhav Joshi and T. David Mason, it could not uphold its popular 
slogan  “the land belongs to tillers, and the house belongs to one who smears it.”187 
People were very optimistic about meaningful land reforms in the democratic political set 
up, but none of the successive democratic governments settled the real peasants’ 
problem.188 Maoists liberated the peasants and poor people from the complex, 
interwoven, feudal nexus protected by the state. Maoists not only wiped out the structural 
dependency between feudal lord/elite and peasants, but they also established the right of 
peasants over the land they cultivated with a redistribution of abandoned land to landless 
people.189 Initially, most of the deprived peasants submitted themselves to the Maoist’s 
violent path to manage basic needs: food, shelter, and clothing. Later, hundreds of other 
poor peasants voluntarily rallied behind the Maoist campaign. They were inspired by 
justice for poor people through violence.190 
2. Maoist’s Agenda and Socioeconomic Relations 
Maoists started people’s war mainly on socioeconomic agenda and external 
imperialism, a cause of backwardness, to convince the people. The CPN Maoists defined 
Western imperialism and Indian expansionism as external factors. They defined the semi-
feudal agrarian structure, regional disparity, bureaucratic capital expansion and 
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oppression of nationalities as internal factors creating the melancholy of Nepal.191 The 
Maoists started their people’s war to fulfill 40 demands in February 1996. The majority 
of those demands were related to the socioeconomic and political grievances of backward 
people. Out of these 40 demands, seven were related to nationalism, 13 political, 13 
economic and 7 to socio-cultural.192 The Informal Service Center (INSEC), a NGO 
working for human rights and social justice, identified 10 causes responsible for 
discrimination and inequality of the Janajati population and the underdevelopment of 
their habitation.193 Coincidentally, or intentionally, all those points are part of the 
Maoist’s 40 demands. Later, Maoists again put forward a 24-point agenda comprised of 
11 economic, eight socio-cultural, three nationalist and two political aspects during talks 
with the government in the 2003 ceasefire.194 
The century-long centralized, exclusionary, socioeconomic, and feudal production 
system was the root cause for the Maoist people’s war. Obviously, the nexus of bad 
governance and corruption helped to accelerate the insurgency. The untouchables and 
ethnic indigenous people were ruthlessly marginalized and exploited by the traditional 
feudal ruling class. Despite the majority of the population living below the poverty level, 
according to Surendra K. C., half of the national income was in the hands of 10% of the 
people.195 He argues that Maoist leaderships were not basic communists. Rather they 
were simply communist-oriented intellectuals who used severe socioeconomic disparity 
of the people in their favor.196 Druba Kumar rightly points out that the Maoist insurgency 
in Nepal is unique in that it was neither for secessionism nor for separatism or self-
determination. It was, rather, a people’s uprising to grab state power through an armed 
                                                 
 191 Baburam Bhattarai, Political Economy of People’s War, ed. Arjun Karki and David Sedom 
(Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2003), 117. 
 192 Gurung,  “Social Exclusion.”  
 193 INSEC, Human Rights Year Book, 137–139. 
 194 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom, 202–205. 
 195 Surendra K. C., “Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and Its Implications to India,” Telegraph Nepal, 
July 8, 2011, accessed September 5, 2012, http://www.telegraphnepal.com/national/2011-07-08/maoist-
insurgency-in-nepal-its-implications-to-india. 
 196 Ibid. 
 48
revolution.197 Since almost 40-45% of the GDP is from the agriculture sector and almost 
80% of the population is still dependent on this sector, land reforms without structural 
transformation and real efforts to improve socioeconomic condition of the people could 
only be a strategy to permanently eliminate the cause of the insurgency/conflict.198Hence, 
failure of state mainly political parties and often king to address the real concerns of 
grass-root people provided Maoists a stage for people’s war. 
3. Hope in Radical Solution 
With the restoration of democracy in 1990, most privileged elites consolidated 
their control in the management of the country. Consequently, people willingly accepted 
the call for a radical, violent insurgency to alter the existing socioeconomic and political 
order. Deepak Thapa termed this  “hope in radical solution, “ and an  “option-less 
function of severe poverty and grievances rather than ideological motivation.”199 Blieck 
argues that the fundamental reason for the persisting Maoist rebellion in Nepal—and 
South Asia, at large—is deep-rooted in inequality and poverty that have not been 
addressed by successive democratic governments. This left no peaceful means to alter the 
catastrophic socioeconomic situation.200  
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter looked at the political history of Nepal that led to the election of the 
CA to make a sovereign people’s constitution. Also, it looked at the transition to 
democracy from the centralized authoritarian regimes of the past. It mapped the diverse 
picture of Nepalese society in terms of caste, ethnicity, religion and language. Nepalese 
society, due to intertwined region, ethnicity, language and prevailing cross-ethnic/caste 
divisions made the issue more complex to address. The issue of inclusion, identity and 
decentralization surfaced in the political debate along with democratic transformation. 
This was more prominent after a decade-long Maoist insurgency. First, it was seen that 
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political consensus among political parties and their commitment of democracy and 
peace made the CA election possible. It over-threw the almost two and half centuries 
long Monarchy. Second, the chapter found Nepalese society diverse and complex in 
terms of culture, ethnicity, language and religion. Third, issues of exclusion and 
discrimination based on caste, gender, culture, language, religion and identity were 
discussed. Lastly, this chapter described the socioeconomic perspective of the Maoist 
insurgency. Also it discussed the Terai movement that established the urgency of 
restructuring the state to address the issues related to ethnic identity and empowerment of 
backward communities throughout the country.  
Nepal is widely recognized as a multi-lingual, cultural and ethnic society. The 
heterogeneous nature of the society is so intense that the size, shape and distribution of 
various caste/ethnic groups all over the country are hard to determine.201 People’s 
aspirations and awareness regarding their political and socioeconomic rights have 
increased many folds. A Maoist people’s war and subsequent political development have 
brought several issues, such as equal access to resources, self-governance, right of IPs, 
secularism, federal structure of the state, and so on, into the public realm. The People’s 
Movement-II (2006) was launched not only for democracy but for inclusive democracy 
and equal participation in the decision-making process of the state. This eliminated 
disparities between dominant high castes and privileged minorities and the rest of the 
people who were victimized by historical discrimination and deprivation.202 The 
Brahmans and Chhetris of the hill are the two dominating groups. Each of them 
represents more than 10% of the population. Together they constitute less than one third 
of the total population.203 Though there is relatively better cultural and religious harmony 
among the different ethnic groups, the competition among them has increased with the 
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introduction of identity politics at the national level, particularly by Maoist and Terai-
based political parties. This has now been spread throughout the country. 
Nepal has been declared as the Democratic Federal Republic in the interim 
constitution, but turning this federalism into reality is the big challenge. Political parties 
and other stakeholders find it very difficult to address federalism and issues related to 
identity politics given the diverse and complex picture of Nepalese society. 
Discrimination, deprivation and marginalization of one group by another are deeply 
rooted. National institutions have never been so weak, possibly because of fragmented 
national politics and a decade-long people’s war. Nepal is at a crossroad, and it is up to 
the political elites who have responsibility to move the country forward. 
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III. STRUCTURE OF CA, POLITICAL PARTIES AND OTHER 
STAKEHOLDERS ON FEDERALISM  
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the successful completion of the CA election on April 10, 2008, the SPA 
and Maoists spent some time in negotiations. On May 28, 2008, the long awaited first 
meeting of the CA convened. It declared Nepal as a federal democratic republic passing a 
proposal to amend the interim constitution. The election results produced a hung CA. 
Maoists failed to secure the absolute majority despite their emergence as the largest party 
securing 38.1% of total seats. Since there was a provision of a two-thirds majority for 
promulgation of a constitution, without the Maoists, the CA was going to be ineffective. 
It made the role of Maoists in CA crucial. The federal republic and democratic 
constitution through CA were the long-standing political agendas of the Maoists. Later, 
all other political parties agreed on the Maoist agenda in response to their commitment to 
become a part of the political main stream respecting people’s sovereignty and multi-
party democracy. 
This chapter tries to answer the question of what prevented the political parties 
from reaching a consensus on federalism. In order to do this, this chapter first describes 
the constitution drafting process. Then the chapter will discuss the political parties, their 
background, constituencies and agendas in the CA, what kind of federal system they want 
and contentious issues among them. Lastly, the role of civil society and international 
communities, including their influence on Nepalese politics, will be highlighted. Points of 
contradictions among different stakeholders will be analyzed to answer the issues that 
caused the collapse of the CA. The stakeholders under study in this chapter are: the main 
democratic political force (NC), left-oriented parties, regional parties, civil society, and 
the international communities, mainly the neighboring countries, E.U. and U.S. 
B. STRUCTURE OF CA AND CONSTITUTION DRAFTING PROCESS  
The result of the CA election gave 25 parties a role in constitution drafting—nine 
parties secured their position in direct election, first-past-the-post (FPTP); whereas 16 
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other political parties got seats in the CA through proportional system. Also, few 
independent candidates got elected.204 During the CA election, Nepal, for the first time, 
adopted a mixed electoral system. In a 601-member CA, 240 were elected through first-
past-the- post (FPTP); 335 through the proportional electoral system and the remaining 
26 were nominated by the cabinet. To make the CA more inclusive, parties were required 
to ensure representation of minimum percentage of several socioeconomic groups, such 
as women, Madhesis, Dalits, and other ethnic and indigenous people. 205 Major political 
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S.N Political parties FPTP Proportional Nomination Total % 
1 CPN(Maoists) 120 100 9 229 38.10
2 NC 37 73 5 115 19.13
3 CPN(UML) 33 70 5 108 17.97
4 Madhesi Jana-adhikar Forum Nepal 30 22 2 54 8.98 
5 Terai Madhesi Loktantrik Party 9 11 1 21 3.49 
6 Rastriya Prajatantra Party 0 8 - 8 1.33 
7 
Communist Party Nepal 
(Marxist-
Leninist) 
0 8 1 9 1.50 
8 Sadbhavana Party 4 5 - 9 1.50 
9 Janamorcha Nepal 2 5 1 8 1.33 
10 Nepal Workers and Peasants Party 2 2 1 5 0.83 
11 Rastriya Jana Morcha 1 3 -- 4 0.66 
12 Others (political Parties and Independent) 2* 28 1 31  
 TOTAL 240 335 26 601 100 
Table 1.   Parties in CA (after  www.election.gov.np); *independent candidate 
The representation of Dalits was significant in the CA. A total of 49 Dalits were 
elected; among them 22 were women. UCPN (Maoist) got a total of 21 Dalits; NC got 
10, CPN (UML) got 10 and MJF got 2 in the CA. There were 7 Dalits’ candidates of 
UCPN (Maoist). These were elected from the FPTP; whereas no Dalits’ candidates of the 
NC and CPN (UML) were elected in the direct election. The attraction of Dalits in NC 
and UML was comparatively less than in Maoists because there were one and four Dalit 
candidates contested in the FPTP from NC and CPN (UML), respectively.206 Nearly half 
of the Dalit representation was from UCPN (Maoist). 
                                                 




Figure 3.  Dalits Representation in CA (after Election Commission Nepal) 
Similarly, women’s participation in the CA was 32.8%. This is according to the 
one-third mandatory participation by the interim constitution. There were a total of 191 
(FPTP and proportional) women CA members out of 575 elected members and an 
additional six were appointed out of 26 seats allotted for appointment. 
 
Figure 4.  Women’s Representation in CA (after Election Commission Nepal) 
The IPs won over one-third of the seats. They got nearly one-third of the FPTP, 
more than one-third of proportional seats and half of the 26 appointed seats. A total 
number of IPs was 212 out of 601, i.e., 35.2%. More than 90 of them were from the 
Maoist party. 50 out of 79 elected were under FPTP and 43 out of 120 elected were from 
the Maoists party. This represented the indigenous communities. Similarly, NC won 10 
from FPTP and 27 from proportional; CPN (UML) won 11 from FPTP and 25 from 





















compared to the 1990 general election. Unlike the Madhesi, they supported different 
political parties according to their aspirations and beliefs (Figure 3). Nearly half of the 
IPs representation was from the UCPN (Maoist). The CA results made the IPs’ 
representation almost close to their share in population—37.8% of total population—and 
ensured the representation of historically disadvantaged groups of the Nepalese 
society.207  
 
Figure 5.  IPs Representation in CA (Election Commission of Nepal) 
2. Constitution Drafting Process  
Article 64 of the Interim Constitution had a provision of CA tenure of 2 years. 
This was from the date of the first meeting of the CA that was held on May 28, 2008. 
Though there was a provision of extension of its tenure for six months in cases of 
unavoidable circumstances, the CA remained until 2012 with four extensions to its 
tenure.208  
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The main objective of the CA was to prepare and ratify the draft constitution, 
addressing the people’s spirit of sustainable peace. The CA had five major functions: to 
prepare and ratify the constitution, to confirm the issues for referendum, to implement the 
republic in the first meeting of the CA, to restructure the state with federal form, and to work 
as a legislative-parliament.209 The CA managed to complete only one out of those functions, 
the implementation of republican set-up before its demise. The first meeting of the CA on 
May 28, 2008, passed the resolution to implement a republican set-up, as directed by Article 
159(2) of the Interim Constitution and proclaimed Nepal a Federal Democratic Republic.210 
Although the CA was empowered by Article 78 of the Nepal Interim Constitution 
(2007), it took more than four months to approve its regulations and working timetable. This 
was due to a disagreement among parties in forming the government. According to Interim 
Constitution, the CA had also to perform the role of legislative assembly. Later, it amended 
the working schedule a couple of times to meet the target on the extended terms of the CA. 
To make the constitution process systematic, the CA organized itself in 10 thematic 
committees, three procedural committees and a constitutional committee. The State 
Restructuring and Distribution of State Power Committee (SRDSPC) is one of the thematic 
committees constituted as per Rule 59 of CA Regulation (2008). The CA Chairman 
constituted this committee of 43 members based on a proportional representation from the 
various parties and minority groups. Rule 66 of the CA Regulation gave SRDSPC the 
responsibility of drafting the federal structure, its names, demarcation, power sharing 
between the center and provinces, and to submit the report on CA. SRDSPC elected 
Lokendra Bista, a CA member from UCPN (Maoist), its Chairman, unanimously. According 
to Article 138 clause 2 of the Interim Constitution, the Nepal government, after three years of 
CA election, constituted the State Restructuring Commission (SRC) to recommend the 
structuring of the state on November 22, 2012.211 
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Article 138 Clause 1 and Clause 1 (a) of the Interim Constitution had mentioned 
the purpose of restructuring and its basis.212According to constitutional provision, Rule 
66 of CA Regulations mandated SRDSPC for the following:213  
 The structure of the state in the federal republic set up 
 The principles and grounds of demarcating the areas of the provinces 
 Naming each province and demarcating the boundary 
 The division of legislative, executive and judicial power among various 
tiers of federal agencies 
 The determination of the common and specific contents of the rights of 
various tiers of federal agencies 
 The determination of interrelation of legislative, executive and judicial 
rights among the federal units 
 The mechanism to resolve the conflicts that may crop up between the 
federal units 
 Other tasks relating to the mandate of the committee 
Rule 73(2) had a provision that all members of the SRDSPC need to attest the 
report, if not unanimous, at least by majority members in the case of disagreement. The 
Chairperson had the responsibility to include any member’s notes of descent.214 Though 
the CA demised on the issue naming proposed states and basis of federalism, the 
SRDSPC had clearly mentioned the probable basis of names in its report and preliminary 
draft. The report says:  
The demand of identity should be considered while naming federal units 
in areas where a particular ethnic population had its dominance. In a 
region with the dominance of a certain language, it would be reasonable to 
choose name on the lingual basis. In areas having dominance of no ethnic 
                                                 
212 Article 138 Clause 1 says— nation would be restructured with an inclusive democratic federal 
system of governance to end any forms of discriminations based on class, caste, language, gender, 
geography, culture and religion—by dismantling unitary structure. Similarly Article Clause 1(a) 
provisioned—to structure Nepal a federal republic consisted of autonomous and powerful provinces—
accepting the wishes of self-rule of backward regions, Madhesis, indigenous communities and other people.    
213 Constituent Assembly Restructuring of the State and Distribution of State Power Committee, 
Report on Concept Paper and Preliminary. 
214 Ibid.  
 58
nationality and language, there are many alternatives left the names can be 
chosen in such a way that hurts nobody’s feelings.215 
The report further says in Chapter 5.1.3 that the priority on naming of federal 
units should be given to the acceptable and common identity of communities living in 
that unit. Actually, the SRDSPC had collected the public opinion on the following bases 
of naming of states: 
 Ethnicity 
 National heroes 
 Mountain Peaks 
 Regional Identity 
 Religious Places 
 Language 
 Rivers 
 Cultural Identity 
 Geography 
 Historical places 
The Constitutional Committee, formed under CA Rule 65 of the Constitution 
Assembly Rules 2008, was responsible to prepare a draft of the constitution incorporating 
the reports of thematic committees and suggestions of the CA during the discussion of 
various reports. It was also responsible to prepare reports and drafts on the issues outside 
the working areas of the thematic committees. The constitution committee had a total of 
63 members. Nilamber Acharya was elected as chairperson of the committee.216 It had 
power to form several task forces and sub-committees to complete the given job. On 
February 2011, the Constitutional committee formed a 5-member Dispute Resolution 
Sub-committee under the chairmanship of Maoist Chairman Prachanda. This was 
comprised of senior leaders from the four main parties. It streamlined the 78 disputes on 
the report prepared by the various thematic committees. Among them, 25 were related to 
the state restructuring issue. Right at the last moment, the dispute resolution sub-
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committee resolved almost all contentious issues except for a few related to federalism—
mainly number, name, demarcation and basis of state restructuring.217 
Article 70 of the Constituent Assembly Rules (2008) described the procedure of 
passing bills related to the constitution. According to Clause 1 of this Article, a motion 
could be passed unanimously by at least two-thirds of the total CA members. Similarly, 
Clause 3 described the role of parliamentary leaders of different political parties in the 
cases of disputes over the preamble or Article of the bill of draft of the constitution. 
Clause 5 provisioned the voting process to pass the bill with two-thirds of those present 
in the meeting, but a minimum requirement was that those present represented two thirds 
of the total CA members. A decision, however, was unanimous if none of the members 
voted against the bill.218  
C. POLITICAL PARTIES, THEIR CONSTITUENCIES AND AGENDA OF 
FEDERALISM 
The political parties in Nepal started to emerge in the latter half of 20th century. 
The oldest democratic-party, Nepal Congress (NP) was established in 1947 influenced by 
Indian political parties and the independence movement. Two years later, on April 1949, 
some socialist leaders founded the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in Calcutta, 
India.219 These political parties and their cadres played a significant role to establish 
democracy in 1949 by abolishing the Rana regime and also in restoring democracy in 
1989 by overthrowing the Panchayat regime. Besides political parties, civil society also 
played a role in Jana Andolan- I (People’s Movement) in 1989 and Jana Andolan II in 
2006. Some regional parties, mainly Madhes-based parties emerged in the 199s in the 
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Nepalese political arena. Madhes-based parties played a role in the second people’s 
movement and became the fourth political force in the CA.  
None of these parties offered an ideological stand on issues including federalism 
and mainly benefitted from another party’s moves. They also often deviated from their 
party policies. Almost all, including the top parties in national politics, were divided in 
every national issue. Thus, it was unlikely that the most serious national issues—the 
issues of federalism and its basis—would be resolved. Yuba Nath Lamsal writes in his 
editorial on Gorakhapatra—a government-owned national daily— “when there is no 
unanimity within a party, it would be unwise to expect consensus and unanimity among 
parties of different ideologies and orientation.”220 No parties were ready to lose their 
constituencies, so apparently the CA collapsed on the issue of federalism despite four 
years of effort to make the constitution.  
A month before the demise of the CA, there were voices preaching the 
reinstatement of the old constitution from 1990; whereas others were for the referendum 
of federalism, republic and secularism. Moreover, significant numbers in the NC and 
UML were not in favor of federalism. They had taken the issue either for their political 
futures or for tactical maneuvers. ICG claimed in the Asia briefing on April 7, 2007,  
“While NC and many in the UML are deeply uncomfortable with federalism; they and 
other parties will make tactical decisions on it, based on the comparative political gains 
of reaching partial agreement, delaying all agreement, or bartering for other deals such as 
integration.”221  
1. Nepali Congress 
The NC ruled the country a couple of times after the restoration of democracy in 
1990. The NC and its president, late GP Koirala, dominated the Nepalese multi-party 
democratic politics in the first half of the 1990s. Later, with growing Maoist insurgency, 
the King’s direct role in party politics weakened the party.  Sher Bahadur Deuba, an 
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influential leader, broke-off from the party opposed to G. P. Koirala’s hegemony and 
served the bidding of the king. This forced G P Koirala into an alliance with other 
political parties and Maoists in 2005 to oppose the King’s direct rule. Following the 
peace process and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Deuba led the NC-
Democratic and merged back into the mother party. Factionalism in the NC is basically 
driven by personality clashes and group interests. Most of the leaders are skeptical about 
the peace process and federalism, despite its official commitment on federalism. 
Consequently, the NC is losing its political space.222  
The NC adopted democratic socialism as its political fundamental principle in the 
1950s and, later, closely associated itself with the international Socialists. This was 
because of the priorities of the time—to destroy the institutionalized feudal order based 
on land ownership and socioeconomic exploitation—and aspiration of democracy in the 
region. Nehru led Indian National Congress provided a guide for this. There is a big 
debate that the NC had abandoned democratic socialism (this was the platform upon 
which B. P. Koirola developed the party) after the party came into power in 1990.223 The 
NC leader, Ram Sharan Mahat, argues that the NC did not abandon the democratic 
socialism; rather, it has transformed with the new world order. He states,  “Seemingly 
antagonistic in terms, capitalism and socialism are interrelated in the sense that the 
socialist objective will not be achieved without capitalist development.”224  
The NC faced a serious backslash in Terai—its strongest constituencies—after the 
Madhes movement (2007) as many senior leaders and mid-level cadres from Terai left 
the party. As a result, the NC suffered heavily in the CA election. Some indigenous 
leaders who are also active in NEFIN—again after demise of the CA on the identity-
based federal structure issue of the country—threatened to quit the party. They claimed to 
form a new indigenous party if the party continued to distant itself from identity 
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politics.225 Some party leaders doubted the party’s commitment to federalism. The ICG 
report states that leaders are vocal about federalism only in front of their constituents. 
The Madhesi leaders continued in the party even after the Madhes Andolan felt 
embarrassed by the party’s strong position against identity-based federalism.226 
The NC had formally included state restructuring and inclusive democracy in the 
political document in the eleventh party convention in September 2005. It stressed equal 
political participation with full rights and autonomy of the people. During the CA 
election, the NC cleared its party stand on pluralism for setting up the democratic federal 
republic.227 It released its CA election manifesto on March 13, 2008. It was committed to 
the rule of law and the federal governing system based on ethnicity, language and 
geography.228 According to the election manifesto, the NC put its position as,  
The bases of provinces will be Nepal’s national integrity; geographic 
location and feasibility; population; natural resources and economic 
feasibility; interrelationship between provinces; language, ethnicity and 
culture majority, and political and administrative feasibility229  
The election manifesto committed to recognize the unique characteristics of 
Madhesi, indigenous, and Dalits during re-structuring of the country, but it remained 
silent on the number of provinces.230 Although the manifesto was more like a plan for 
government, it also stressed the significance of the CA and its constitution drafting 
process, and reminded the people that the NC was the one who demanded the elected CA 
to draft the democratic constitution in 1950. It advocated liberal democracy with a 
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Westminster government structure, i.e., upper and lower houses, prime minister-led 
cabinet and ceremonial president.231  
The NC’s federal rights concept paper had proposed that the central government 
should have rights on international relations, national security, currency policy and inter-
state coordination issues, such as air transport, highways, customs, tax, and projects of 
national importance like hydropower projects. In regards to powers that provinces should 
enjoy, the NC proposed that provinces should be given all rights related to social, 
cultural, linguistic, and economic rights, including agricultural, forest, health, education, , 
employment, property tax, housing and land, and other sources of income.232 
In April 2012, almost a month before termination of the CA tenure, the NC for the 
first time proposed seven-province model of federalism in the four-party meeting to end 
the disagreement on a number of provinces, its name and basis. Maoist and Madhesi 
parties were quick enough to reject this because it was not based on the ethnic identity 
that they were fighting for. Maoists, in response to the NC’s proposal, stepped back from 
its proposal of 10 provinces and claimed that its 14-province model was its official stand. 
The model produced by congress was not named and responsibility to name it was given 
to the future provincial assembly. The NC, however, claimed its proposal as the best 
balance between identity and capability as well as population and geography. They put 
the existing 75 districts—administration division since the Panchayat time—intact and 
grouped them together to form seven provinces.233 Since time was running out and there 
was less than a month left, the NC, in response to Maoist’s 10-province model, floated by 
Prachanda last month, proposed a nine-province model comprising four provinces in 
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Terai and five provinces in the hills. The Maoists and Madhesi parties strongly rejected 
the proposal.234 
The NC has benefited to some extent from the movement of the highest class and 
caste against federalism, but elite-promoted anti-federalism spectrum put the NC in 
skepticism about secularism and republic. The NC also took serious risks by playing 
upper class politics. This was because the mid-level Chhetris often feel deprived in the 
decision-making level of the party.235 The NC had a strong understanding about taking 
leadership of the government before the election to regain its influence in national 
politics. Factional struggles, primarily in the center, poor communication between party 
headquarters and field, weak leadership and personal ambitions of the top leaders, and 
financial constraints are responsible for weakening the party. The NC’s recent claim over 
leadership of the government possibly could be the result of fears of leadership about 
losing the election without an extra advantage. Most of the leaders, however, believed 
that congress will remain home to democrats and recover its position in coming elections. 
This is because of the split in the Maoist party, internal disputes in UML and poor 
performance of ethnic groups and regional parties.236  
After collapse of the CA, leaders from ethnic and indigenous groups submitted 
the memorandum to leadership demanding a clear party stand on federalism. The NC 
Central Working Committee formed an 11-member study committee to clear the party’s 
official stand on federalism. The Study Committee submitted the report suggesting that a 
federal state based on multi-ethnic identity should be the party’s bottom line.237 The 
Nepali Congress is traditionally perceived as representing the anti-federalist and higher 
caste party. The NC initially rejected the announcement of fresh elections of the CA by 
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the government and later expressed that the election should be for legislative parliament 
that could also function as the CA. Nevertheless, the latest stand of the NC is to form a 
consensus government in its leadership and to conduct the fresh election.238 
2. United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
After rising as the largest political force in the CA, the UCPN (Maoists) became 
the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) absorbing some fringe communist 
parties, including Janamorcha Nepal. The Maoist agenda on an ethnicity-based federal 
structure—a calculated political move assessing political and ethno-cultural situations of 
Nepal—aimed to gain political mileage. The Maoists were encouraged from the results 
from the CA election due to their political mobilization of the hitherto oppressed groups 
of various lingual and ethnic communities.239 
The UCPN (Maoist) successfully mobilized various ethnic constituencies—
Magar, Gurung, Rai,Tamang, Limbu, Tharu and Madhesi people—against the high caste-
based monarchial feudalism during the people’s war.240 In return, ethnic communities 
were promised federal states or autonomous units based on right of self-determination. 
They formed a Jatiya Morcha (caste/ethnic front) selling the slogan of liberation from the 
centralized feudal system.241 Subsequently, the Madhesi and Tharu felt themselves 
neglected in peace and power sharing negotiations, and started agitations against the 
establishment in Kathmandu in 2005/2006. Then Madhesi parties and IPs like Tharu 
initiated ethno-political agitation and accused that present Nepali nationalism is based on 
an axis of power and authority of high caste Hindu.242  
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Regarding federal rights, the UCPN (Maoist), in its CA election manifesto, had 
proposed that a central government should control the issues of foreign relations, national 
army, border security, monetary, inter-state trade, customs revenue, mega hydropower 
projects, air/land routes, including national highways and airports, metrology and central 
university. Similarly, regarding powers of provinces, Maoists proposed all residual 
powers except those defined for central government to the autonomous states.243 
The Maoist’s election manifesto was extensive and deliberate compared to others. 
They explained Nepal’s historic problems caused by feudalism and imperialism, along 
with explaining that the election of the CA is not the same as the periodic election of the 
house of representative. In the commitment paper, they claimed that Maoists was the only 
party that can implement the agenda of the republic and state restructuring. They 
proposed party president, Prachanda, for future president and offered compromises on 
their economic principle, e.g., a public-private partnership and foreign investments.244 
During the people’s war, the Maoists proposed a division of the country into nine 
autonomous republics based on ethnicity and region.245 When joining the CA, however, 
they revised their previous concept and proposed 11 autonomous provinces and the 
possibility of numerous autonomous sub-units in their commitment paper for the CA 
election. They outlined the basis of state restructuring—ethnic, geography, feasibility and 
language—in their election manifesto. They added two provinces, Limbuwan (for Limbu 
community) and Kochila (for Tharu rajbansi and satar community) in eastern Nepal. This 
was separate from their earlier set-up during the people’s war. They proposed Mithila 
Bhojpura and Abadh sub-autonomous units in the Madhes province. These adjustments 
were, possibly, due to the Madhes movement in Terai and the Limbuwan movement in 
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eastern Nepal because Madhesi people and IP of eastern Nepal launched their movement 
demanding autonomous status after Maoist come into peace process.246   
The Maoist, however, submitted a 13-province model to the SRDSPC as their 
party stand in CA. They added two more ethnicity-based provinces, Sherpa and Bhotela, 
and they further proposed four regions, Bijayapur, Tamakoshi, Ridi, and Narayani, as 
centrally-administered territories due to the oppressed ethnic groups in the minority.247 
The Maoist changed party’s position on number of provinces time and again because they 
did not want to lose their constituencies. The Maoist commitment paper claimed their 
understanding of ethnicity and regional identity most practical and scientific, and it 
states: 
…ethnic we mean common language, common geography, common 
economy, and group of people with similar history and culture or 
‘nationality ‘and not ethnicity or race or caste. Also, attention must be paid 
to the fact that there will be sub-national units within a province and 
liberation of one ethnicity should not be at the cost of other nationalities, 
and rights of minorities should be ensured in the provinces with mixed 
nationalities.248 
Political parties, in the last ditch of negotiation, were almost in agreement on the 
mixed form of governance though details to work out the power sharing was yet to be 
done. Prachanda refused to backtrack from the 10-point proposal based on identity, 
floated by his party, as it is the most scientific and practical. The Newa community and 
other ethnic groups supported this Maoist proposal.249  
After the collapse of the CA, the UCPN (Maoists) faced splits in the party. The 
UCPN (Maoist) had long rivalries between its top three leaders—chairman Prachanda, 
Vice chairman Mohan Baidya and Vice Chairman Baburam Bhattarai—on the issues of 
ideology and completion of the revolution in Nepal. These disagreements surfaced during 
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the plenum in Palungtar in 2010.250 There had been sharp differences between Baidya-led 
hard liner factions and Prachanda establishment-led over the integration of the Maoist’s 
army, ethnicity-based federalism, party line to view India and tactical alliances with other 
parties, including growing corruption and greed in party leaders. In addition to 
differences in strategy and ideology, competing personal ambitions and dogmatic 
characters of Baidya-led faction made a vertical split in the party.  
 On June 19, 2012, the Baidya-led faction of Maoists announced the new party—
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-Maoist)—claiming themselves the real 
Maoists. This new party is now working for its organizational build up. Some wartime 
party members and former combatants, including some ethnic cadres, have joined this 
new party. The CPN-Maoist managed to slice a third of the Central Committee members 
and former CA members from its mother party, UCPN (Maoists).251 Failure of the CA to 
promulgate the new progressive constitution was an easy excuse to split the party, but the 
ICG report argues,  “The new draft constitution could also have triggered the break with 
the Baidya faction arguing that it was not revolutionary enough and that ethnicity-based 
federalism had been abandoned.”252 
3. Communist Party of Nepal (UML) 
The CPN (UML) appeared as major political party in1990, which believes in the 
ideals of democracy and socialism for the material development of society. Its guiding 
principle is the People’s Multi-party Democracy along with Marxism-Leninism and 
Socialism as its ultimate goal.253 The CPN (UML) became the largest party in the mid-
term election held in 1994 securing 88 seats out of 205, and formed the minority 
government in December 1994. The government under the leadership of party chairman, 
Man Mohan Adhikari earned popularity in a short time. As a result, a conspiracy hatched 
to collapse the minority government, and the NC formed the coalition government. The 
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CPN (UML) again returned to power under the leadership of RPP, and successfully 
conducted local elections. It became the largest in the local bodies. 254 
The ICG states in its Asia Report on August 27, 2012,  “The UML has ignored its 
ethnic constituency previously and this is not the first time it has lost out to the Maoists 
on ethnic issues.”255 The UML reached out to indigenous groups in the 1990s promising 
their representation in state institutions and politics and promotion of their culture, 
language and heritage. The indigenous, however, witnessed continuous dominations of 
higher caste not only in party politics but also in state machineries and national 
institutions.256 A controversial decision of Sanskrit news broadcasting on national radio 
was taken during the UML-led government from 1994–1995.257 Any efforts to promote 
Sanskrit are considered to be the promotion of the Brahmin–-dominated culture of 
hierarchical Hinduism.258 
The CPN (UML) returned to ethnic-politics and raised pro-indigenous agendas 
following the peace process in 2006. Since the CPA committed to address long-lasting 
issues of socio-political exclusion through broad-based social transformation, it almost 
confirmed that the Maoist would further mobilize their identity-based organizations in 
open environment. So the UML endorsed the regional and ethnic autonomy in August 
2006 to save the party from the Maoists. It also accepted IP rights based on ILO’s 
Convention 169. It promised federalism based on identity and capability in its manifesto 
of the CA election. It had submitted a 15-province model of federalism as a party 
suggestion—based on single identity states and a homeland of particular ethnic groups—
to SRDPC of CA in 2009. Coming to the final negotiation earlier in 2012, however, the 
party stepped back from its earlier stand and opposed federalism based on single-ethnic 
                                                 
254 “Participation in Election and Government”,  CPN (UML), accessed on January 18, 2013, 
www.cpnuml.org/en/pelection.php  
255 ICG, Nepal’s Constitution, 19. 
256 Ibid. 
257 “Party on Verge,” Kathmandu Post, May 26, 2012, accessed June 22, 2012, 
http://www.ekantipur.com/2012/05/26/top-story/party-on-verge-of-split-maoist-hardliners/354520.html.  
258 T. Louise Brown, The Challenge to Democracy in Nepal: A Political History, (London: 
Routledge, 1996), 224. 
 70
identity because party corrected its previous position due to intense differences in party 
central committee over federalism and ethnic identity.259 
Regarding federal rights, the CPN (UML) proposed that the issues related to 
national security, foreign relations, monetary policy, air and land routes, including 
highways and railways, customs revenue, mega hydropower projects, protection of 
human rights and fundamental rights, central university and sharing of heritage should 
come under the jurisdiction of the central government. Likewise, it, being more 
elaborative in its CA election manifesto, had proposed the rights of the provincial 
government in the issues—provincial court, service commission, management of public 
security, trade industry and labor, education, health and protection of provincial roads 
and heritage. Whereas it proposed that rights related to local roads and transport, gas 
power, and water supply, including local education, health and promotion of local 
resources and heritage, should fall under the authority of local government.260 
Although the UML presented its concept of restructuring of the state in 2006, it 
was not clear on a number of provinces and basis of formation. Later in the election 
manifesto, it provided the bases of restructuring—ethnicity culture language and 
geography. The manifesto, however, stressed political consensus for restructuring the 
state. It refrained to provide any number of provinces and models of federalism.261 
Before the demise of the CA, during hot negotiations of the issue of federalism, 
the UML Standing Committee proposed two models in response to the Maoist proposal: a 
10-province model based on a single ethnic identity, an eight-province model based on 
multi-ethnicity and an 11-province model with provisions of neutral names. This policy 
shift of party annoyed indigenous leaders. An intra-party revolt by ethnic leaders further 
deepened after the demise of the CA. They sought for an immediate correction of party 
decisions. The party expelled Ang Kaji Sherpa, who was general secretary of NEFIN, 
because he defied party policy and made inflammatory remarks to top party leaders. 
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Subsequently, the next day another leader of the Solukhumbhu district, Dandu Sherpa, 
who was also a treasurer of NEFIN, resigned from the party blaming that the party’s later 
stand of opposition on ethnic-based federalism was the main cause of the dissolution of 
the CA. It proved that the party undermines the identity of IPs.262 On June 19, 2012, the 
UML CC endorsed the proposal of a seven-province model—an attempt to compromise 
between two extreme views in the party—based on multiple ethnic identities and mixed 
names as prepared by the standing committee. It could not, however, hold the agreed 
party line because five divergent views floated against this proposal in the CC meeting. 
Those were officially registered in the party Secretariat.263 Significant numbers of ethnic 
leaders, including senior vice president Asok Rai, left the party because of the issue of 
the failure to address their demands for an ethnic-based federalism. Around a dozen 
indigenous leaders, including Rai, left their responsibilities in July 2012.264 
Upon failing, the SRC proposed a common model of a state restructuring. The 
CPN (UML) formally came up with two options of federalism: an eight-province model 
with three in Terai, and a twelve-province model with four in Terai. This included three 
tiers of government: central, provincial and local. This proposal actually was an attempt 
to search for a middle ground between two extreme stands of the NC and Maoist along 
with the Madhesi parties. The UML claimed that, after wide consultation with people and 
leaders all over the country, a provision of 11 metropolitan cities achieved economic 
empowerment and social integration, and 150 metro cities and five autonomous regions 
addressed the country’s ethnic diversity. 265 
The CPN (UML) constantly passed through the crisis related to ideology and 
identity and emerged as the third largest party in the CA. It has a past of division and 
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unity due to personality-based factionalism and ideological differences. Some 
enthusiastic indigenous leaders alienated from the party due to serious refutation of senior 
leaders on ethnic- based federalism. Those indigenous leaders were active in cross-party 
indigenous caucus of the CA, and its chair was also from CPN (UML). They blamed their 
own party as a primary reason of the CA’s failure. They termed the role played by the 
UML as a later phase of the CA tenure  “sabotaging “ federalism.266 Top party leadership 
was not convinced with the structural discrimination in Nepal, so they did not follow the 
identity politics. There was common criticism that European donors and INGOs were 
behind the identity-based movements, and identity based federalism was purely a Maoist 
agenda.267  
The UML party faced serious revolt from dissident and indigenous leaders after 
the demise of the CA. Those leaders blamed party leadership for leaving identity based 
federalism. They argued that our official stand was for identity based federalism, as a 
result UML voted in favor of 14 province proposal in SRDSP committee along with CPN 
Maoists and other parties. Dissident leaders including one of the party vice president 
Asok Rai and other influential Madhesi and indigenous leaders accused the high caste 
dominated Central Committee for the conspiracy.268 Consequently, some indigenous and 
Madhesi leaders left the mother party and formed another party taking dissident 
indigenous and ethnic leaders from other parties. 
4. Madhes-Based Parties 
People from the southern belt started to mobilize for political purposes after the 
1990 restoration of democracy. The Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) was the first political 
party represented as a regional party in parliament in the 1991 election. Subsequently, 
political elites in Madhesh acknowledged the importance of mobilization of people using 
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ethnic division to pressure Kathmandu (center).269 They built the politics of Madhesi 
identity mobilizing the Madhesi ethnic people against hill people, indigenous people, 
Tharu and non-tribal people. Maoists, in fact, had used the same strategy to mobilize the 
people against authoritative unitary establishment. Upendra Yadav, an activist from the 
Terai people, formed the MJF in 1997 and cashed the grievances and discrimination of 
Madhesi by the hill people. They became more active and politically-motivated during 
the Maoist insurgency. As a result, most of the activists of the MJF helped the Maoist 
insurgency.270 
After the peace agreement in 2006, most of the Madhesi who were active and 
high ranking in the Maoist movement, blaming sidelining and neglect, broke away from 
the Maoists and started their own movements. Shortly, several groups erupted under the 
Madhesi banner, exploiting the people’s aspiration for change and the political vacuum 
due to 10-year Maoist insurgency. Those groups successfully used Maoist tactics and 
knowledge of how to mobilize the people and how to strategically tackle the state from 
their active involvement in the Maoist people’s war. Later in 2007, the three largest 
Madhesi organizations—Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), Terai Madhes Loktantrik 
Party (TMLP) and NSP—came together to distance themselves from their violent 
activities and formed the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF). They grew the 
UDMF as a legitimate political entity of the Madhes and used this platform for 
negotiations with the government. They, by doing so, distanced themselves from a 
number of criminal gangs who used the Madhesi slogan and the people’s sentiment to 
disguise their criminal activities.271 
The Sadbhavana Party, in its concept paper of the constitution regarding federal 
rights, had proposed that three issues—national security, foreign relations and currency–
needed to be handled by a central government. It proposed all powers to province except 
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those outlined for center. While the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, in addition to the issues 
raised by the Sadbhavana Party, had proposed that policy related and topics of central 
concern should be handled by center. In its CA election manifesto, it had proposed all 
rights related to internal security and administration, trade and resource management, 
education and public health, agriculture and micro industry, transit and housing 
development to the provincial government.272 
MJF (Nepal), in his manifesto, demanded that the entire Terai region be a single 
autonomous province. It stressed their demand of a Madhes province—in response to 
Maoists division of Terai into several autonomous state, such ase Kochila,Tharuhat, 
Bhojpura, Awadh—and claimed that a single province could only free Terai from internal 
colonialism. 273 Similarly, TMLP also demanded a Terai-Madhes Autonomous unit in its 
election manifesto.274 
The UDMF managed to sell the Madhes identity by turning historical grumbles to 
political benefit. Madhesi leaders mobilized the grass root people and justified the 
violence against the state that shifted the connotation of Madhes from its geographical 
origins to ethnic identity. UDMF leaders took every opportunity to remain in power in 
the government and stick with the agenda of the Madhes in order to maintain their 
political base in Terai. Miklian states in his briefing paper,  
UDMF leaders alternate between threatening rhetoric and conciliatory 
statements to press their demands…The UDMF has shifted allegiances 
several times among political parties on the left and right in Kathmandu 
since elections, hoping to strike the deal with any party that will support 
One Madhes.”275  
Perhaps that could be the reason why the present ruling coalition of Maoist and 
UDMF sticks with identity-based federalism. 
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Many Madhesi people who were supporting UDMF during election openly 
questioned the interest of their leaders on securing exclusive rights and power in Terai 
rather than seeking and ensuring a reasonable share of power in the center, Kathmandu. 
That substantiated the fear of secession as a final goal of the Madhesi movement.276 It is 
not that  “One Madhes “ demand was unopposed in Terai. Tharu, who claimed IP of 
Terai, opposed their inclusion in the  “One Madhes “ agenda and demanded a separate 
autonomous unit. Though less in number than the Madhesi, they are located mostly in 
Terai.277 
The government signed two agreements with the UDMF in August 2007 and Feb 
2008 following the agitations in the entire Madhes. The principle demand was for a 
single autonomous unit in the entire Terai with the right of self-determination, and other 
demands related to equal participation in national institutions, government machineries 
and politics in center.278 The UDMF dissolved during the CA election period and it again 
revived immediately after election, possibly, to make the Madhesh voice effective in the 
CA. The UDMF with 81 out of 601 seats secured the fourth position in the CA. the 
election results, however, showed that they had  less hold in western Terai.279  
In August 2009, the Madhes-based parties again came to the street and protested 
with widespread strikes immediately after Supreme Court declared the oath in Hindi 
language by Vice President is unconstitutional. Supreme Court ordered the Vice 
President to retake the oath in Nepali language. Vice President was from the Madhes 
origin and affiliated with one of the political parties of Madhes. Earlier, he had taken the 
                                                 
276 Prashant Jha, “Plain Speaking Things Fall Apart: Will the Madhesi Centre Hold?,” Nepali Times, 
February 1, 2008, accessed January 5, 2013, http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=14438.  
277 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Nepal: Political Developments and 
Bilateral Relations with the United States, by Bruce Vaughn., CRS Report RL34731 (Washington, DC: 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, April 7, 2011), 3. 
278 Miklian, “Nepal’s Terai: Constructing,” 5–6. 
279 Madhesi parties exploited their political slogan of “one Madhesh” during election and Madhesi 
parties got over 1,150,000 votes, and majority of voters were from eastern Terai. This was great 
achievement for Madhes based politicians as they had a very weak representation during 1991 election, 
hardly a half dozen in 205 constituencies in House of Representative. For further details, see ICG, Nepal’s 
Election: A Peaceful Resolution, Asia Report No.153, July 3, 2008. 
 76
oath in the Hindi language.280 Madhesi, after the CA election, appeared as an important 
regional dimension in the political stability of Nepal. Since the majority of people in the 
Terai region, especially eastern Terai, are ethnically and culturally-close to the northern 
states of India, significant presence of Madhesi parties in the CA and both president and 
Vice president being from Madhes posed new threats to the political stability of the 
country.281 Furthermore, Hindu radicals from India were alleged for the frequent violence 
in Terai. Religious groups--like Shiva Sena-Nepal--are active in the region, which has 
close connections to the South.282 
The Madhesi party, in formation of the SRC, argued that the proper place to 
discuss this is the CA and no other body would be more legitimate than they CA. They 
feared that SRC would be overwhelmed by major political parties and it would delay or 
disrupt the federalism. So they constantly opposed the SRC.283 The Madhesi party had 
pressed systematic pressure against the other national parties and government several 
times in history. They often times pressed either to promulgate the constitution with 
federalism or to dissolve the CA. It is widely believed that they are closer to the Indian 
establishment. A few influential leaders from the Madheshi parties visited India in March 
2011, and they threatened the government to dissolve the CA or be ready to face the 
Madhesh movement.284 
The UDMF flatly rejected the 11-province model and reiterated that no other 
proposal would be acceptable except a 14-province model proposed by the SRDPC or a 
10-province model proposed by the SRC. Earlier there was agreement among three 
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parties on an 11-province model comprising five states in Terai in a meeting where the 
UDMF was not present. The UDMF even threatened to walk out from the coalition and to 
go to the street for protest. Then Prachanda asked the UDMF leaders to calm down, and 
assured them that he would withdraw the 11-province model after consultation with the 
NC and UML. Prachanda stressed the continuation of the present coalition because it was 
taking progressive agendas forward.285  
5. Other Parties 
Other parties’ voices in the CA did not mean a lot due to their negligible numeric 
representation. Many fringe parties are polarizing to either of side depending upon the 
immediate political benefit. Certain small parties, however, represented the certain 
sections of society and stood firmly against the federalism issue inside the CA and 
outside in the street. The RPP (N) campaigned for constitutional Monarchy and a 
referendum to decide the future of Monarchy, federalism and secularism. The RPP and 
the RJP, however, expressed their commitment to follow the decision of the CA on 
monarchy. RPP’s manifesto embraced the concept inclusive of multi-party democracy 
and reasoned the upper house is ethnic- based, but it remained silent on the future of the 
Monarchy286. Similarly, Rastriya Janamorcha Nepal, with four members in the CA, 
opposed federalism claiming it was not viable and would disintegrate the country. It not 
only opposed federalism in Nepal, but strongly advocated a unitary system of governance 
with democratic decentralization and local autonomy for oppressed communities. The 
rest of all political parties who were in the CA included federalism in their manifestos.287 
Several indigenous leaders from major political parties—after dissolution of the 
CA on the issue of ethnic-identity-based federalism—felt neglected. Leaders from the NC 
and CPN (UML) forced party leaderships to clear their stand and threatened to quit the 
party. They blamed their party leaderships for failing to address the demand of the ethnic 
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people.288 The dissatisfaction of ethnic leaders was serious in the national parties. The 
vice president and other leaders from the UML left the party because of this issue and 
opened a new party of indigenous people, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). This step 
hinted at the further polarization in politics and society. Asok Rai, former vice president 
of CPN(UML), however, failed to accommodate other ethnic leaders of the NC differing 
in ideology as he was rigid with Marxism and others, such as Chaitanya Subba, an 
influential indigenous leader of NC, refused to accept the Marxism ideology.289 The NC 
and CPN (UML), along with other several parties in opposition, following the dissolution 
of the CA, demanded the resignation of the Bhattarai-led government and the formation 
of a national consensus government to conduct an election of a fresh CA. They termed 
the decision to dissolve the CA as ‘unconstitutional,’ but no consensus on draft 
constitution and the order of Supreme Court not to extend the term further, possibly, 
forced the government to dissolve the CA just a few hours before its natural death. Then 
they announced a fresh election.290  
D. ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES IN 
NEPAL 
Nepal being a poor country with economic dependence on foreign assistance, 
neighboring countries, donor countries and international communities have been 
contributing significantly in its transition to democracy. Considering the geopolitical 
situation and dependent economy, India, China, E.U., and U.S. have special roles and 
interests in Nepal’s political impasse. The democratic world had a close eye on the 
political development in Nepal, and it often put pressure towards the democratic 
transition of the country. 
Nepal had used the  “China card “ to counterbalance the hegemonic relation with 
south in the past, and, at times, sought for independent foreign policy. Prachanda’s first 
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visit to China as a prime minister in 2008—breaking the tradition of a first visit to India 
by new prime minister—was viewed as the strategic closeness of Maoists to China.291   
1. Ineffective and Divided Civil Society 
Civil society in Nepal started to organize itself along the movement for 
democracy. It has played an important role in the restoration of democracy since 1990.292 
Its role in the People’s movement II in 2006 was very significant for pressuring the 
political parties into a decisive end. At the height of the people’s struggle for democracy, 
civil society’s role in regime change overshadowed the leadership of parties and proved it 
irrelevant to the centrality of civil society. The role and significance of civil society, 
however, slightly eroded in the years after completion of the second people’s movement. 
Civil society has lost its credibility about representing the voice of the common people, 
and it has started to reflect the political mouth piece with certain political leaning—a 
serious concern for the future role of the civil society293 
Civil society ideally should work as watchdog on activities of the political parties 
and government so that the voice of the poor and marginalized groups and common 
people will not be suppressed. It needs to check the political forces to serve the greater 
interest of the nation and welfare of the people. There is a need that Nepalese civil 
society should come up with its own language and maintain the old image on the logical 
conclusion of the peace process institutionalizing democracy.294 Since federalism and the 
institutionalization of democracy is the national agenda, civil society should come 
forward and take this agenda out of political debate and bargain. The inactivity and 
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politicization of civil society had contributed to the failure of the CA without 
promulgation of constitution. Since people are not organized in such a manner, political 
forces did not feel accountable to them. Civil society could have filled this vacuum.  
The role of civil society and donor agencies so far has not seen coherence to 
peace building in society. Some projects financed by donor agencies and INGOs have 
been blamed for causing ethnic tension exacerbating violence in the harmonized society 
for centuries. It is hard to find an apolitical civil society in Nepal. Since it is divided by 
partisan lines and linked to one of the political parties, their ideal function of the 
facilitator between government and community has not materialized. Similarly, relation 
between private organizations and civil society also lacks cooperation and mutual 
understandings.295  
Social organizations for the welfare of community due to dependency on foreign 
aid and technical support, often contradict with national and social agendas. Chandra D. 
Bhatta puts his view of mixed results regarding donors’ roles in Nepal as: 
Some large donors are circumventing the state and its institutions 
promoting within civil society clients to sell their agendas. Other donor 
countries—Germany, Finland, and Japan—are operating at the grass roots 
level with mandates from the government…German development 
organizations are seldom criticized because of their engagement at the 
grass root level and aligning with national priorities.296 
2. India’s Concern in Nepal 
Nepal‘s economy is heavily dependent on its southern neighbor, India. India, for 
Nepal, is the primary source of import, export and, most importantly, the only access to a 
sea route. India is a major donor country of Nepal. Nepal’s proximity with India is not 
limited to geography and economy, but people of both countries, particularly residing in 
the Terai belt, share religious and cultural traditions. India perceives that the instability in 
Nepal contributes to the potential threat in its troublesome Northeast and Northern 
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states.297 In January 2011, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao visited Nepal and 
conducted political consultations with Nepalese PM Madhav Kumar Nepal and leaders of 
other political parties, including Maoist chairman Prachanda. It was reported in the media 
that she asked about Maoist’s anti-India posture and Prachanda requested to review the 
India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950)—popularly known as the 1950 
Treaty.298  
India, a regional hegemon, believes Nepal is within its area of influence and its 
involvement in Nepalese internal politics—guided by its own national interest—often 
makes the situation complicated. India always assumed that the growing Maoist in Nepal 
meant greater influence by China. This is because of the ultra-nationalist and anti-Indian 
sentiments in Maoist leaderships and cadres.299 India is worried about the strong Maoist 
role in Nepalese politics because it would have a spillover effect in the provinces that are 
already crippled by the Maoist movement. India certainly wants stability across the 
border for its own security and stability. Sudden visits of a few top Madhesi leaders in 
March 2011 to consult with Indian leaders in Delhi, at the time of political hot debate on 
federalism in Kathmandu, could possibly be viewed as Indian influence in Nepalese 
politics.300 Adam Bergman argues in his report,  
Whether this meeting was to discuss Madhesi violence and secessionist 
steps to force Kathmandu to concede on federalism, or whether it was a 
move with Nepal’s stability and unity at heart is difficult to know, but very 
act of inviting regional political parties that have strong ties to Delhi for 
secret discussions does not send positive signals about India’s 
intentions.”301  
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The presence of the U.N. mission in Nepal was a matter of concern for India. 
Possibly, it might have reduced the Indian role in the region. India pushed both the 
United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the Office of High Commission for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) to scale down. Since the UNMIN rolled back from Kathmandu 
in January 2011, India filled the vacuum of political influence. Regarding Indian Interest 
in Nepal, Adam Bergman argues,  “…an Indian interest in Nepal plays a key role in the 
prospects for federalization to end with peace and stability.”302  
Since Nepal is going through complicated democratic transition with weak state 
institutions and political instability mainly due to mistrust among political parties, 
competitive geopolitical actors also have their respective interests. India, for its strategic 
interest in Nepal, wants less outside influence, especially from China, U.S. and E.U. The 
domestic political forces of Nepal are also polarized along these geopolitical lines.303 
Chandra D. Bhatta views the present security vacuum due to fragile political environment 
and Indian interest in Nepal as: 
The absence of National center has caused a security vacuum. Given this 
state of affairs it appears that India will continue to cultivate pro-Indian 
leaders in main stream parties, support Madhesis and engage with armed 
non-state actors hiding in India. Political analysts view it as an attempt to 
shift Nepal’s political heartland from the hills to the Terai-Madhes.304 
3. China’s Interest in Nepal 
Considering China is a rising global power and of its problem with Tibet—Nepal’s 
bordering autonomous state of China—it has key interests in Nepal. China is extending its 
influence to the SAARC region as it received Observer status in the SAARC since 2005. In 
2011, China announced that it seeks strong economic and political relations with South 
Asia.305 China had significantly good cooperation with some of the South Asian countries in 
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the recent past, possibly with economic interest, but it may encircle India strategically. Some 
view this Chinese approach as a geopolitical concern to India.306  
Chairman Mohan Baidya of CPN-Maoist, a new faction split from the UCPN 
(Maoist), revealed in July 26, 2012 that China was seriously concerned with growing 
foreign influence about federalism. China had sent a strong message that such illicit 
activism under cover of federalism will not be tolerable. According to him, Chinese 
leaders doubted that federalism may risk the unity and integrity of Nepal. China, at the 
same time, reiterated the policy of non-interference in Nepalese domestic affairs, he 
added in the media. China was for strong alliances among communist parties and political 
stability in Nepal.307  
China also has great security concerns due to frequent activities of the free Tibet 
movement of Tibetan communities in Nepal with the support of a few political leaders 
from different parties, such as the INGOs and the Human Right organizations. In the 
recent past, China increased its engagements in Nepal. It had not only increased 
investments on infrastructure development and high level political visits, but also 
expressed its desire to strengthen the capabilities of security organizations, such as Army, 
Armed Police Force and Police. The primary interest of China in Nepal, with all these 
supports, appears to nullify the growing congregating interest of India, E.U. and U.S. on 
the Tibeten issue.308 Though federalism is the issue of state restructuring and domestic 
political debate, it will be very hard to totally undermine the interest of neighbors and 
their views on the issue with given geopolitical scenario of Nepal. 
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4. E.U.’s Role in Nepal 
The assistance and support of E.U. in development and transformation is very 
important. It ranks as one of the top donor parties of Nepal. The role of E.U., however, 
has often been criticized for instigating roles to ethnic and regional groups. Its 
involvement in Nepal is mostly through donor agencies and INGOs implementing 
numbers of projects with the promotion of constitutional democracy, social justice, 
human rights, peace and several development projects mainly in remote places.309 
On November 14, 2008, Danish ambassador to Nepal, Finn Thilsted, cautioned 
Nepalese politicians for blindly copying the model of federalism from other parts of the 
world. He said federalism in Nepal could be impractical, and urged the politicians—who 
have no clue of the federalism type that is best suited for Nepal—to consider the possible 
consequences of federalism.310 He expressed his view regarding his understanding of 
Nepalese socioeconomic structure as,  
Since there are various ethnic groups within a single village development 
committee in Nepal it would be difficult to find the foundations for 
federalism…If federalism is adopted under such conditions there will be 
unnecessary costs in the basic needs of the people like education and 
health.311 
He highlighted the urgency of ground work, based on his tour of remote villages, 
to empower the rural people to be included in the decision-making process. He, citing the 
example of his own country, said that the Danish constitution was written by a single 
person almost one and a half centuries ago without federal structure, and it successfully 
worked with amendments to match the time and need of people to achieve socioeconomic 
development.312  
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5. U.S. and Nepal  
The U.S. policy for Nepal is to help build a peaceful, prosperous and democratic 
society. The U.S. has provided development assistance worth more than $1.2 billion since 
1951 and it has increased significantly in recent years. Annual bilateral assistance now 
has reached to about $54 million. Trade between the two countries is not significant, and 
the total two-way trade amount was $86 million in 2009.313 Democracy, rule of law, 
promotion of human rights and regional stability are the U.S concerns in Nepal. Initially, 
Maoist violence, along with its policies of a one-party Republic, class enemies, and 
export of revolution were some of the serious concerns.314 Due to its violent past and 
Maoist ideology, the United States put the UCPN (Maoist) on its terrorist list. Recently, 
this has been corrected after reviewing the Maoist commitment to multi-party democracy 
and peaceful political settlement. According to Media Note released from the U.S. 
Department of State on September 6, 2006,  
The Department of State has revoked the designation of the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)) and its aliases as a Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist entity under Executive Order 13224, and as a  
“terrorist organization “ from the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).315 
U.S. foreign policy in Nepal basically is guided by democracy, human rights and 
other international norms, and it differs from policy practiced by India and China. The 
U.S., however, continuously advised Nepal about constructive engagements with both its 
giant neighbors.316 The U.S. policy of continuing engagement and assistance for 
institutional development is being supportive in the democratic transition in Nepal. U.S. 
interest in Nepal has grown significantly after the Maoist insurgency reached at height, 
and it is continuously monitoring ongoing political debates primarily logical ending of 
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peace process and democratization of the country. U.S. being the world power has lot of 
influence in every political development given the unique strategic location of Nepal.  
E. ISSUES ON FEDERALISM AND RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
The Madhesi and indigenous people sparked protest immediately after the release 
of a draft interim constitution in December 2006, demanding explicit commitment to 
federalism and a proportional electoral system in constitution. The protest further 
accelerated after the legislature parliament passed the interim constitution in January 15, 
2007. The MJF and NSP turned to violent protests in Terai demanding Terai as a single 
province. G. P. Koirala, then prime minister, in response to protest across the country, 
addressed the nation twice, and he expressed his commitment to federalism, the electoral 
system and to representation of the Madhesi and minorities. The government had signed 
several agreements with the Madhesi and ethnic groups during January and February, 
assuring a mixed electoral system and a federal republic, possibly, to make the 
environment conducive to the CA election.317 Protests, however, stopped only after 
declaring Nepal a  “Democratic and Federal State “ in the first amendment of the 
constitution on April 12, 2007.318 
1. Why Number of Provinces Matter? 
The SRDSPC of the CA—the most democratic institution to decide any political 
matter—came up with 14 province models with the authority to grant autonomy to more 
than 30 ethnic groups. Similarly, the SRC—a body of political consensus to forge the 
stalemate of federalism in Nepal—came up with 11-province models (10 territorial states 
and one non-territorial state for Dalits) based on ethnicity of the country (see Figure 6). 
Political leaders in the CA, however, could not come up with a common consensus of the 
number of provinces and its basis and naming. Mahendra Lawoti, an scholar advocating 
the right of the IPs, writes in the National Daily,  
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…putting forward various excuses and explanations, the status quoists are 
attempting to adopt a six-eight province model where Bahun-Chhetri will 
become the majority or the largest group in most of the provinces. The six-
eight-province model is primarily a mono-ethnic model where one ethnic 
group will dominate the center and most, if not all, provinces, and rejects 
autonomy to numerous other ethnic groups, including by not envisioning 
local autonomy for many small populated groups.319 
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Figure 6.  14-Province Model Proposed by SRDSPC and 10 Province Model proposed by SRC  
(from http://linguae.weebly.com/nepali.html) 
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He further argues that all federal models are basically ethnic. The basic difference 
is that six-eight province models will be mono-ethnic and 11-14 province models will be 
multi-ethnic. He counters the idea of viability to more than 10 provinces by saying that 
the experiences of countries around the world validated the fact that countries with larger 
number of units are less susceptible to collapse. As any decisions in the SRC or SRDSPC 
were unanimous, the question on protection of minority voice needs to be addressed. This 
is true, however, only in the democratic process when the minority is harmed by the 
majority. Regarding the role of the higher caste in the two models—11 and 14 province 
models—he claims:320  
Bahun Chhetri’s interest will not only be protected in both models, but 
they will continue to dominate the polity but less than before. First, they 
will be large group in most provinces hence their interest cannot be 
undermined in electorally based polity … Two, the Bahun Chhetri will 
continue to be the largest group in the country and will dominate central 
politics …Third, Bahun-Chhetri will in fact be the majorities or the largest 
group a few provinces in the 14 province model and continue to influence 
politics in multiple provinces whereas other ethnic groups will dominate 
only one province each. In fact, without autonomy, minority rights of the 
Bahun Chhetri groups will be violated because they will have to live under 
the policies formed by the dominant group whose culture, values, needs 
and preferences are different in many instances.321  
In the 14-province model, nine provinces were crafted based on ethnicity and 
economic viability was neglected over sentiments for ethnicity. For efficient work of any 
model of federalism, three factors—availability of resources, its mobilization and 
capacity to engage trade—at least need to be seriously considered. Complete reliance on 
the center of any province ultimately loses the basic meaning of federalism and 
autonomy. The issue of resource distribution and identity often tends to increase the 
number of provinces. Take the case of Nigeria currently with 36 states which originally 
was planned for three states.322   
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Mahendra outlined two basic reasons that supporting the 11 to14 province model 
more suited to Nepal. First, Madhesi and most of the IP will not be satisfied in the case of 
the five-six province models and there is ample chance that they will join the hands that 
may threaten the stability of the country. Second, more province means the provincial 
government will reach for the best of his people to help democratization of the country by 
empowering the real grass root’s people. There is the question of sharing resources and 
interdependence. This question is not only limited to a country; rather, it is a global 
phenomenon of today’s globalized world.323 
Criticizing the 14-province model the NC argued that this model tried to address 
the ethnic groups but failed to address the 103 ethnic groups of the country. The 14 
province models were basically based on the representation of provinces by the largest 
community within that province. The very fact of the country is co-existence of the 
communities all over the country because of mixed settlements and, interestingly, no 
community or province named enjoys a majority. No province existed with a simple 
majority of any ethnicity/caste/community. 324 
A point to note is that the high caste leaderships lost considerable political 
leverage once they tried to omit federalism in the Interim Constitution that gave birth to 
the Madhesi parties through the Madhes movement. Thus, an attempt to enforce the six to 
eight-province models essentially harms the main political parties because of significant 
segmentation of ethnic leaders within each party who are uniting for their individual 
causes.325 
2. Last Minute Efforts in CA 
Later, Terai-based parties formed the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) 
and joined the club of decision makers. Nepal witnessed the power games among the 
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CPN (Maoists), NC, CPN (UML) and UDMF. During the last week of the CA tenure, the 
NC and CPN (UML) flatly rejected the joint proposal of the ruling coalition (Maoists and 
UDMF) for 10 provinces based on single ethnic identity. Disputes persisted among 
political parties on the name and number of provinces. The NC and UML proposed to 
promulgate a draft of the constitution by May 27, 2012 with provisions to settle the issues 
of federalism—number, boundary and name of provinces—by transforming parliament. 
The UCPN (Maoists) and UDMF, in response, accused the NC and UML for conspiring 
against the constitution without guaranteeing federalism. Political parties, however, 
restrained from participating in the voting method to resolve the disputes. They 
considered that voting on the CA would danger democracy, federalism and the republican 
set-up.326 
One day before demise of the CA, the Maoist and UDMF proposed a 14-based 
province based on a single identity; whereas the NC and CPN (UML) proposed an eight-
province model based on multi-identity in terms of language, ethnicity and culture. The 
ruling coalitions, the UCPN (Maoist) and UDMF, blamed opposition parties, mainly the 
NC and CPN (UML), for turning down both proposals: the 14-province model proposed 
by the SRDPC and the 10-province model prescribed by the SRC. 327 
Initially, a fresh election of the CA was scheduled for November 2012, but it 
could not meet because of the failure to form a consensus government to conduct the 
election. Now, May 2013 is the target, yet there is no signal of a consensus in 
government. The president, in ceremonial role, has been urging to forge a consensus and 
is giving ultimatums for parties to do so. Neither opposition nor ruling coalition is 
showing flexibility. There are 27 opposition parties, including the NC and UML, stating 
that the government’s decision to dissolve the CA and call for a fresh election as 
unconstitutional, and they started a campaign to remove the present coalition—as they 
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term unholy—and to form the consensus government to conduct the election.328 The 
present government—coalition of UCPN (Maoist), UDMF and some other parties—
want to stay in power till the election, but the opposition is demanding first resignation 
of the present Bhattarai government before any negotiation.329 Presently, failing on 
several options of power sharing and form of government, both the opposition parties 
and ruling coalition are on the street to show their muscle. This is not the solution of the 
political crisis. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed the structure of the CA and the role that the political parties 
play in it on the issue of federalism. It summarized the constitution drafting process, 
various positions of parties on federalism and the possible reasons behind such positions. 
The chapter highlighted the inconsistency of parties in the issues related to federalism 
and the role of international communities, including the civil society in Nepal’s transition 
to democratic federalism. 
State restructuring through federalism and republican set-up were two radical 
agendas established by the People’s Movement (2006). The first meeting of the CA 
implemented the republican set-up; whereas, the next one remained undecided due to 
lack of political consensus and sincerity. Political parties polarized into two camps—
ethnic-based federalism and federalism based on economic viability with a multi-ethnic 
state. Parties backing identity-based federalism—mainly the UCPN (Maoists), Madhesi 
parties and various ethnic groups—to accommodate large numbers of ethnic groups, 
pushed for a greater number of states. While the other camp is comprised of the NC, CPN 
(UML) and other traditional parties in order to achieve economic viability, they are 
pressed for the minimum possible number of provinces so that all could run their state 
affairs independently.  
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Since its establishment, as it led the every political movement in Nepal, the NC 
has its own constituencies. Likewise, left-oriented parties, mainly the CPN (UML) and 
CPN (Maoist), have their own constituencies, mostly grass root and deprived sections of 
the people, including the ethnic IPs and Dalits. Though all political parties agreed upon 
federalism and democracy, they differed about the basis of federalism, forms of 
government, and such other issues that kept the CA in the prison of indecisiveness. 
Basically, new revolutionary forces of the Maoist and Terai-based regional parties 
advocated for ethnic-based federalism. Other parties, however, mainly the NC, CPN 
(UML) and other traditional parties, opposed the ethnic identity-based federalism and 
pressed for multi-ethnic federalism based on geography and viability. 
Two major parties—the NC and CPN (UML), appeared reluctant federalist at 
their best. They pressed to promulgate the constitution without the federal set-up. The 
UCPN (Maoists), Madhesi parties and ethnic communities, however, stood firm on the 
constitution with identity-based federalism as their bottom line. In addition, parties 
lacked proper homework and vision regarding the federal structure. They often changed 
the stand as per the political calculation in the power game. Polarization of parties and 
geopolitical impacts on national politics caused crystallization of the contentious issue. 
Defunct and politicized civil societies and international communities with diverse interest 
added to the complexity of the problem. 
The issue of the number of provinces and their basis of creation made the drawing 
of provincial borders more challenging. The pattern of demographic distribution and 
growing regional politics in the recent past further complicated the issue of federalism. 
The Newar community of Kathmandu Valley, for instance, the most historically 
concentrated group in the country also falls short of majority as they constitute 36% in 
the valley.330 Similarly, Chhetri may claim for the autonomous region as a largest single 
caste group, but they also are only 16% in that province.331 So, political parties cheaply 
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committed to the people during the democratic movement and election. Later on, the 
spread out of IPs and ethnic communities put them in difficult positions to finalize the 
number of provinces and basis of formation, including its border and naming. Drawing 
the border is not only difficult but politically very sensitive as it divides the community in 
one way or another. 
Every party is focused on its own party’s interests. All aim to finish the process 
under their leadership so that their own party would get political credit for the smooth 
transition, and interests of their respective class and groups would be best represented. 
Class interest and fear of losing constituencies are the fundamental causes of the present 
day deadlock. It is unlikely to resolve unless the parties compromise their political 
interests, putting national agenda in the center. 
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IV. SPAIN AND INDIA: ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES ON 
DEMOCRATIC FEDERALISM AND LESSONS LEARND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Spain is a multi-ethnic, diverse state in terms of language, history and traditions. 
The government of Spain structured the country into 17 self-governing regions, each with 
its own government and legislature in 1980s, after the end of Franco regime. This 
federalist solution successfully managed the issue of ethno-territorial cleavages, and it 
kept the country unified in a democratic political structure.332 Great ethnic diversity and a 
long legacy of authoritarian regime did not derail the democratic consolidation process in 
Spain, unlike in Russia and other newer democracies that witnessed repression and 
exclusion of ethnic minorities. Linz and Stepan term the Spanish democratic transition 
case ‘paradigmatic’ because of its unique characteristics.333 An authoritarian regime-
initiated transition under tremendous pressure from society and continued the cultural 
work of a civil society before and during the transition. Spain used its lessons of civil war 
to promote further transition and problems of diverse ethnicity and nationality as well as 
the democratization, all at the same time.334 
India’s political leaders, after independence in 1947, faced the challenge of 
forming a government to satisfy people diverse in caste, religion, culture, ethnicity, 
language and class. There was a strong demand of good governance and effective 
development from the people at the grass roots, but nation-building was the priority of 
the political leaderships. They encountered tough challenges particularly due to a vast 
territory and an extremely heterogeneous, pluralist, economically rural society.335 
Political leaders after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, adopted liberal 
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democracy and federalism for the future socioeconomic structure of India. Indian 
political elites were already in trauma with the partition of sub-continent into two 
countries, India and Pakistan, based on religion. Additionally, smooth integration of 
princely states in the wake of independence from the British Raj and continental size 
nation-building with a large population of multiple identities left no other alternatives. 
The Unitary system of addressing those issues was out of the question because of 
opposition. Hence, democracy and federalism proved to be the sole political solution to 
managing India, a vast country with social and ethnic diversity.336  
Spain and India, two countries with a lot of dissimilarities, have two things in 
common: multi-ethnic societies, and successful federalization and transition to 
democracy from an authoritarian/colonial past. Though every case is unique, these two 
cases establish the fact that democracy and federalism, or decentralization in a broader 
sense, are mutually supportive in pluralistic society. This chapter analyses the process of 
federalism and gradual institutionalization of democracy in each case. Furthermore, this 
chapter attempts to draw some lessons for consolidation of democracy in Nepal.  
B. SPAIN: A CASE OF DMOCRATIC FEDERALISM  
Despite complications of overlapping levels of representation and regional 
politics based on nationalities and ethnic lines, Spain is a case of successful federalization 
of a multi-ethnic state. It took the process of democratization forward, establishing 
federal institutions without jeopardizing its territorial integrity. Contrary to the case of the 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—where disintegration, chaos and 
protracted civil war loomed over years—Spain managed its problem peacefully by means 
of federalization, dividing the country into self-ruled units. Spain adopted a constitutional 
process to address the demand of all ethnic and culturally diverse groups, keeping the 
democratic norms alive.337 
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1. Ethnic Diversity of Spain 
Language had the main role in the Spanish cultural diversity. Though 
Castilian Spanish was the dominant language throughout the country, it is believed 
that one fourth of Spanish used to speak a mother tongue other than Castilian in 
the late 1980s. Ethnic group boundaries do not coincide with administrative 
jurisdictions. As a result, diversity becomes more complex to determine. The 
native tongues, other Iberian languages, served mostly for the informal 
communication; whereas, Castilian continued to be dominant in formal and official 
use.338 Besides dominant Castilian, there were three distinct peripheral ethnic 
groups, possibly, whose historical existence was older than state. Catalan was the 
first, Galician second and Basques was third in terms of their respective sizes. 
Basque drew the attention due to its influence in Spanish politics and society in 
late 1980s by its violence struggle against Spanish state. Catalans and Galician 
were less violent than the Basque. Additionally, Andalusia in the south was a 
center of fragmenting regionalism. Gypsies were very negligible in numbers, but 
represented a troublesome and depressed cultural minority in Spain.339 
2. Political History of Spain 
Spain is one of the oldest, traditionally centralized states in Europe with 
ethnic and linguistic diversity. The project of federalization that materialized after 
the end of Franco’s authoritarian regime, in fact, was not the first but the third 
endeavor to institutionalize federal structure in Spain. First, during 1873–74, Spain 
was declared a republican confederation (First Republic), possibly due to the direct 
influence of the liberal progressive upsurge of the nineteenth century. Republican 
leaders actually planned for 17 states (13 peninsular and 4 overseas) with their 
separate constitutions and legislation.340 This could not be implemented and 
remained on paper as it attracted serious criticism and strong resistance from the 
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wider range of societal and political forces. Consequently, the first attempt of 
federalization collapsed with the military rebellion against it in 1874.341 
The second effort for federalization, ‘The Second Republic,’ was considered the 
first deliberate attempt. It was carried out by a diverse coalition of leftist parties from 
19311939.342 Republican leaders granted Basque and Catalonia self-rule in haste. They 
were all set to create a third autonomous region, Galicia. These politically unplanned and 
hasty steps dragged Spain into catastrophic and tragic civil war and into ethno-political 
violence that took the lives of nearly a million people. The political consequence of this 
catastrophe meant that Spain was ruled by Franco’s authoritarian regime, a dictatorship 
from 1939 to 1977. Franco ruled the country as a centralized state, successfully rallying 
forces—military, Catholic Church, traditional conservatives and nationalist—behind him. 
The federal structures, political parties and trade unions, Franco believed, were the root 
causes of civil war. Franco perhaps believed that the multiple nationalities and ethnic 
diversities of Spain were the sources of civil unrest and separatist movements. Hence, at 
the very beginning, he abolished the federal set-ups/institutions, and banned political 
parties, including all kinds of trade unions, to strengthen his regime.343  
3. Issues of Federalism and Democracy in Spain 
The territorial dimension of Spain in terms of distinct ethno-territorial entities 
were strengthened in the19th century along with a process of industrialization in 
Catalonia and the Basque region. Consequently, elements of distinction among ethnic 
communities prevailed despite several attempts at nation-state harmonization. The 
subsequent process of state-building could not guarantee the meaningful integration of 
the existing ethnic communities.344 The permanent dispute between the center and the 
periphery of Spain was the product of traditional, political and economic dissimilarities. 
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Despite being the most dynamic economies, Catalonia and the Basque—from northern 
peripheral Spanish ethnic communities—enjoyed very little influence in the state’s 
political affairs. The provision of a regional model of territorial organization in the 
Spanish constitution (1932) provided ethno-territorial autonomy to Catalonia, the Basque 
region and Galicia. Nevertheless, hyper-centralization under Franco’s authoritarian 
regime managed to destroy the emerging consensus of territorial consideration of various 
Spanish nationalities.345  
Franco’s regime received wider support from other democratic countries, 
especially the U.S., due to the cold war. An agreement between Franco and Eisenhower 
in 1953 strengthened the centralized authoritarian regime. It adopted a policy of  “sacred 
unity of the homeland “ and  “Castilian spirit “ of universal language and ideals. Franco 
imposed homogeneous and powerful centralism for almost 40 years, banning all political 
institutions of self-governance. He also banned the use of minority languages, including 
Basque, Catalan, and Galician. Interestingly, ethnic minorities such as, Basques and 
Catalans, surprisingly with the highest living standard in Europe, had never been 
economically marginalized. They only became victims of political and cultural 
marginality. The Spanish civil war was never between regions, but between the center 
and the ethnic minorities concentrated in some regions. Unlike other cases, such as 
Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, an element of ancient hatreds was not 
significant in Spanish context.346  
By the end of the 1970s, the popular grievances reached a climax in the peripheral 
areas of Spain. As a result, there was an aspiration of self-governance not only from 
historical nationalities—Catalonia, the Basque region, Galicia—but also from the Canary 
and Balearic Islands. The transition to democracy started immediately after the death of 
Franco in 1975, with the broad understanding of political parties in regards to self-
government and political decentralization. Though the Spanish constitution of 1978 
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emerged from the wider consensus among the political parties, there was clear cut lack of 
an agreed model of decentralization ensuring the home-rule for all Spanish 
nationalities.347  
While adopting a federal structure in Spain, the political conflict over domination 
of a single language was also addressed in 1977. The policy of regional bilingualism 
provided the regional languages, including Euskera (a Basque language), a co-official 
status in their respective autonomous regions, and substituted the Castilian mono-
lingualism. Since it aimed to end the monopoly of a single language, it produced a 
serious debate over the constitutional rights of regional governments to promote regional 
languages. In addition, the issue of linguistic discrimination surfaced due to the 
requirement of a regional language for government employment in the region where a 
majority of the population was non-native, particularly minorities such as Andalusians 
residing in Catalonia.348 
The arrangements under the new democratic constitution were not specifically 
aimed at undermining the military and their professional prerogatives. Some military 
leaders perceived that self- rule of regions weakened the central state, and that could be 
the point of departure towards disintegration of the country itself. So, they, some military 
factions opposing autonomy of Catalans and Basques, attempted a coup in 1981. The 
radical separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) of the Basque region was not 
convinced that the regional autonomy was stipulated in the constitution. It started a 
violent separatist movement for outright independence of the Basque region from Spain. 
Unlike in history, military hardliners and radical separatists could not derail the overall 
process. Hence, federalization and democracy in Spain continuously flourished.349  
4. Democratic Federalism: A Solution to Ethnic Diversity 
The promulgation of a democratic constitution in 1978, a fresh step of transition 
to democracy after the long authoritarian regime, was the third attempt for federalism in 
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Spain. Omar Guillermo Encarnacion describes the democratic constitution (1978) one 
that  “encapsulates an exquisitely ambiguous compromise that recognizes the historic 
indissoluble unity of Spanish nations together with the existence of multiple Spanish 
nationalities.”350 Since any constitution is a political agreement, the constitutional 
provisions in Spain tried to address the concerns of nationalist loyalty to Franco and 
regionalists, particularly from Catalonia and Basque.  
Spain confirmed the conventional notion of federalist distribution of political and 
decision making authority between central government and federal state. The democratic 
constitution (1978) did not directly refer to Spain as a federal state. It took Spain on the 
path of federalization through institutional innovations, such as regional self-governance. 
Omar Encarnacion argues that the constitution was carefully drafted without mentioning 
the word federalism because there was fear of offending the military and nationalist 
supporters of the Franco regime as they were historically supporters of a unitary state.351 
A provision written in Article 2 of the constitution actually opened the door for self-
governing units.352 This provided Spain a constitutional recognition of nation of nations, 
but this self-governance in many regions made it a hybrid state rather than a complete 
unitary or federalist state.  
The unitary nature of Spain was very well represented because regional 
communities did not have any direct decision-making role in the Centre. The autonomous 
communities did not enjoy the power to amend the constitution and to alter the powers 
enjoyed by the center. Although Spain adopted a federalist system of governance (though 
not federalist in name), it successfully created 17 autonomous communities within less 
than a decade of the democratic journey. Such autonomous regions enjoy power of 
administration in several fields, such as education, social-cultural law enforcement and 
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taxation policy. 353 The process of federalization in Spain had come through a series of 
agreements and pacts. It validates the notion that federal arrangements can be achieved 
through various agreements and supportive actions of successive governments.354 
All Spanish ethnic/nationality regions except the Basque region sorted out the 
issue of self-governance with great mutual respect and without any violent struggle. 
Catalonia—a region claiming to be a separate nation for a long time—and Galicia—a 
region with inherited distinct ethno linguistic identity—were accommodated in the 
federal structure without any impediments. Notwithstanding the tense relationship at 
times with the central government and the complex arrangement of self-rule to the 
regions, political violence did not play a deciding role in acquiring regional autonomy 
through the process of federalization in Spain except in the case of the Basque region. 
Though socialist government from 1983 to 1987 came heavily on ETA’s provocation and 
got criticized by human rights organizations, the democratic consolidation and policy of 
decentralization was never compromised.355 The survey data of Freedom House reveals 
that the democratic persistence of Spain is noteworthy because Spain was rated not free 
to partly free after Franco, yet free after the election in 1977. Since then, Spain has 
remained in the free category and in recent years its ratings regarding civil and political 
rights stand at par with older and reputedly consolidated democracies, such as the United 
States and other European countries.356 The Spanish case of federalism and transition to 
democracy has some uniqueness in the following aspects: 
a. Elite-Led Dual Transition 
Spain is a case in which the country succeeded to a dual transition from an 
authoritarian regime to democracy, and a more structured economic reform from fragile 
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economy. The greater vision of the political elites and electoral sacrifice of the first ruling 
party, in particular, played a significant role for this dual transformation of Spain.357 
Nancy Bermeo describes the Spanish model as the transition based on sacrificial 
sequencing and ruling party strength, and she states: 
Concentrating on the task of consolidating the transition to democracy, the 
first ruling party delays many of the potentially destabilizing aspects of 
structural reform and uses the state’s economic resources to mitigate 
political conflicts. As a consequence political problems worsen, the ruling 
party is punished at the polls, and a new party is voted into office ... a new 
phase of the dual transition begins because this second party has the 
autonomy to take the political risks that a deepened structural adjustment 
program involves. Spain’s successful dual transition thus rests on an 
unintentional sequencing of tasks between the nation’s first two ruling 
parties. The first party concentrates, out of necessity, on democratic 
consolidation while the second, electorally stronger party, concentrates on 
economic reform.358  
The Spanish case is an elite-led transition, in which King Juan Carlos 
contributed an exemplary role towards democratization followed by Adolfo Suarez, who 
led the first democratically elected UCD (Union Democratic Center) minority 
government. Despite credibility problems of the UCD government, due to its long 
association with Franco’s regime and an unpredictable situation due to regional separatist 
and labor movement, Suarez contributed much the democratic consolidation of 
Spain.359The political environment, at the time of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) 
won the election in 1982, was relatively stable as a democratic constitution was already 
in place and political parties, including civil societies, were optimistic in democratic 
consolidation.360  
Prime Minister Suarez in 1977 managed to convince regional leaders, such 
as Catalan leader Joseph Tarradellas, to postpone their self-rule agenda until the national 
democratic institutions matured. This provided the full leverage to push forward the 
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process of democratic consolidation. Contrary to all these positive moves with national 
political consensus, the extreme pro-independence group, mainly the ETA, launched a 
violent political struggle. Those extremely violent activities actually provided moral 
incentives to the government and opposition parties to work together for the promotion of 
democracy in Spain. The culture of wider political consensus was well sustained till the 
mid-1980s. By the time, Spain was well ahead in the journey of democratization and 
federalization.361 
b. Consociational Politics 
Since Spain was in a dual political transition—from an authoritarian 
dictatorship to democratic system and from a strong unitary state to a decentralized 
federal structure—a higher level of political consensus was vital to consolidate the fragile 
democracy. Luis Moreno states,  
Conservatives, centrists, nationalists, socialists, and Communists 
hammered out an agreement of a type of quasi-federalism or asymmetrical 
federalism that would not jeopardize the constitutional consensus on the 
issue of decentralization. It proved to be among the most delicate 
constitutional concerns to be agreed upon in the period after the demise of 
Francoism (1975-1978).362 
The historic Moncloa Accords (1977/78) were the outcome of high level 
of political consensus in Spanish history of post-civil war.363 All political elites were 
committed to privileging democratic consolidation. According to those Accords, all other 
contentious tasks, including economic reform and institutionalizing the federal system, 
would not be allowed to overshadow the democratic leap forward. The crux of the 
Accords was to create broader political consensus among key players on political and 
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economic issues, such as inflation control and military reform at the national level so that 
drafting of a new democratic constitution would go unobstructed. Moreover, this 
nationwide political consensus led the country towards democratic consolidation. It not 
only ensured that federalization and democratization could go together, but they were 
complementary to each other.364 
Consociation politics in Spain during the post-Franco period got positive 
encouragement from several standpoints. First, there was significant pressure from 
international players for a peaceful settlement of domestic conflicts. Europeanization 
through the E.U. and N.A.T.O. actually overshadowed the issue of regionalism because 
Spain as a stable democratic state became prerequisite to get membership of N.A.T.O. 
and E.U. Second, the culture of political compromise and accommodation based on a 
broader consensus played an instrumental role for the transition of democracy. Third, the 
Moncloa Accords—wider socio-political accords from the entire political spectrum—
committed the country to a democratic regime and peaceful settlement of any disputes. 
Finally, varieties of political institutions, including credible bureaucracy, civil society, 
and political parties emerged, and they played a positive role in promoting the policy of 
cooperation and compromise to address the issues originating from the multi-ethnic 
settings of Spain.365  
c. Asymmetry in Federalism 
The Spanish case is an example of asymmetric federalism. The historic 
three regions were granted the highest degree of self-rule; whereas, new autonomous 
regions, such as Aragon, enjoy the least autonomy. Each federal state/region in Spain had 
its own degree of negotiated autonomy between the region and the central Spanish state. 
There was a provision for periodic revision and revision needs to be requested by the 
regional authority. The central government had been revising the federal system for the 
devolution of some kind of administrative power to the federal autonomous regions. The 
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Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (OLHAP)-1982 was one 
attempt of the Spanish central state to reduce the imbalance of administrative power 
among regions.366 
The Spanish case, however, was a pragmatic evolution in federalism with 
certain contradictions suited to the special historical context of a multi-
ethnic/nationalities country. The contradictions in the Spanish constitution and gradual 
decentralization of centralized power with full asymmetry among autonomous 
communities and regions supported the description of Spain as ‘a covertly federal state, 
the hybrid federalism, an imperfect/incomplete federation.’367 Nevertheless, the peculiar 
process of federalization in Spain succeeded in addressing the problems associated with a 
deeply-rooted unitary government and a diverse and distinct ethno-linguistic plurality in 
the specific context so that it emerged as a modern democratic state with regional 
autonomy.368  
d. Constitution for Unity in Diversity 
Like all constitution should be, the Spanish constitution (1978) is a 
document of political negotiation and compromise, fused unity and pluralism. It adopted 
the quasi-federal principles in a state structuring.369The framers of the Spanish 
constitution showed their reluctance to label the Spanish system  “a federal “ because of 
its possible diverse implications. On one hand, unreformed nationalities perceived the 
federal country a larger state of several independent states; whereas, Basque and Catalan 
activists were suspicious that equal treatment to all units under a federal system would 
undermine their discrete identity and self-governing capacity. So, Article 145.1 
confirmed the power of treaty and agreement of a central government to avoid the 
probable problems of claiming independence from the Spanish nation as faced during the 
First Republic. The Spanish constitution, however, rested on the twin pillars of national 
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unity and plurality. Though balance between diversity and unity was  always a challenge, 
the national unity—as Article 138 stresses, an adequate and just economic balance 
between Autonomous Communities (ACs)—was strengthened by the principle of 
solidarity among the regions. It granted no economic and social privileges based on status 
of ACs.370 The main focus of constitution framers in Spain was to cast the system as one 
that maintains unity and addresses the issue of diversity in a meaningful way.  
5. Role of Military in Democratic Federalization 
Military intervention in politics, until the end of the 1970s, was a regressive 
phenomenon in Spanish history. Adrian Shubert argues that  “the presence of military in 
politics has been a constant in Spanish politics since the end of the Napoleonic 
wars…However the nature of this military intervention varied.”371 The Franco 
regime (1939–1975) was the result of military revolt against the civilian government. 
Earlier, General Primo de Rivera had ruled the country nearly a decade as military 
dictator from 1923.372  
The armed forces during the Franco regime were primarily the regime’s 
safeguard. They were isolated not only from society, but also from the international 
arena. There was lack of assertive military leaders to represent the armed forces as a 
whole after the Franco regime, and King Juan Carlos acted a legitimate successor in 
power. The King played a moderate and firm role, so he managed to transfer loyalty 
from Franco to him.373 Article 8 of the democratic constitution of Spain (1978) 
defines the mission of the military as defending the constitution of the country. The 
democratic election of Congress in June 1977 for the first time stopped the military 
officers from appearing in parliament and playing a direct role in politics. By the end 
of 1980, institutionalization and legislative reforms of the military had achieved 
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significant progress. There was still ambiguity, however, in practice and interpretation 
of the provisions. Caneiro and Bueso state, 
The commander in Chief of military was the King, and Government was 
the one that direct the Military Administration. Concretely, the President 
was responsible to direct and to coordinate the Policy of Defense and the 
Minister of Defense who organized and executed the Military Policy. The 
Board of Chiefs of Staff (JUJEM) composed for the Chiefs of Staff of the 
three Branches of the Armed Forces was the collegiate superior organ of 
the chain of command should be subordinated to executive power.374 
The economic crisis of the seventies made the situation bad to worse in Spain 
because the country’s priority was political reform, not economic reform. As a result of 
massive inflation, unemployment and depletion of resources, the armed forces did not see 
any hope for improvement. There was clear division in the military so that some were 
willing to break the law and military discipline. Caneiro and Bueso see the attempted 
coup in 1981 as a product of internal division in the armed forces. They argue,  
What happened with the eleven commands of the Military Regions (nine 
at the peninsula and two at the islands) was a significant indicator of the 
internal division in the Armed Forces. A region was joined to the coup, 
three were pronounced clearly against it, and the others did not define 
their postures.375 
The professionalism and effectiveness of the Spanish military was the great 
question even after the Franco regime. Mostly the allocated budget of defense was for 
salaries and other office administration purposes. Furthermore, besides the major portion 
of defense budget being dedicated to salaries, civilian official equivalent to military rank, 
even in 1982, enjoyed a higher salary, almost double in some cases, than the military. As 
a result, Shubert argues that Moonlighting was a common phenomenon in the military, 
and records reveal that two-thirds of officers were forced to have second jobs to maintain 
them. This was mainly due to the heavily swelled size of the officer corps—an 
unresolved historical problem since the nineteenth century.376  
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The first elected democratic government of Spain had a variety of challenges, in 
addition to military reform: promoting social harmony, crafting constitutional framework, 
modernization of national economy and integration to Europe. They were interrelated as 
well as interdependent.377 Shubert argues that the Spanish military tolerated the transition 
mainly because it propounded the leadership role of King Juan Carlos, keeping the 
military in confidence for peaceful and orderly political transition and avoiding any 
abrupt rupture.378 He states,  “The King’s resolute defense of democracy has deprived 
future conspirators of the hope of his support.”379  
Spanish transition to democratic federalism after the end of Franco regime did not 
face any significant opposition from military because of exemplary role of King Juan 
Carlos and simultaneous military reforms along with political transition. Thus, 
democratic transformation of military with past of frequent interventions in national 
politics and democratic transition of any country should go concurrently, and it greatly 
depends on wise decisions of political leaderships. 
C. INDIA: A CASE OF DEMOCRATIC FEDERALISM 
The democratic constitution of federal union of India was enacted in January 
1950. The elites of India dominated the decision-making process and constituted the 
 
system of federal democracy with a center strong enough to impose decision onto states. 
Kushal Pal and Anita Aggrawal argue,  
Indian leaders and makers of the constitution opted for democracy not 
only because of their liberal orientation imbibed from the western 
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education on one hand and the consensus developed during the national 
movement on the other, but also because they believed no other form of 
government could work and gain legitimacy in this multi-regional, multi-
religious, multi-lingual, multi-caste, and multi-ethnic society.380  
There was consensus on the British model of parliamentary democracy within the 
Congress party—a major driving political force of that time. Furthermore, the Nehru 
committee381, comprising all political parties, went along the line of the Congress party. 
They rejected the presidential democracy because of fear of degenerating into a 
dictatorship and lack of strong party-culture with democratic ethos. Thus, India adopted 
the British model of parliamentary democracy as a legacy of colonial rule because there 
were no other opinions surfaced in political debate for it.382 
The three pillars of Indian federalism—strong center, flexibility and cooperative 
federalism—were the derivatives of historical experiences suited to address the Indian 
context of feudal societal structure and diverse identities with wider variations.383 The 
Indian constitution adopted the process of accommodation at greater extent so that vast 
territory with ethno-cultural diversity remained integrated into the Indian Union. The 
constitution-making process followed the culture of consensus that had embedded in the 
Indian tradition of Panchayat, where verdict was given based on consensus and 
contesting parties feeling a win-win situation. The technique of accommodation 
concession and compromise were applied during the process that: 
Those opposed to socialism were accommodated by excluding the word 
socialism in the preamble…Hindu- nationalists were accommodated by 
excluding the word secular. The landlord and capitalist classes were 
accommodated by giving them right to property. Gandhians were 
accommodated through directive principles of state policy. Minorities 
were accommodated by giving the right to educational institutions and 
maintain their own culture. Princes were accommodated by giving them 
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privy purses and by constituting part B states and by making the ruler of 
largest state as the Rajpramukh (A position and status equal to the 
governor of the state) of that part B state. Jammu & Kashmir in general 
and National Conference in particular were accommodated through article 
370 that gave special status to Jammu & Kashmir. Schedule castes were 
accommodated by giving them reservations for 10 years. The Hindi 
speaking people were accommodated by making Hindi as a national 
language and non-Hindi speaking areas were accommodated through the 
provision that the English should be retained as the official language for 
10 years.384 
1. Complex Picture of Indian Society 
India is the seventh largest country in terms of area and second most populated 
country of the world. India, a federal republic consisting of 28 states and seven union 
territories has been governed through a parliamentary form of democracy. The picture of 
Indian society is complex and diverse. There are 114 languages spoken at least by 10,000 
people and out of which 22 are spoken at least by a million people. There are 461 
indigenous groups and more than 216 dialects in India. Although estimation reveals 850 
languages and 1652 officially listed dialects, 22 languages have acquired constitutional 
recognition for political, educational and regional purposes.385 
Though the majority of populations are from high castes, there are 16.2% 
scheduled castes and 8.2 % scheduled tribes (Indigenous people) of the total population. 
Distribution of scheduled caste and tribes are so diverse that Punjab has the highest 
number of scheduled caste with 28.9%; whereas, Mizoram has the lowest with 0.03%. 
Similarly, Mizoram has 94.5% that ranks highest in proportion of tribes; whereas, Goa 
stands as lowest with 0.04%. The religious picture is dominated by Hindu with 80%, but 
Muslim comprises 13.4%, Christian 2.3%, Sikh 1.9%, Buddhist 0.8% and Jain 0.4%.386 
Despite government efforts of land reform and development, still in the mid-90s, 90% of 
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scheduled castes were found living in rural areas, and 50% of them were landless 
agriculture labor.387Therefore, ethnic distribution in India was complex and single basis 
of identity was very hard to adopt for federal structure throughout the country. 
The issue of minorities and ethnic diversity in India was essentially multi-dimensional in 
nature, and this was more complex to address as it had been envisaged by political elites. 
Jonathan Porter argues:  
The different ethnic groupings within India are in themselves very 
stratified. Political power for the elites in Punjab will not necessarily 
pacify those lower down the social hierarchy. India’s history as a 
civilization defined by castes denotes a clear stratification even within 
social groupings, thus undermining the effectiveness of any attempt to 
politically include or give state resources to minorities.388 
2. Political Journey of Federalism and Democracy 
Federalism in India has a history dating back to colonial rule. The constitutional 
development process started with the Indian Council Act of 1861. The process of gradual 
federalization proceeded with the Indian Council Act of 1892 & 1909; Government of 
India Act of 1919 introduced diarchy governing system. The GOI Act of 1935 granted 
provisional autonomy creating federal courts and anticipated the Indian federation 
incorporating British India provinces and several princely/satellite states. Similarly, the 
Cripps Mission as well as the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1940s recommended federalism a 
prescribed solution of growing Indian unrest. The political elites responsible for 
constitution-making decided India should have federal system for its sustenance and 
continuation. After the declaration of independent India in 1947, federalism served as a 
bind for more than 500 princely states and various ethnic groups with diverse identities 
into one nation, despite the partition of sub-continent on the basis of religion as an 
identity.389 
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India opted for the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy from the 
available three options: parliamentary, presidential and participatory types of democracy. 
The constitution drafters, possibly, had considered the same experiences of working 
under the Act of 1919 and 1935 along with the daily and periodic responsibility of the 
government and its accountability to parliament.390 The role played by the national 
political leaders, mainly Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, Ambedkar, Sardar Patel and Maulana 
Azad, believed in the highly-acclaimed consensus. Kushal Pal and Anita Aggarwal argue,  
“…the constitution was made when India was having euphoria of independence and 
trauma of partition. In such a situation the possibility of consensus building became 
easier.”391 The Indian case established the dialectical relationship between federalization 
and democratization as they were complementary to each other. Nehru, who ruled 
independent India for more than two decades, followed the principle of accommodation 
and consensus that flourished democracy and federalization.392 Considering a peculiar 
socio-cultural set-up of Indian society, democracy would not be possible in the absence 
of a federal polity because it rooted the democracy through a power structure at various 
levels of governance: national, state, local and even to several small ethnic, religious, 
cultural and linguistic groups/minorities. 
3. Democratic Federalism: A Solution to Ethnic Diversity 
The Indian National Congress since 1917 started to form a linguistic-based 
organization in order to mobilize large masses against colonial rule. Gandhi was also in 
favor of linguistic provinces than administrative zones formed by colonial rule based on 
their divide and rule philosophy. Nehru, discouraging separatist tendency, focused the 
security, unity and an economic prosperity of the country. Nevertheless, he reorganized 
provinces on linguistic lines due to massive mobilization in favor of a language-based 
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division and, most importantly, death of Sriramulu—Gandhian Potti—after a hunger 
strike for nearly two months in 1952. Subsequently, India moved into the path of 
federalism with the formation of provinces, such as Punjab, J&K based on religion, the 
Northeast based on ethnicity, and so on.393 
The chairmen of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, Ambedkar and Prime 
Minister Nehru, were leaning to a unitary state, but the Minister of Home Affairs, Sardar 
Patel, played a crucial role to adopt federalism in a new constitution. With the 
promulgation of a constitution in 1950, India constituted large federal states based on 
geo-political foundations, except Orissa (based on ethno cultural identity). Bihar and UP, 
in fact, enjoyed partial autonomy before the enactment of a new constitution. The State 
Reorganization Act-1956 formed eight new states (AP, Karnataka, Kerala, MP, Punjab, 
Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, and Tripura) on the basis of ethno-linguistic identity. Similarly, 
five more new federal states (Gujarat, Maharastra, West Bengal, Nagaland and Haryana) 
from 1960 to 1966; three more (Meghalaya, Manipur, Himanchal Pradesh) in 1971 and 
1972, and Sikkim in 1975, were created based on ethno-linguistic identities. Three more 
states (Arunachal Pradesh, Goa and Mizoram) in 1987 based on ethno-linguistic and 
historical basis and the latest three states (Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, and Chattishgarh) 
were created based on territorial backwardness that counted a total of 28 states in 
India.394 The State Restructuring Committee officially started its work in 1956, and so far 
28 states and seven union territories are in place. Most of the states constituted based on 
linguistic coverage and ethnic identities, but recent states, such as Uttarakhand, 
Chhatisgarh and Jharkhand, were constituted based on relative backwardness to the 
mother state.395 
The Indian Constitution (1948) confirmed the social structure and its cultural 
orientation. Various ethnic communities and aspiring nationalities, joining the Indian 
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union, have been preserved as distinct entities in a multi-cultural mosaic. Political 
accommodation of socio-cultural diversities and competing aspirations has been achieved 
through power-sharing mechanisms. Multiple and cross cutting social fragmentation and 
scattered nature of demographic distribution, however, provides a shared feeling of 
minority to every community. 396 Indian federalism, transiting to thriving democratic 
country from colonial rule, has some distinct features. 
a. Strong Center 
Lack of adequate experiences and democratic institutions under the 
colonial rule made the Indian political masters, after independence, less confident and 
suspicious vis-à-vis success of democracy. As a result, they leaned towards supremacy of 
a strong center. Some special powers given to center and a number of other provisions 
actually made the form of government with features of a unitary system. Furthermore, 
center was constitutionally empowered with emergency powers in the wake of external 
aggression and internal crisis, including natural disasters and manmade conflicts. Hence, 
the Indian constitution was unique in nature as it had incorporated several features of 
unitary as well as federal system of governance. 397 
The Indian constitution of 1948 had envisioned the federal system based 
on a need of a strong center in federation to respond to emergencies due to war, 
socioeconomic consequences of industrial societies and any kind of disasters. A 
federation needs to be flexible enough to meet contemporary needs and to establish 
cooperative federalism for social welfares. Founding fathers of Indian constitution 
applied some innovative techniques, besides lessons learned from other federal systems 
of the world that made Indian contributions distinct and original. The turbulent history 
and partition in the eve of independence forced them towards a strong center to avoid 
further disintegration of the country. Growing hostility with Pakistan, along with the hot 
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issue of Kashmir and prevailing socioeconomic stagnation, validated the role of a strong 
center to maintain the status of unified country.398 M. P. Jain argues,  
The present day Indian federalism is thus the product of two processes, 
that of disintegration of British India from a unitary to a federal system 
and that of assimilating the hitherto autonomous princely India with the 
rest of the country.399 
Taking the lesson from federalism practiced in other parts of the world, 
the built-in mechanism of powerful center was there in the Indian constitution. The 
amending procedure of the constitution for the federal aspects not for fundamental rights 
is flexible. According to Article 368, any bill of amendments needs to go through both 
houses by majority of the total members.400 
b. Spirit of Federalism in Constitution 
India is sovereign, secular, socialist, democratic republic, and structurally 
it is union of states. The very nature of union is unalterable and inviolable, but it is not 
the case of the Indian states and their boundaries. We cannot find a single word of federal 
or federalism in the entire text of Indian constitution, but the verdict of the Supreme 
Court in 1994 clearly states,  “India’s states are neither satellites nor agents of the center 
and have an important role to play in the political, social, educational and cultural life of 
the people of the Union.”401 The issue of Center State power-sharing in Indian federalism 
had been a controversy since its inception. B. R Ambedkar, chairperson of the 
Constitution Drafting Committee, responding to the criticism of the draft constitution as 
too centralized and states are no more than the municipalities, clarified the foundation of 
center state relationship, 
The basic principle of federalism is that the legislative and executive 
authority is partitioned between the Center and the state not by any law to 
be made by the center but by the constitution itself. This is what our 
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constitution does …The center cannot, by its own will, alter the boundary 
of that partition. Nor can the Judiciary.402  
The Indian constitution had arranged the Finance Commission and the 
Planning Commission to regulate the fiscal matters of the states. The executive channels 
through union ministries provide fiscal resources to state counterparts. The Finance 
Commission is the key institution to maintain fiscal balance between center and the 
states.403 This strengthens the notion of federalism in economic and financial practice. 
c. Federalism for Unity and Integrity 
Jayant Prasad, the current Indian Ambassador to Nepal, argues that Indian 
federalism is more than a constitutional construct. Rather, it is a dynamic and evolutionary 
idea that contributes to national integrity. The diverse ethnic and socio-cultural pluralist 
impulse is getting stronger and well-articulated within the constitutional parameters.404 
Strengthening the national integrity apparently became the high priority national project after 
the independence because of growing hostility with newly-born Pakistan through painful 
partition. Furthermore, there was growing aspirations in princely states that made compulsion 
to established strong centralized state. The chain reaction of ethnic violence on the partition 
issue, communist uprising in Telengana, and INC’s social and economic roadmap, made 
Indian orientation towards unitary bias. Jayanta Prasad, describing the merits and uniqueness 
of Indian federalism, argues, 
The Indian context may not be perfect text. It has, however, a distinct 
merit, that of its adjustable capacity by the facility of easily amending its 
provisions … the federal structure has helped maintain India’s unity and 
integrity. Indeed, India’s relative stability and progress would not have 
been possible without the institutions to promote democracy and 
federalism.405 
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Constitutional construct of Indian federalism with strong center and 
dynamism in practice has strengthened the unity of the country. Democratic institutions 
and its rightful use in the structuring of the country have actually contributed to transform 
India into a matured democracy with vibrant economy.  
d. Secularism and Reservation for Backward People 
The secular India, despite domination of Hindu majority in socioeconomic 
life of the country, brought an equality and harmony among religious groups, 
notwithstanding occasional communal riots in some parts of the country. Similarly, the 
policy of reservation to Dalits, tribal and socially backward community in education, 
legislature and government apparatus has made grass root people not only benefitted, but 
it developed sense of ownership of a democratic system. Mahendra Lawoti argues in his 
paper,  
Of course reservation has faced backlashes from upper caste Hindus; but 
Indian democracy have survived the revolt, which was avoided through 
Dalit cooptation that was bound to come after the Dalits became 
mobilized, especially if they were continued to be excluded?406 
e. Political Consensus 
The federalization of the country and consociation politics to manage the 
growing political and cultural aspirations of citizens in multi-ethnic societies, are always 
awaited by the people. The rights and leverages permitted to such ethnic/religious group, 
however, may eventually become volatile and dangerous for unity and cultural harmony of 
the country.407 Consociationalism, in the true sense, would demand proportional 
representation of all minorities, but it was almost impossible in Indian case with vast 
ethnically diverse society. So, federalism with three levels, in which each state organized 
itself as federation of minorities within, served as the ideal solution.408 The consociational 
political arrangements did not appear in Indian constitution, but distribution of cabinet 
portfolio based on proportional approach and broader political sharing in practice made the 
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Indian political practices more inclined to consociational theme.409 Furthermore, the dominant 
political party—Indian National Congress—had given minorities’ mainly linguistic, ethnic, and 
religious groups, an overriding right while formulating religious and social legislation. This 
also strengthened the notion of consociation politics that has been practiced.410  
f. Asymmetry in Federalism 
According to Louise Tillin, there is de facto, but not de jure asymmetry in 
Indian federalism.411 In the attempt to accommodate a wider range of diversities of Indian 
society and processes of political accommodation, the Indian constitution contained some 
features of asymmetry, particularly to accommodate Jammu and Kashmir, and the new states 
of the Northeast Region in the political mainstream of united India. Louise Tillin, however, 
argues that asymmetric provision in India does not provide any special protections of 
minorities, and it is totally different than in the case of Canada and Spain. Likewise, provisions 
of some kind of asymmetry had no significant role to strengthen India’s ability to hold together. 
The Muslim personal law was not limited to territorially-concentrated religious/cultural groups. 
Similarly, the provision of linguistic reorganization did not necessarily intend for differential 
protection of any regional or local languages; rather, it adopted to accommodate linguistic 
differences so that no groups should be deprived on language.412 Article 370 of the constitution 
exempted Jammu and Kashmir from uniform constitutional arrangements applicable to other 
states.413 This asymmetrical solution made the Indian case a poor example of asymmetrical 
federalism, but such provision was aimed for eventual resolution of the conflict.414 
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4. Role of Military in Democratic Federalization 
The India, a contrast to Spanish case, inherited military structure from the British 
bureaucratic set-up. Military greatly co-operated the independence movement as well as the 
subsequent democratic process. Indian military organizations, set-up by the British, were one of 
the professional organizations with experience of wars being a part of the Allied Forces during 
the great wars. On the eve of independence, the British decided to break the military 
proportionally into India and Pakistan based on the agreed norms of partition negotiation. The 
Joint Defense Council, a body to decide a partition of armed forces, favored the Indian side a 
lot. As a result, most of the defense industries and military ordinance stores, in fact, remained 
on the Indian side, which contributed to a growing sense of insecurity in the Pakistani 
establishment.415 It boosted, however, the sense of ownership and professionalism of Indian 
military. The military obeyed the order of partition as the Indian army inherited most of the 
assets and acted as a firm and founding organization of independent India. This could be the 
reason that the Indian army did not pose any opposition in the process of federalization and the 
democratic transition of India, since it was the continuation and extension of independence 
movement. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, founding architect of modern democratic India, played a key role in 
maintaining civilian control and professional autonomy of the military. The military, in turn, 
perceived itself as a custodian of the constitution and promoter of popular will. The popular 
aspiration was to promote democracy along with inclusive participation of different ethno-
linguistic groups in national politics through federal structuring of the country. All political 
parties and citizens of the country viewed the military as an extension of the British Indian 
Army and, hence, a tool of coercion. Anshu Chatterjee argues,  “By focusing on the British 
Institutional legacy and the Jawaharlal Nehru administration’s development of civil defense 
ministry, such literature explained why the military authorities did not seek to control the 
Indian polity… “416  
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Indian military, because of its strong bureaucratic structure and a great sense of 
ownership in democratic transition and independence movement, did not intervene in the 
process of democratization and federalization of the country. In turn, political leadership—
mainly Nehru in early days of independent India—did not drag military in any political 
debates. Thus, the role of the Indian military throughout the transition process remained 
supportive and extremely positive to the political leader. 
D. LESSONS FROM SPAIN AND INDIA 
India’s federal system with strong center probably is the best suited model for Nepal 
due to its proximity to ethno-cultural diversity, socioeconomic particularity and the political 
notion of liberal democratic ideology. The presidential power to dismiss any elected state 
government on due recommendation of the union cabinet in the case of constitutional and 
political conflicts, and center’s power to impose state of emergency, represent the strong 
center. Whereas, 28 states and seven union territories with state government and autonomous 
governance represent the federalism in India. Nepal, considering its geo-political context and 
organic pluralist characteristics related to ethno-cultural identities of various groups of the 
country, needs to account for several aspects for successful federalism: economic viability, 
population concentration, ethno-linguistic diversity, religious heterogeneity, unequal 
development, and spatial element.417 Bishnu Pathak argues regarding federalism in Nepal, 
…Nepal should give extreme attention to national security, foreign affairs, 
minority policy, big hydro-powers, national highways, and an 
international airport in the course of declaring a federation of states. 
Indeed Nepal can neither be ‘One Himal One Pradesh’ nor ‘One Madhesh 
One Pradesh.’ Rather, the country needs ethno-cultural-regional states … 
federal states without inclusive democracy would ultimately lead to the 
corrosion of Nepalese identity, united strength, and harmony as each 
would fight for its own supremacy.418 
The biggest lesson from the Spanish transition is that the management of any type of 
conflict is only possible in a democratic context. This is because political elites and ethnic 
leaders can benefit from freedom and transparency in democracy to express their aspirations 
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and grievances.419 The state should be inclusive. Contrary to domination of major ethnicity in 
the nation-state, de-ethnicized inclusive states provide equal opportunities to all its 
constituencies irrespective of minority or majority ethnic groups.420 Daniel Conversi argues,  
“…the Spanish experience of dealing with ethno conflicts provides a model for other political 
elites. It should be particularly illuminating for those states trying to dismantle decades of 
centralized administration.”421 
The Spanish process of democratization and federalization suggests a number of 
lessons to multi-ethnic countries. Constitutional and political arrangements, decentralization 
and inclusiveness in particular can be supportive to manage ethnic conflict. Wider nationalist 
revival and aspiration of autonomy based on ethnic identity serves for successful 
democratization. Committed political leaderships and institutionalization of coherent 
democratic politics can effectively settle the conflicts due to diverse ethnic and cultural 
identities. Democratizing and vibrant civil society can absorb incivility, disorders and violence 
emitted from ethnic conflict.422 
Contrary to the basic notion of federalism in territorial terms, Spain’s transition to 
democracy progressed along with political acknowledgement of ethnically pluralistic country 
emphasizing multi-cultural and the multi-linguistic character of Spain.423 Daniel Conversi 
argues that Spain is a unitary state, but its open character for regional autonomy actually 
contributed towards the development of a federal nature. The complete translation of this 
openness in decentralization of governing power between center and regions greatly depends 
on political will and vision of the ruling parties. The Spanish Senate in the center, as in the 
case of traditional federations, provides full range of regional representation.424 Spanish 
experience of post-modern federalism suggests that formal constitutionally guided federation 
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is not the only means to federalism, but wider arrangements of decentralization that foster 
autonomy from a non-federating constitution might also lead to federalization of a 
country.425 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter studied two successful cases of federalism in the multi-ethnic societies of 
Spain and India and looked at how federalism and democratic transition are mutually 
supportive of each other. It described the ethnic diversity and role of political elites to balance 
the growing demands of different ethnic communities to self-rule, consolidation of 
democracies and in maintaining the integrity of the country. It tried to deduce lessons from 
both cases that can be useful in the Nepalese context. 
Despite the fact of a predominantly rural and agrarian society with the majority of its 
population being illiterate, political elites of India flatly ignored the notion of western 
scholars that democracy would only flourish in modern industrialized literate societies where 
political consciousness and economic prosperity is at a profound level with developed media 
and communications. They showed their political wisdom and a sincere conviction of 
democracy. They accepted the calculated risk of introducing federal democracy in India, a 
semi-feudal country with conservative and parochial societies. 426 
Though conflicts in Kashmir, the Northeast and occasional tension due to Hindu-
Muslim riots are not resolved completely, India is seen as a mature democracy. Despite a 
high level of socioeconomic and regional inequality present all over the India, and Maoist 
insurgency posing serious threat to almost half of India, sustenance of democracy and 
economic growth suggests the strength of Indian democracy.427 The amount of India’s 
achievement in democratic consolidation and economic development in the context of poor 
and diverse societies is acknowledged by the world as a large and well-functioning 
democracy. The political institutions functioning in India have successfully managed 
diversity in caste, ethnicity, language, religious, and conflicts associated with it. India’s 
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federalism, mainly based on linguistic, religious, and ethnic lines, have accommodated 
diverse and complex social groups. For instance, India has 22 officially-recognized languages 
and many states are supporting and promoting three languages: Hindi, English and the locally 
spoken language.428 
Spain started its democratic journey with its democratic election in 1977. Perhaps 
Spanish leaders and people had learned great lessons from their political extremism and 
autocratic rules of the past. The dynamics of federalization and democratization and its 
complementary effect are considered keys to Spanish success in transition. The lesson from 
the Spanish case is that consensus, compromise and restraint are three fundamental aspects 
for decentralization, and a democratic framework is the right stage to orchestrate the 
federalization of any country. 429 There is a crucial equilibrium that needs to be forged 
between the central state and the regionalist. Hence, political elites should show their 
commitment to decentralization and regionalist leaders should show restraint in their 
demands of home rule in accordance with the pace of democratization.430  
One may deduce from the Indian and Spanish experiences that proper recognition of 
identities by the state effectively diffuses popular mobilization based on any form of 
identities; whereas, repression and discouragement of the same certainly can instigate 
conflicts and violence. So, being diverse a country in terms of demography, geography and 
socioeconomic-cultural, Nepal should take lessons from India and Spain to manage its 
diversity.  “Unity in diversity, “ however, only comes into reality once all citizens, political 
elites/masters in particular, open their eyes and minds to acknowledge the things that exist 
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This thesis assessed the political development leading to the declaration of a 
Federal Democratic Republic and contentious issues of a federal design in Nepal. It was 
to answer the question why the CA failed despite the agreement on the concept of 
federalism in principle among political parties. It analyzed the complex picture of multi-
ethnic societies, the rise of ethnic politics and agenda of political parties of federalism. 
Two case studies of federalism, Spain and India—in order to compare and deduce lessons 
learned for the Nepalese context—discussed in depth and established the importance of 
federalism in a transitional democracy to maintain its integrity and to address the 
grievances of the people. The findings of thesis are as follows. 
First, people’s aspirations to self-rule and the ethnic identity were obvious 
political demands against a century-long centralized exclusionary feudal system. The 
Maoist insurgency raised the political consciousness and provoked the demand to 
decentralize the state. Hence, the demand of the federal system based on ethnic identity 
surfaced as a political demand. The UCPN (Maoist) and regional parties, mainly the 
Madhes-based parties along with IP groups, carried this agenda forward in political 
negotiation. The IP movements, Madhes movement and Joint People’s Movement II 
(2006), established the agenda of federalism. This is embedded deeply in every 
community. It covered the entire political spectrum of Nepal; even the conservative 
panchayat-based party (RPP) accepted this agenda. The traditional democratic parties of 
the NC and UCPN (UML) included federalism and republic in their political program 
with growing pressure from constituencies and vote banks. 
Second, political parties were divided into two camps: first, the UCPN (Maoist), 
Madhes-based parties and indigenous groups supporting single identity-based federalism 
with more number of provinces and, second, the NC, CPN (UML) and other smaller 
parties supporting multi-ethnic federalism with a lesser number of provinces. The voice 
against federalism was almost insignificant since people from all over the country were 
supportive of federalism. Most of the parties, however, were unclear why federalism is 
needed and to address problems associated with it. As a result, different models of 
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federalism were floated around by both camps. Political parties took acceptance or 
rejection of their model in the CA as horse-trading and prestige issues. They, in one way, 
were under tremendous pressure from their constituencies and ethnic leaders within their 
individual party and outside, but they, in other ways, worried about the ground reality of 
multi-ethnic societies, questions of economic viability and fear of losing their traditional 
constituencies. 
Third, political parties used the federalism issue as a ladder to achieve to power 
and to blame each other. At times they competed to claim the ownership of the federalism 
agenda, but failed to devise the model to satisfy all ethnic communities. In fact, people 
want federalism to eliminate discrimination and inequalities that they had faced in the 
past. So, parties with clear programs to uplift backward people with equal access in state 
mechanism and economic development certainly would convince the people of any 
model of federalism. The first important step to resolve the dispute on federalism is to 
agree on a democratic process and respect the procedure if it goes against the expectation 
of political leaderships. If home politics finds political consensus then only international 
communities and neighboring countries could be supportive on any agenda. 
Fourth, despite dissimilarities—in historical context, socioeconomic conditions, 
geography and people—multi-ethnic societies and aspirations of people for ethnic 
identity along with democratic transition were similar between Nepal and in the cases of 
Spain and India. The biggest lesson from the illustrative case studies of India and Spain 
for democratization and federalization is political will power and commitment to change 
major political forces and political consensus for the national agenda are most important 
to make a smooth transition. Democratization and decentralization (restructuring the 
state) to empower all backward and oppressed communities should be concurrent. 
Though the CA collapsed, apparently due to a disagreement on federal models and 
possibly vested political interests of parties, the solution is again an agreement on 
democratic process and the people’s sovereignty. 
Nepal, with diverse demography and geography, remains one of the poor 
countries in South Asia and the world. It is a multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-
ethnic country. At the same time, this is complicated by religious hierarchies that add to 
 127
the problematic political and social set-up. Domination of Hindu religion and high caste 
elites made the situation worst. The discrimination of state to the people of lower strata 
and disparity of resources and opportunities were so embedded in society that certain 
sections of the population found themselves with no option except to raise weapons 
against the state.  
Since two thirds of the population are considered marginalized, social exclusion is 
not limited to the IPs or any particular ethnic group. Women and Dalits are the most 
marginalized section of society. Political parties are univocal for inclusive democracy and 
against any type of discrimination based on caste, gender, religion and ethnicity. Madhesi 
and Dalits are believed to be victims of systematic marginalization of state and political 
elites. The main political issues, in the later phase of political movements, are the 
systematic discrimination and under-representation of deprived sections of population in 
the state machineries. With this analysis, the Maoist problem is viewed as an offshoot of 
severe socioeconomic conditions of Nepalese society coupled with discrimination and 
inequality based on caste, region, and religion. As a result, identity politics came to the 
forefront of national politics. The present situation is such that different ethnic groups are 
mobilized towards the federal structure with ethnic identity, and main political parties are 
polarized for and against federalism based on ethnic identity. 
The political forces behind the 1990 democratic movement could not uphold 
popular aspirations, and there was significant growth of frustration and resentment among 
ethnic groups and minorities. This chronic problem of wide spread feelings of ethnic 
groups regarding systematic marginalization of their culture, religion and language 
greatly undermine the growth of the economy. Hence, political crisis deepened in the post 
1990 period due to instability, bad governance and a widened sociopolitical disparity 
with lack of inclusiveness of the wider spectrum of the population. In this backdrop, the 
Maoist people’s war started in 1996 and lasted for 12 years. This not only derailed Nepal 
from democratic consolidation, but resulted in a loss of more than 13,000 lives and huge 
infrastructural damage. Interestingly, certain ethnic groups who had long been 
discontented with the state backed the Maoist people’s war.  
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An unhealthy competition, conflict within the parliamentary system racing to 
acquire support from the traditional institution of the monarchy, unacknowledged popular 
aspirations, and use of people as raw materials and self-perpetuating behavior of leaders 
further aggravated the fragile situation to the verge of conflict. Blunt neglect of the 
leadership in every aspect of statecraft and great deficiency in democratic culture make 
the state irresponsive to societal demands. The monarchy also played an intervening 
factor rather than to play the facilitating role in national polity.  
The interim constitution stands on the bedrock of the principle of political 
consensus. So, it is the moral obligation of all political parties, their responsible leaders in 
particular to abide by the fundamental principle of federalism, democracy, republicanism, 
secularism and inclusion, and to reaffirm their commitments that they have made to the 
people during elections and to the People’s Movement II in 2006. If parties continue with 
their brinkmanship and blame game to each other, they not only lose their base in the 
people, but risk the political achievements and peaceful democratic transition of the 
country.  
Political parties in Nepal were not clear enough in their agenda and design of 
federalism during and after the CA election. They simply raised the aspirations of people 
many fold and distributed fake commitments just for votes. People did not get a chance to 
discuss and debate regarding the pros and cons of different federal options. Party 
leaderships took the agenda so cheaply that they acknowledged every ethnic community 
as a viable nationality for federal structure. 
A very important lesson of the collapsed CA is the need to make an agreement of 
political parties to respect to the parliamentarian procedures. The Nepalese people now 
are sensitive and politically aware enough that they will not accept anything short of a 
democratic constitution with the proper amount of decentralization whether anybody 
names it federalism or not. The political forces representing the change, Maoists and 
regional parties are setting ‘constitution from the CA and constitution with federalism 
based on ethnic identity’ as their bottom line of negotiation. Similarly, democratic forces 
of the NC and UML with other smaller parties are showing reluctance to accept identity-
based federalism and more number of states considering heterogeneous society and 
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viability to sustain such a federal structure. They argue that a single identity and a larger 
number of provinces weaken the national integrity and compromise the sovereignty of the 
country. This argument cannot be ruled out considering fragile economic conditions, 
geographical distribution of population and various sub-groups in multi-ethnic society. 
Responsible parties, however, should compromise their political interests without 
compromising the national interest and people’s aspirations. The way out of the current 
constitutional and political limbo is always possible as long as there is genuine political 
will. 
The political journey to the CA election provided new hopes for the people, but 
the political parties continued to indulge in inter and intra-party squabble. The CA failed 
to settle the basis of federal structure. As a result, it has collapsed without promulgating 
the constitution. In Nepal, the people are mobilized on ethnic lines by political parties, 
particularly by the Maoist party. Yet, there are no ethnic groups characterized by 
common territory and embracing political institution. The heterogeneity within and 
between ethnic groups prevails. Thus, federal structure based on single ethnic identity is 
hard to adopt. A few recommendations follow in order to arrive at an agreement for the 
basis of federalism and standard procedures to adopt after they are democratically agreed 
upon with room for amendment in the future. 
Firstly, considering the provision of the Interim Constitution and the people’s 
aspiration of federalism, it is hard to backtrack from restructuring the state. The basis for 
federalism, however, can be finalized primarily by negotiation. If not, all political forces 
need to agree upon democratic procedures. Democratic procedures could be through 
referendum or voting in the CA. There should be political understandings at the highest 
level possible and political sincerity in the implementation of any agreement. The right to 
disagree or oppose does not mean to oppose everything that rose by political parties in 
opposition. The minority voice of referendum or voting in the CA needs to be respected 
by means of several political arrangements, such as autonomous units within province 
and reservation quotas in the case of multi-ethnic province and strong center with a 
number of provisions to promote ethnic harmony in the case of identity-based federalism. 
Whatever would be the verdict of such democratic decision-making procedures; there 
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should be zero tolerance for any discrimination based on caste, ethnicity, region, religion, 
gender, language and beliefs. This will gradually pacify the importance of ethnic identity 
to enjoy the rights and privileges of a citizen. 
Secondly, democracy is the solution to every dispute. This issue of federalism will 
be solved once democratic institutions are strengthened and function properly. 
Democratic cultures and practices inside and outside political parties eventually help to 
promote the understanding. So democratization and federalization, as in the case of Spain 
and India, need to be concurrent because these are mutually inclusive and supportive. 
Sooner or later, fresh election of the CA and to abide by democratic procedures is the 
only solution. Political parties need to use their influence to convince all ethnic 
communities that federalism without democracy and democracy without decentralization 
of power to empower grass root people will not sustain for long.  
Thirdly, politics of consensus need to develop so that political parties can 
compromise their party’s interest for the betterment of the people. Every political party 
should cultivate the culture of co-existence and tolerance of pluralism. The issue of 
identity automatically dilutes once the country adopts the policy of the rule of majority 
and respect of the minority in the political culture and institutional development along 
with economic empowerment of the people. No party should make a question of win or 
lose in democratic procedures. All parties need to be sensitive for communal harmony 
and historical coexistence. No model is perfect. Thus, sincerity in implementation and 
other arrangements, to make any model perfect, need to adopt to compensate weaknesses 
of certain model. 
The credibility of parties, considering intra-party fractured pictures and politics 
for the power they are playing so far, is seriously damaged. To rescue the country from 
the present political stalemate, however, they are the ones who need to forge a consensus 
and abide by fair play based on democratic norms putting national interest and people’s 
desire to change at center. There is no alternative way forward towards political 
consensus or abide by democratic procedures for any political decisions. They have to 
come with a clear cut vision and roadmap for democratic federalization. They need to 
work together to provide a justification to rely upon them again. 
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APPENDIX: CASTE, ETHNICITY AND LANGUAGE IN NEPAL431 
1. Parbatiyas (Nepali speaking)       40.3% 
Twice born:    
Brahmans:    12.9% 
    Thakuris    1.6% 
    Chhetries(khasas)    16.1% 
Renouncers:    
Dasnami, sanyasi and Yogi  1% 
Untouchable:     
Kami(Metal worker)   5.2%   
Damai(Tailors)   2.0%  
Sarki(Cobblers)   1.5% 
 
2. Newars (Newar or Nepali speaking)      5.6% 
Higher pure caste: 
    Brahmans    0.1% 
    Bajracharya/ Shakya    0.6%  
    Shresthas    1.1% 
    Uray (tuladhars etc.)   0.4%  
Other Pure caste: 
    Maharjans(jyapus)   2.3% 
    Ekthariyas and other small groups 0.7% 
Impure caste (Khadgi, Pode etc.):     0.4% 
     
3. Hill or Mountain ethnic groups (Tibeto burman language or Nepali)  20.9% 
     Magars    7.2% 
     Tamang    5.5% 
     Rai     2.8% 
     Gurung    2.4% 
     Limbu     1.6% 
     Sherpa     0.6% 
     Chepang    0.2% 
     Sunuwars    0.2% 
     Bhotiyas    0.1% 
     Thakalis    0.1% 
Thamis    0.1% 
4. Madhesis(Speaking north indian dialects, including Awadhi, 
 Bhojpuri and Maithili)        32.0% 
 a)Caste (16.1%) 
  Twice born:   
Brahamans    1.0% 
                                                 
 431 John Whelpton, A History of Nepal, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9–10. 
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     Kshatriyas:  Rajput   0.3% 
       Kayastha   0.3%  
       Rajbhats   0.2% 
     Vaishyas(Baniyas)   0.5% 
 
  Other Pure Caste:   
Yadhav (herdsman)  4.1%  
  Kushawahas(Vegetable growers) 1.1% 
  Kurmi(Cultivators)   0.9% 
  Mallahs (Fisherman)  0.6% 
  Kewats(Fisherman)   0.5% 
  Kumhars(Potters)   0.3% 
  Halwais (Confectioners) 0.2% 
 
                            Impure but touchable:   
  Kalawars(Brewers/merchants) 0.9% 
  Dhobis(washerman)   0.4% 
  Telis(Oil-Pressers)   0.4% 
 
                            Untouchable: Chamars(Leather worker)  1.1% 
  Dushandhs(Basket makers)  0.5% 
  Khatawes(labourers)   0.4% 
  Musahars(Labourers)   0.8% 
  
           b) Ethnic group (9.0%) 
                             Inner Terai:  Kumals    0.4% 
  Majhis     0.3% 
  Danuwars    0.3% 
  Darais     0.1%  
                            Terai proper:  
  Tharus     6.5% 
  Dhanukas    0.7% 
  Rajbanshis    0.4% 
  Gangais    0.1%  
  Dhimals    0.1%    
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